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ABSTRACT 
The key objective of this research is to examine various issues relating to trades of UK 
directors (insiders’) in their company shares. Specifically, we examine the general 
patterns and characteristics of directors’ trades, the seasonality patterns of aggregate 
directors’ trades (measured by insider aggregate number and value of insider trading 
activities), the impact that director’s age has on trade informativeness, and the effect 
of industry classification on the information content of directors’ trades. To the best of 
our knowledge, no empirical examination of these issues has yet to be examined. 
When examining the general patterns and characteristics of directors’ trades, we find 
that directors buy more frequently than they sell but the average value of sell trades 
are approximately seven times larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently 
but in larger monetary amounts. Furthermore, the majority of trades occur for directors 
aged between 45 and 65. Small transactions tend to be purchases while large 
transactions tend to be sells. The majority of the trades were by former directors (for 
both transaction types) followed by executive and non- executive directors. The 
majority of trades occurred in the financial industry. When examining the seasonal 
patterns of aggregate directors’ trades (as measured by the number and the value of 
insider transactions), the results show that there is a day of the week anomaly in 
aggregate insider activities. Insiders tend to trade more on Fridays and less on 
Tuesdays. Also, there is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as 
measured by the number of insider transactions). Specifically, insiders tend to trade 
more in March and trade less in August. The impact of director’s age is also examined, 
and the results suggest that younger directors’ buy transactions produce significantly 
higher abnormal returns than older directors. There is some evidence of statistically 
significantly negative CAARs for younger directors’ sell trades. When controlling for 
director type, we find that younger executives (formers) are more informed about their 
buy trades than executives (formers) of other age groups. Unlike the previous pattern, 
older non-executives (over 70) seem to be more informed about their buy trades than 
younger non-executives. Finally, the results of whether industry classifications have 
an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades indicate that abnormal returns are 
highest for directors of technology industries. The level of information asymmetry has 
an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. Specifically, insider gains are 
highest, for directors, in high R&D, high volatility, low regulated, highly 
concentrated, and low CEO compensation industries/sectors. 
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Chapter 1:  General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
This thesis is organised in seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
thesis while the second chapter reviews previous studies relating to the 
informativeness of insider transactions as well the theoretical arguments, for 
and against, insider trading activities. Chapter three describes the 
characteristics and patterns of insider trading activities pertaining specifically 
to UK directors over the period 1991-2010. In the following chapter, we test 
for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading activities, as measured by the 
aggregate number and value of insider transactions. The impact of directors’ 
age and industry classifications on the informativeness of directors’ trades are 
investigated in chapters five and six respectively. Finally, chapter seven 
concludes the thesis by summarising the findings. 
This chapter lays the foundation for this thesis. Firstly, it justifies the research 
in section (1.2), and then it defines the term of insider trading in section (1.3). 
Section (1.4) explains the importance of this research, whereas the research 
objectives are presented in section (1.5), section (1.6) addresses the data and 
the methodology used to test the research hypotheses. The research limitations 
are outlined in section (1.7) and finally the thesis structure is presented in 
section (1.8). 
1.2 Insider Trading and Financial Analysis 
Financial analysis is defined as the process of identifying financial strengths 
and weaknesses of the firm by examining historical financial data to gain 
information about the current and future financial health of a company. 
Financial analysis gives managers (and investors) the information they need to 
make management (and investment) decisions.  
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Financial analysis serves the following purposes: measuring the profitability, 
indicating the trend of achievements, assessing the growth potential of the 
business, comparative position in relation to other firms, assessing overall 
financial strength, and assessing solvency of the firm.  
Different parties benefit from the analysis of financial statements for different 
reasons. For example, investors who are interested in the earning capacity of 
the business and its prospects of future growth; managers who are interested in 
the financial position and performance of the enterprise. Other parties who may 
use financial analysis are lenders interested to know the solvency position of 
the entity and regulators interested to know if a company’s statements are 
consistent with accounting standards and the rules of the SEC;  and employee who 
are interested to know the growth of profit
1
. 
One piece of information can be used by these parties is other trades by 
company directors in their own company shares, because these directors often 
have access to private information not in public domain, we refer to them as 
insider trades. Outside investors have attempted to extract the information 
contained in their trades in attempt to make more informative investment 
choices. Furthermore, any systematic patterns in their trades can be exploited 
for the same reasons.  
The aim of this thesis is to examine the general patterns and characteristics of 
director trading as well as to contribute to the previous literature on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades by examining the impact of age and 
industry classifications on the informativeness of directors’ trades.  
1.3 Insider Trading by Definition 
Insiders can include directors, managers or employees of a company, or they 
can refer to persons who can access private information indirectly from such 
managers or directors. In the context of insider trading, this information can be 
called inside information. This inside information can be accessed by many 
users and, therefore, can be used to gain abnormal returns. For the purpose of 
this thesis, insider trading refers to buying, or selling, shares by corporate 
                                                          
1
 The increase in profits may enable employee to ask for an increase in their salaries.  
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insiders of their own firms for which they have superior information not 
publicly available (not disclosed yet). Seyhun (1992) and Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) defined insider trading as stock transactions by officers, directors, key 
employees, and shareholders holding more than 10% of any equity class
2
. 
Ajlouni and Toms (2008) defined insiders as those persons who have access to 
the firm's inside information. Hence, they include not only firm's directors, 
officers, and staff, but also the firm's external advisers, such as bankers, 
auditors, lawyers, and financial advisers. Insiders, according to Fidrmuc 
(2006), are “managers and members of the board of directors of publicly traded 
corporations, usually possess more information about their company than do 
(small) outside shareholders”. 
A distinguishing needs to be made between legal and illegal insider trading. 
Illegal insider trading is defined as trading activities by officers, directors, or 
employees possessing private information (price sensitive information or 
material information) not in public domain yet (Meulbroek, 1992).  Moreover, 
Illegal insider transaction is one by which directors have their trades on 
information that the public have not or cannot access. An example of legitimist 
insider trading is when a director buys his or her company stocks because he or 
she is confident in his or her own ability to improve his or her company’s 
performance.  
 An example of illegal insider trading is a director of a mobile company having 
private information about a new product release and buying more shares in the 
firm, from which he or she may benefit after the disclosure of this information. 
Another instance, a director of a company has lunch with her financial advisor 
and shares private information that the said company’s annual reports have 
been consistently overstating profitability in recent years. The financial advisor 
then recommends to clients that they sell shares in the said company, and when 
the information becomes public those who sold such shares benefit.  
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. However, ex post, 
academics have attempted to distinguish between those trades that outside 
investors view as being informative and those that are simply noise.  
                                                          
2
 The term officers covers the company president, principal of financial officer, principal of 
accounting officer, president in charge of any principal business unit, division, or function 
(sales, administration, or finance), and any other person who performs a policy-making 
function within the firm (Bettis et al 2000). 
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The literature which pertains to the informativeness of insider trades has 
attempted to apply various filters in order to distinguish between the two. For 
example, transaction, director and firm characteristics are often used in order to 
identify the information contained in specific trades. For example, Lorie and 
Niederhoffer (1968), Barclay and Warner (1992), Chakravarty (2001), and 
Friederich, et al. (2002) examined how the informativeness of directors’ trades 
varies with trade size. King and Roll (1988), Pope et al. (1990), Hillier and 
Marshall (2002), and Gregory et al. (2009) studied how the informativeness 
varies with transaction type. Seyhun (1986), Gregory et al. (1994), Fidrmuc et 
al. (2006), Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008), and Gregory et al (2011) reported that 
directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. 
One aim of this thesis is to contribute to this debate. In chapter five, we inquire 
as to whether the age of a director at the time he or she transacts is viewed by 
outsiders as being relevant in determining whether the trades were informed or 
not. In chapter six, we examine whether the information contained in directors’ 
trades varies with the industry in which the firm belongs.  
To the best of our knowledge, both of these empirical questions have yet to be 
addressed. Furthermore, in chapters three and four, we examine the general 
patterns and characteristics of aggregate directors’ trades and test for the 
existence of seasonal patterns that can potentially be exploited by outside 
investors. Thus, many issues that are relevant to regulators, who monitor 
insider trades, and outside investors who can use their information as a basis or 
their investment decisions.  
1.4 The Significance of the Research 
This thesis examines four topics in the general area of insider trading. Chapter 
three investigates the general patterns and characteristics of directors’ trades. 
Chapter four examines the seasonality patterns of aggregate directors’ trades 
(measured by insider aggregate number and value of insider trading activities). 
The impact that director’s age has on trade informativeness and the effect of 
industry classification on the informativeness of directors’ trades will be 
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examined in chapter five and six respectively. To the best of our knowledge, no 
examination of these issues has yet to be examined.  
Chapter three will describe the dataset used in this thesis to analyze the 
information content of insider trading. The objective is to familiarize the reader 
with some important characteristics of insider trading activities. By identifying 
these characteristics and patterns, investors might be more able to make better 
decisions (Seyhun, 2000). For example, suppose an investor would like to use 
insider trading to help guide a portfolio decision. The first question the investor 
would ask is how often insider trades occur for a typical stock? If an insider 
trade is expected to occur once in every other month, then the investor would 
have a sufficient buy and sell signals to monitor his/her portfolio decision. 
One aim of chapter four is to test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider 
trading transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider number and value of 
insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to trade on any particular 
day of the week or month of the year? A second aim of chapter four, given that 
such seasonal patterns exist, will be to attempt to relate these patterns to 
explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies (in returns and 
volumes). The previous literature on calendar anomalies has been on returns 
.i.e. do returns vary by month of the year or day of the week? This literature 
has attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to 
explain their existence. For example, Cross (1973) and French (1980) reported 
negative returns on Monday. This is maybe due to the methodology employed 
or the way of calculating returns (Connoly, 1989), investor psychology 
(Rystrom and Benson, 1989), the difference in trading patterns of individual 
and institutional investors (Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990), or settlement 
procedures (Keef and McGuiness, 2001). Similarly, studies by Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976), Keim (1983) and Gu (2006) documented positive returns on 
January. . Also, the literature on trading volume suggests that Monday’s 
trading volume is higher compared to other days of the week. More 
specifically, investors sell more on Monday if they are individual investors and 
sell less if they are institutional investors. This is maybe due to the private 
information hypothesis (Sias and Starks, 1995), and the behavior of individual 
and institutional investors (Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990) The existence of 
monthly anomalies can be explained by a tax loss selling hypothesis (Fountas 
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and Segredakis, 2002), capital gains taxation (Constantinides, 1984), window 
dressing hypothesis (Haugen and Lakonishok, 1987), new information 
provided by the firms at the end of the financial year (Barry and Brown, 1984), 
or insider trading activities (Seyhun, 1988b, and Hillier and Marshall, 2002a). 
Also, the turn of the year effect might be due to director trading activities as 
measured by the aggregate number of directors’ trades (Seyhun, 1988b, and 
Hillier and Marshall, 2002a).  
Previous empirical literature in the general area of insider trading has found 
that the informativeness of directors’ trades differs with trade, firm, and 
director characteristics. For example, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Barclay 
and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001), and Friederich, et al. (2002) examined 
how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade size. Medium-
sized trades (where the information exists) were found to be more informative 
than other sized trades. King and Roll (1988), Pope et al. (1990), Hillier and 
Marshall (2002b), and Gregory et al. (2009) studied how the informativeness 
varies with transaction type. Directors’ buys are, generally, more informative 
than sales. Specifically, positive (and significant) abnormal returns are 
associated with buy trades, and negative (and insignificant) abnormal returns 
are associated with sale trades. Seyhun (1988a), Gregory et al. (1994), Fidrmuc 
et al. (2006), Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008), and Gregory et al (2012) reported 
that directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades 
in large firms. Degryse et al. (2009), Gregory et al. (2009), and Knewtson 
(2011) documented higher abnormal returns associated with executives’ trades, 
whereas Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Jeng et al (2003) found that there is no 
impact of directors’ type on the informativeness of directors’ trades (for 
example, there is no difference in the informativeness between Executive and 
Non-Executive directors).  
By using a certain type of individuals which are directors, the purpose of 
chapter five is to examine whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades 
varies with age. There are many reasons why financial decisions may vary with 
life cycle. Psychological and physical studies concerning age suggested that 
memory and cognitive abilities decline with age (Gunesh and Merli, 2011; Fair 
2007; and Grady and Craik, 2000). Intelligence level also declines with age 
(Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997). Introducing socioeconomic and demographic 
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factors such as education, income, wealth, race, ethnicity, and gender can lower 
the adverse effects of cognitive aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). Financial 
literature also suggests there are opposing effects of age. On one hand, older 
investors who have more experience and greater investment knowledge are 
more likely to make effective financial decisions (Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). On the other hand, the possibility to make 
unsuitable decisions increases as the director get older due to memory decline 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij, et al. 2007).  
Finally, there are also many reasons why the informativeness of directors’ 
trades may vary across industries. These are related to information asymmetry 
differences across industries. Many measures of information asymmetry such 
as Research and Development expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 2000), industry 
regulation (Knewtson, 2011), industry concentration (Gugler, 2001; Blair, 
1995; Chu and Song, 2011), and directors pay (Jung and Subramanian, 2013) 
have been shown to vary across industries. This variation may enable directors 
in certain industries to exploit information, trade on the basis of this 
information and this should manifest itself in higher abnormal returns (Aboody 
and Lev, 2000). Thus, the aim of chapter six is twofold; Firstly, to examine 
whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies among different 
industries, and secondly, to investigate whether the level of information 
asymmetry in an industry influences the informativeness of directors’ trades.  
1.5 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this thesis is to comprehensively examine the following 
principles: 
Objective 1: to analyse the increasing body of literature considering the 
information content of insider trading, the timing behaviour of insiders’ 
activities, and other issues. This could provide readers, researchers, and 
newcomers with an insight into how these concepts have been researched, been 
developed, and been linked over time. 
Objective 2: to describe insider trading behaviour by describing the general 
characteristics, patterns, and activities of UK directors (Chapter 3). 
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Objective 3: to search for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading 
transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider number and value of insider 
transactions). Given that such seasonal patterns exist, there is an attempt to 
relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on calendar 
anomalies in returns (Chapter 4). 
Objective 4: to examine whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades 
varies with age or whether the age has an impact upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades (Chapter 5). 
Objective 5: to examine whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades 
varies among different industries, and whether the level of information 
asymmetry in an industry influences the informativeness of directors’ trades 
(Chapter 6). 
1.6 Data and Methodology 
This study is based on data supplied by two different data sources for the 
period January 1991 to December 2010. 
1) Directus Ltd compiled a complete record of director’s trades in the United 
Kingdom.  
2) Directors Deals, which monitors and analyses share transactions made by 
directors in their own companies (sometimes known as Insider Deals).  
This period yields a sample of 181,275 trades for every publicly disclosed 
transaction by UK directors in their own firms. The data covers trades by UK 
directors in both UK and Alternative Investment Markets over the period under 
examination. 
The focus of this thesis will be only on ordinary shares purchases and sales by 
UK directors over the period 1991-2010. We removed trades
3
 other than open 
market purchases and sales of ordinary shares by directors. Open market sales 
and purchases are more likely to represent actions taken because of special 
insider information (Seyhun, 1988; Gregory et al., 1994; and Friederich et al., 
                                                          
3
 We removed trades such as option exercise, derivative, script dividends or bonus shares, 
rights issue, awards made to directors under Incentive plans or reinvestment plans, gifts, 
transfers and purchase, and sales of shares under personal equity plans, operations derived 
from tax or “bed & breakfast” 
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2002). Therefore, the sample includes 92,093 trades divided into 70,067 buy  
trades and 22,026 sale ones over the period 1991 to 2010, with a total monetary 
value of £29 billion. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is a much larger dataset that has ever been 
used in similar UK studies. For example, Fidrmuc, et al. (2006) used the FTSE 
all small firms (the study covers the years 1991-1998), whilst Ajlouni and 
Toms (2008) have used the FTSE 100 firms (this study covers the years 1999-
2000).  
The methodologies employed in this thesis vary according to the objectives of 
each chapter. More specifically, descriptive statistics to highlight insider 
trading patterns are employed in chapter three, whereas the linear regression 
model and the ordinary least squares-method (OLS), TOBIT regression model 
(which is a concord form of OLS model), and K-W statistic test are used in 
chapter four to investigate the seasonal pattern of director trading activities 
(measured by the aggregate number and value of director transactions). In 
chapters five and six, standard event study methodology based on the market 
model and market adjusted model is employed using announcement dates as 
the event dates to construct the abnormal returns. To examine whether the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with the director’s age (and industry 
classifications), a Univariate and multivariate regressions are used.  
1.7 Research Limitations 
The first limitation is that the period 2002-2010 contained more detailed 
information about directors’ activities. Moreover, before 2002, the data covers 
only specific information about directors’ trades such as company name, 
transaction and announcement date, transaction price, transaction amount, 
transaction value, transaction type and transaction class. After 2002, the data 
set contained more detailed information such as holding, holding changes, 
holding percentages, and company International Securities Identification 
Numbers
4
.  
Due to the lack of available data on director age, we are only able to cover the 
periods 1991-1997 and 2002-2010.  
                                                          
4
 This piece of information is discussed in more details in the first empirical chapter. 
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Because of data availability on directors’ types, the sample analysed covers 
only 37% of total available trades during the sample period. More specifically, 
the period under examination starts at January 2002 and ends at December 
2010.  
Again, due to the lack of available data on director Industry/sector, we are only 
able to cover the period 2000-2010. This covers approximately 64% of total 
available trades.  
Finally, the data on company International Securities Identification Numbers, 
which will be used to collect daily returns and market values and other 
variables needed to examine the hypotheses, covered only the period 2002-
2010.  
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One: General Introduction 
This is an introductory chapter to the thesis.  
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to insider trading activities 
and the debate, for and against, their activities.  
Chapter Three: Patterns and Characteristics of Aggregate Insider Transactions 
in the UK 1990-2010 
This chapter describes the general patterns and characteristics of insider 
trading activities in the UK over the period 1990-2010.  
Chapter Four: Seasonal Patterns of Aggregate Directors’ Trades 
This chapter tests for seasonal patterns of aggregate directors’ trades, as 
measured by the number and value of insider transactions.  
Chapter Five: The Informativeness of Directors’ Age 
This chapter explores whether the informativeness of directors’ trades 
varies with age.  
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Chapter Six: The Informativeness of Directors Trades: The Impact of Industry 
Classifications 
This chapter examines whether the informativeness of UK directors’ 
trades varies among different industries and whether the level of 
information asymmetry in an industry influences the informativeness of 
directors’ trades 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
This chapter concludes and summarises the results of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
As the key objective of this research is to examine various issues related to 
insiders’ trades, particularly, the general patterns and characteristics of 
directors’ trades, the seasonality patterns of aggregate directors’ trades 
(measured by insider aggregate number, volume, and value of insider trading 
activities), the impact that director’s age has on trade informativeness, and the 
effect of industry classification on the informativeness of directors’ trades, this 
chapter critically reviews the relevant literature of insider trading activities. It 
analyses the increasing body of the literature, considering the information 
content of insider trading, the timing behaviour of insiders’ activities, and other 
issues. This could provide readers, researchers, and newcomers with an insight 
into how these concepts have been researched, been developed, and been 
linked over time.  
The remainder of the chapter is to review insider trading literature regarding 
the informativeness of directors’ trades, the timing behaviour of directors’ 
trades, the methodological employed in examining various insider trading 
hypotheses, and other studies relating to insider trading activities. The chapter 
concludes with a summary given in the last section. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature on insider trading drawing on research in the 
UK and other countries. Following that, the literature on insider trading for 
each sub-section is divided according to smaller categories in similar fashion to 
Clacher, Hillier and Lhaopadchan, (2009). These categories are; 
1. The information content of corporate insider trading 
activities; and 
2. The timing behaviour of corporate insider trades.  
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In addition to the previous channels, we also review the methodological 
approaches and other evidences in separate sections. 
2.2.1  International Evidence 
This section reviews the literature on insider trading based on research held in 
different countries except UK. 
2.2.1.1 The information Content of Insider Trading 
In this section, insider trading studies that examined the existence of abnormal 
trading performance and the informativeness of directors’ trades are presented. 
Early insider trading studies focused on the relationship between insider 
trading activities and stock market movements (changes). For example, Rogoff 
(1964) examined this relation using a sample of 45 companies in which, within 
a single month, three or more insiders bought their company’s stocks and no 
insiders sold the stocks. The results showed that the returns to the insiders of 
these companies in the following six months were approximately 10% higher 
than the return to the stock market as a whole. Similarly, but using a sample of 
companies’ directors where at least two more buyers than sellers or at least two 
more sellers than buyers, Lorie and Neiderhoffer (1968), Pratt and DeVere 
(1970), and Jaffe (1974) found that insiders are able to earn higher abnormal 
returns. Additionally the following pattern emerges: directors’ purchases tend 
to be followed by purchases and directors’ sales by sales, and they are also net 
purchases of their firm shares. This pattern emerged again in a study by 
Chowdhury et al. (1993). Furthermore, studies by Seyhun (1986, 1992) and Lin 
and Howe (1990) examined the relationship between insider trading activities 
and returns. These studies indicated that insiders are able not only to earn 
abnormal returns, but also to predict abnormal future stock price changes i.e. 
insiders purchase stocks before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stocks 
before an abnormal decline in stock prices. Unlike the previous findings, Wu 
(1963) found no relationship between insider trading activities and stock 
market movements, using a sample of fifty firms over the period 1957-1961. 
Therefore, insider’s knowledge is not valuable for both the managerial 
authorities and the investors. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Lin and Howe 
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(1990) showed that once transaction costs were controlled, the abnormal 
returns to insiders’ trades disappeared. 
Moreover, previous insider trading studies examined whether the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, firm, and director 
characteristics. 
Using US data, Barclay and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001), Lebedeva, 
Maug and Schneider, (2009), and Abad and Pascual (2011) examined whether 
the informativeness of directors’ trades vary with trade size across insider 
groups, and found that medium-size trades are more informative than other-
size trades (small or large trades). One explanation given is that privately 
informed traders would concentrate their trades in medium-size trades because 
small trades are expensive in term of trading cost and large trades might give 
them away. In the same vein, Seyhun (2000) argued that insiders broke up their 
large trades into smaller medium-size trades to avoid being caught by 
regulation authorities. Another explanation arises; directors act as liquidity 
traders who have no superior information and try to reduce price impact from 
trading large shares (Abad and Pascual, 2011). In Germany, Aussenegg and 
Ranzi (2008) showed that large volume sell trades reveal less information 
about the firm value than small volume sell trades do. These studies have used 
the number of shares as a measure of trade size.  
Also, transaction type has been shown to have an impact upon the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1988a), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Aktas, De Boot and Oppens, (2008), and 
Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008) showed that buy transactions are more 
informative than sell transactions. This is because market participants view the 
insignificance of sell trades to be motivated by liquidity/diversification needs. 
On the other side, market participants view the significance of buy trades to be 
motivated by information advantages. Scott and Xu (2004) examined the 
informativeness of directors’ sells. More specifically, this study tried to 
separate sales driven by liquidity or diversification needs from those driven by 
insiders’ superior information. For that reason, they used the number of shares 
traded as a percentage of insiders’ holdings. The results indicated that when 
insiders have negative information about their firms’ future prospects, their 
sells are likely to be large in volume and to stand for a large portion of their 
holdings. Furthermore, small sells that accounted for small percentages of 
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insiders’ holdings may show owners’ need to raise income and reflect their 
attitudes towards their company which, in turn, lower their sells transactions as 
a percentage of their holdings.  Using a sample of US companies, Aussenegg 
and Ranzi (2010) reported significantly positive abnormal returns associated 
with buy trades, but sell trades, unlike the previous studies, did not reveal 
negative private information.  
Unlike the previous studies, Aktas et al. (2008) found positive abnormal 
returns associated with sell transactions and insignificant abnormal returns 
associated with buy transactions.   Also, Degryse et al. (2009) examined the 
information content of corporate insiders’ trades in Dutch listed firms. The 
results implied significantly large abnormal returns associated with insiders’ 
buys and significantly low abnormal returns associated with insiders’ sells.  
When examining the impact of some trade characteristics such as size, number, 
and direction of the trade, Meulbroek (1992) found that these characteristics 
lead inside information to be incorporate into price. 
Tavakoli, McMillan and McKnight, (2012) examined the informativeness of 
directors’ trades by using three measures of insiders’ activities (number of 
trades, volume of trades, and the value of trades). Their results revealed the 
following: when net buys are positive (negative), future returns are positive 
(negative) because of the belief that future firm value would increase.  
The impact of firm size on the informativeness of directors’ trades is also 
analysed by a number of studies. For example, studies by William (1986), 
Seyhun (1988a), Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008), Hotsen et al. (2008) and 
Tavakoli, McMillan and McKnight, (2012) found that directors’ trades in small 
firms are more informative than directors’ trades in large firms. There are 
many reasons why insiders in small firms are more informative than insiders in 
large firms. These reasons are; large firms tend to have more non-executive 
directors than small firms, or that directors’ trades in large firms are more 
public which makes stock market react faster. Additionally, directors’ trades in 
small firms are more informative because directors in small firms might have 
more relevant information, or because financial analyst have less attention to 
directors’ trades in small firms (Ataullah et al., 2012). These studies, however, 
used market value (capitalization) as a measure of firm size. Other studies such 
as Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013) used another 
measure of firm size which is the book to market value. Madura and Wiant 
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(1995) examined whether bank size has an impact on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. The results showed that insiders in small banks are more 
informative than insiders of large banks.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) further explored the impact of earning to price ratio, 
as a measure of the performance of insider trading, on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. They found that insiders in small firms with high earning to 
price ratio tend to buy, whereas insiders in large firms tend to sell.  
Zhang, Cahan and Allen, (2005) examined whether there is a relationship 
between insiders’ activities and pay to performance and reported low (high) 
insiders’ activities are associated with high (low) pay to performance. . 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2003) examined whether directors base their trades on 
superior information about firm’s future returns and earning performance. The 
results showed that trades by insiders are positively associated with the firm’s 
future earnings performance. Also, the behaviour of insider trading varies with 
the horizon of earning news within each book to market group. Moreover, 
directors’ buys are significantly positive and related to next year’s earning 
news. Also, for glamour (value) firms, the relation between directors’ buys and 
earnings are negative (positive).  
Other studies, such as Aboody and Lev (2000), Barth et al. (2001) and Joseph 
and Wintoki (2013), investigated the relation between insider trading profits 
and the superiority of insider information or whether investment in advertising 
has an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. More specifically, 
Aboody and Lev (2000) showed that insider trading gains are lower for firms 
with low or no R&D expenditures, Barth et al. (2001) found that firms with 
more investment of intangible assets are associated with higher analyst 
following, and Joseph and Wintoki (2013) showed that directors’ trades at 
firms characterised by high advertising investment are more informative than 
directors’ trades at firms characterised by low or no advertising investments.  
Frankel and Li (2002) examined the impact of firm’s financial characteristics 
(financial statements, analyst following, and firm information provided by 
voluntary disclosures) on determining their effects on information asymmetry 
between managers and outsiders. The results suggested that increasing the 
informativeness of financial statements has an impact on managers’ ability to 
predict future returns. Insiders buy less frequently when financial statements 
are more informative and when more analysts follow the firm.  
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Studies by Seyhun (1988a) and Jenter (2005), assumed that directors who 
involve more in firm’s daily operations, such as the chairman of the board of 
directors or officer-directors, are more able to predict any changes in future 
stock price than officers or shareholders alone. The results showed that top 
managers tend to have contrarian views regarding their own firm shares. 
Therefore, high valuation firms’ managers view their shares as overpriced, and 
low valuation firms managers view their shares as underpriced. Furthermore, 
undervalued firms experience net insider buying and have capital structures 
that reflect such undervaluation. Degryse et al. (2009) implied that top 
executive purchases in small and value
5
 firms are more informative than top 
executive purchases in large firms. Besides, high abnormal returns are 
associated with large holdings prior to top executive purchases, and low 
abnormal returns are associated with large purchases. This is because executive 
directors are more involved in the firm’s daily operations than other directors. 
Knewtson (2011) and Wang, Shin and Francis, (2012) examined the impact of 
CEOs and CFOs on the informativeness of directors’ trades. The results 
showed that buy trades by CFOs are more informative than those by CEOs .i.e. 
Abnormal returns associated with CFOs buy trades are higher than abnormal 
returns associated with CEOs buy trades. This is because CFOs are responsible 
for the firm’s financial strategies and financial reporting which allow them to 
have more detailed and unique information than CEOs. . On the other hand, 
Jeng et al. (2003) found no impact of director’s type upon the informativeness 
of directors’ trades. Also, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) showed that abnormal 
returns associated with independent (non-executive) directors’ buy transactions 
are positive.  
Hillier, Korczak and Korczak, (2013) examined whether individual 
characteristics (such as skills, expertise, or personality) have an impact on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. They found that firm or observable 
characteristics have less influence on insider trading performance than 
individual characteristics do. Also, superior return performance of top 
executives (CEOs and CFOs) can be due to their better expertise and skills and 
not preferential access to firm information. 
                                                          
5
 Value firms are firms that have low stock price compared to their accounting value. 
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Finally, Degryse et al. (2009) and Lebedeva (2012) reported that in less liquid 
market, insiders trade more slowly if they compete with other insiders, and 
trade faster under private information assumption. 
2.2.1.2  Timing Behaviour of Corporate Insider Trades 
The second major theme in insider trading research is concerned with an 
analysis of insider trading behaviour around firm specific information events 
(such as dividend announcements, merger announcements, and earning 
announcements).  
 The second major theme in insider trading research is concerned with an 
analysis of insider trading behaviour around firm specific information events 
(such as dividend announcements, merger announcements, and earning 
announcements).  
 Elliot Morse, and Richardson (1984), Givoly and Palmon (1985), and 
Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988) investigated insider trading relative to 
specific corporate announcements. Different from Penman’s findings, these 
studies concluded that only a small proportion of insider trades may be related 
to firm-specific announcements. Elliot, Morse, and Richardson tried to test 
whether insiders can earn abnormal profits from advance knowledge of new 
announcements prior to their release to the public. Specifically, the authors 
studied abnormal returns generated before and after the public disclosure of 
information concerning dividends, earnings, bond ratings, mergers, and 
bankruptcies. Specifically, they examined the distribution and the general 
patters of insider trading activities surrounding public announcements. This 
will help indicating unusual insider trading patterns as well as providing insight 
why insiders trade. They used two measures of insider trading activities; the 
net number of buyers/sellers and percentage of shares purchased or sold
6
. 
Insider trading behavior was examined surrounding four good-news events
7
 
and four bad-news events
8
.The results indicated that insiders with private 
                                                          
6 This variable is defined as the market value of shares bought minus the market value of 
shares sold divided by the market value of shares of the firm's common stock. 
7
 They are large earnings increases, large dividend increases, bond rating increases, and merger 
announcements.  
8
 They are large earnings decreases, large dividend decreases, bond rating decreases, and 
bankruptcy announcements.  
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information should purchase shares before the public release of good news that 
increase prices and should sell shares before the public release of bad news that 
decrease prices. If a speculative portfolio position is taken before the public 
announcement, then increased selling should follow the public announcement 
of good news and increased buying should follow the public announcement of 
bad news. More specifically, Reduced selling (and/or greater buying) was 
observed before merger announcements and before large earnings and 
dividends increases. This pattern was also observed before large earnings 
decreases and bankruptcy announcements. Also, extreme insider trading for the 
net buyer/seller measure was defined as the number of sellers exceeding the 
number of buyers by three or more for a given month or vice versa. Extreme 
insider trading for the percentage of shares measure was defined as sales in 
excess of .202% of the outstanding shares and purchases in excess of .226% of 
the outstanding shares. Accordingly, periods of intensive insider buying are 
expected to occur more frequently preceding good-news events and periods of 
intensive insider selling are expected to occur more frequently preceding bad-
news events. Therefore, trading strategy based on intensive trading by insiders 
yields greater abnormal returns. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) were unable to document a link between returns 
earned by insiders and specific disclosure announcements such as earnings and 
dividend announcements, whereas John and Lang (1991) and Del Brio and 
Miguel (2008) noted the relationship between insider trading and dividend 
changes, rather than earning announcements. Dividend increases accompanied 
by unusual insider buying signal good news, resulting in positive abnormal 
returns. The opposite is also true. LaPorta et al. (1997) found that, on average, 
value (growth) firms tend to have positive (negative) future earnings 
announcement period returns. Betzer and Theissen (2007) analysed both the 
profitability of insider trading and trading patterns around German earnings 
announcements. They reported that trading prior to earning announcements has 
a larger impact on prices. Another study in Hong Kong, Jaggi and Tsui (2007) 
examined the association between earning managements and insider selling 
after the end of the financial year, and found that executive directors reported 
earnings to maximise their private benefits from insider selling. Thus, the 
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relationship between insider selling and earnings can be moderated by the 
proportion of independent directors.  
Chiang and Chang (2012) studied the relation between insider trading and 
option returns around earnings announcements. The results indicated that 
investors who take advantage of insider trading information can earn a return 
premium by holding option contracts even after controlling for systematic risk, 
volatility risk, and transaction cost. 
Jeng et al. (1999) analysed all insider trades that took place in the US between 
1975 and 1996. The results suggested that the purchase portfolio does better 
than the market by about 7.4 per cent per year. About one-sixth of the 
abnormal returns arise within the first five days of a trade, one-third within the 
first month, and three-quarters within the first six months. Nevertheless, insider 
sales do not provide evidence to be economically or statistically significant. 
In Indiain capital markets, Agarwal and Singh (2006) examined trading 
activities by of insiders prior to merger announcement. The results showed that 
trading activities by insiders are higher (buying or selling shares) before 
merger announcement. Also in Germany, Li and Zhang (2006) looked at 
insider trading activities around financial restatement announcements, and 
found strong evidence of informed trading by insiders. Focusing on the 
association between net insider selling and restatement announcement 
abnormal returns, they provided evidence of net insider selling before the 
restatement announcements, little net insider selling immediately around the 
announcements, and net insider buying after the announcements. Ching et al. 
(2006) examined insider trading around seasoned equity offering 
announcements in Hong Kong. The results indicated positive (negative) 
abnormal returns associated with the announcement of placing (rights 
offerings). 
Noe (1999) examined insider trading around management forecasts of earnings 
and found the trading patterns to be unrelated to the forecasted earnings news, 
whereas Seyhun (1990) also confirmed that insiders in bidder firms traded 
more prior to the announcement of a takeover bid. 
Finally, evidence related to insider trading and bankruptcy is mixed. Gosnell et 
al. (1992) found that insiders sell prior to bankruptcy while Loderer and 
Sheehan (1989) did not find any evidence of selling.  
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2.2.2  UK Evidence 
This section reviews the literature on insider trading based on research held in 
the UK. 
2.2.2.1 The Information Content of Insider Trading 
King and Roll (1988) examined the profitability of insider trading in the UK 
over the period from January 1986 to August 1987. The sample excluded 
option exercises, rights issues, and new share issues. They found that abnormal 
returns persevere for up to one year after the publication. Ignoring transaction 
costs, investors using this published information were able to gain abnormal 
profits. Another finding was that the abnormal returns for buy trades were 
greater than the abnormal returns for sell trades. This is because insider sell 
decisions are more likely to happen for non-information based reasons than 
purchase decisions. Therefore, insider purchases, as a whole, may be a stronger 
signal than collective sales.  
Pope, Morris and Peel, (1990) tested whether directors in the UK, over the 
period 1977-1984, earned abnormal returns on their trades and whether the 
markets responded to their dealings. The main results implied positive average 
returns associated with insider purchases and negative average returns tend to 
follow insider sales. Nonetheless, only the insider sales tend to be significantly 
different from zero. 
Gregory et al. (1994) re-examined the UK results of significant abnormal 
returns from directors' trading, and found that abnormal returns tend to be 
associated with small firms. Later, Gregory et al. (1997) tested whether the 
number and the size of insider trades are related to the magnitude of 
subsequent abnormal returns. They used a dataset of non-option related trades 
over the period 1986-1990. They found that there is a size effect over the 
period under examination, and this effect was indeed variable (positive during 
1986-1988 and negative during 1989-1990). Thus, they concluded that it is 
necessary to choose correct the benchmark return model that controls for the 
size effect in this type of studies which examine abnormal returns over long-
post event windows and includes many small firms in the sample under 
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examination. Furthermore, it was found that signal definition is also important 
when obtaining results and drawing conclusions.  
Friederich and Tonks (2004) examined abnormal returns patterns in the days 
around directors’ trades which are consistent with director’s ability to predict 
short-term abnormal returns. Similar to earlier work, buy trades appear more 
informative than sells. Also, large abnormal returns are associated with buy 
trades that occur close to earning announcements.  
Calvo and Lasfer (2002) analysed trades conducted by insiders prior to 
transaction date, and whether insiders time their trades and whether market 
reaction varies with insiders’ superior knowledge. The following results 
emerged: insiders buy shares before price decreases and sell before the price 
increases, and abnormal returns associated with buy transactions are positive 
on the event date (and up to ten days event window) while abnormal returns 
associated with sell trades are negative for the same event windows. Therefore, 
insiders may convey information and outside investors may follow their trades.  
Hamill et al., (2002) examined the informativeness of UK small firms’ 
directors, and the relationship between excess returns and future financial 
performance of the firm. The results showed that buy trades produce 
significantly positive signals, whereas sell trades produce insignificantly 
negative signals. Therefore, outside investors may response positively to 
directors’ buys. Furthermore, and similar to Gregory et al.(1994), there is a 
positive association between excess returns and future performance.  
Fidrmuc, Georgen and Renneboog, (2004) explored the impact of the firms’ 
ownership and control structure on the informativeness of directors’ trades for 
all UK listed companies. The results showed that buy trades in firms with large 
directors’ holdings is less positive than that for buy trades in firms with low 
directors’ holdings, whereas sell trades in firms with large directors’ holdings 
is less negative. Also, market reaction to former directors’ buys (and poor 
performance firms’ buys) is the strongest. Besides, the informativeness of 
chairman executive officers’ trades is lower than that of other directors. 
Abnormal returns associated with buy trades are positive, whereas abnormal 
returns associated with sell trades are negative. Finally, the presence of block-
holders (corporations, or individuals or families) reduces the information 
asymmetry. Later, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) tested the informativeness of the 
trades of five types of directors in the UK (CEOs, other executive directors, 
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chairman, other incumbent directors, and former directors). The results implied 
that the CAARs for the various categories are not significantly different from 
each other. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) went step further by comparing abnormal 
returns associated with insiders’ trades between UK and US and found that 
abnormal returns in UK is higher than those in US. This difference is due to the 
difference in insider trading regulations between the two countries.  
Similarly, Gregory et al. (2009) examined whether the informativeness of 
directors’ trades varies with the director’s type (executive or non-executive 
director) and the director’s gender (male or female). The results were as 
follow: directors buy after a decrease in prices and sell after an increase in 
prices; this is consistent with the view that directors possess superior 
information about firm future prospects, buy trades produce positive signals; 
director’s gender has no impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades, 
whereas director’s type has an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ 
trades; similar to Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, (1997), directors of small 
companies are more informative than their counterparts in large companies; 
finally, the results confirmed the previous findings of Scott and Xu (2004). 
Extending the analysis, Gregory et al. (2012) suggested that although market 
react less to female trades, but abnormal returns associated with female 
executive trades are significantly higher than abnormal returns associated with 
male executive trades up to twenty days after the announcement dates (when 
controlling for the firm and trade characteristics). For longer event windows 
(three months to one year), market reaction to male and female trades is not 
significantly different, but female trades (concentrated in executive groups) are 
more informative than male trades.  
Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks, (2011) examined directors’ trades patterns and 
the long run returns to their activities in value (glamour) firms listed in London 
Stock Exchange between 1997 and 2003 and found the following results; with 
buys (sells) following price falls (rises), directors buy (sell) more value 
(glamour) shares; buy (sell) signals in value (glamour) shares produce 
significantly positive (insignificantly negative) abnormal returns. Larger 
abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller value stocks in particular.  
Ajlouni and Toms (2008) examined market reaction to FTSE100 directors’’ 
trading on their own firm’s ordinary buys and sells between 1999 and 2000. 
The results were in the same line with UK studies by King and Roll (1988), 
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Pope et al. (1990), and Friederich et al. (2002) which found positive abnormal 
returns associated with buy trades, and negative abnormal returns associated 
with sell trades. In long run (short run) event windows, directors of small firms 
earn significantly more returns than their counterparts in large firms. Moreover, 
outside investors can earn abnormal returns by observing insiders’ transactions.  
Giamouridis et al., (2008) examined the informativeness of directors’ trades in 
the UK during the period 1994-2006 and found positive abnormal returns are 
correlated with trade size as a percentage of outstanding shares, director’s type, 
and price momentum, whereas abnormal returns are negatively correlated with 
transaction value. Specifically,  large trades by executive directors are more 
informative than small trades by other directors.  
Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2011) examined the impact of aggregate insider 
trading on market returns in the UK. They found that, in the period surrounding 
the announcement dates, insiders are able to predict future returns; based on 
market to book ratio, insiders tend to buy shares with poor past performance. 
Market reaction to insiders’ trades in small firms is stronger than that in large 
firms, and insiders’ buy transactions convey information, whereas insiders’ sell 
transactions are not.  
Depending on a recent dataset on UK company director’s trades in the banking 
sector; Lambe (2010) attempted to disentangle the relationship between bank 
returns, the activities of bank insiders and a variable taken to represent the 
extent of media coverage of the financial crisis. They found that the 
relationship is slight, and, at a shorter horizon, the actions of insiders, when 
looked on aggregate, bear a relationship to that overall sector’s return. By using 
two samples of UK listed firms over the period 2001-2010 for announcements 
and rumours dates, Lambe (2011) reported significant abnormal returns prior to 
the public release of information. These abnormal returns are not due to 
reported informed trades, they are perhaps due to material information which is 
undisclosed and/or non-public.  
Fidrmuc et al. (2012) tested whether country-level shareholder protection has 
an impact on abnormal returns after insider trades. The results showed that 
shareholder protection has a positive impact on cumulative abnormal returns 
for both insiders’ buy and sell transactions.Besides, directors’ buy trades are 
more informative than directors’ sell trades because sell trades are likely to be 
driven by diversification and liquidity needs. 
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Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) examined the impact of Chief Executive 
Officers’ trades and Chief Financial Officers’ trades upon the informativeness 
of directors’ trades. The results showed that trades conducted by CEOs are 
more informative than trades conducted by CFOs.   
2.2.2.2 The Timing Behaviour of Corporate Insider Trades 
On the other hand, the effect of the London Stock Exchange Model Code, 
which bans directors from trading two months prior to their firm’s earning 
announcement, was examined by Hillier and Marshall (2002c). They found that 
insiders buy after abnormally bad earnings news and sell after good news. On 
the other hand, Kavussanos and Tsounia (2007) suggested that, on basis of 
advanced knowledge, insiders tend to trade regarding proceeding mergers.  
Tables (2.1) and (2.2) summarise the literature on the informativeness and the 
timing behaviour of directors’ trades for UK and other countries.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of the Literature Relating to the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades 
The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades 
Author (s) Sample Period Main Results 
Rogoff (1964)  The returns to insiders’ trades in the following six months were approximately 
10% higher than the return to the stock market as a whole. 
Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968)  1/ 50 to 12/60 Insiders are able to earn higher abnormal returns. Directors’ purchases tend to be 
followed by purchases and directors’ sales by sales, and insiders are also net 
purchases of their firm shares. 
Pratt and DeVere (1970) 1960-1966 
Jaffe (1974) 1962-1968 
Chowdhury et al. (1993) 1975-1986, Directors’ purchases tend to be followed by purchases and directors’ sales by 
sales, and insiders are also net purchases of their firm shares. 
Seyhun (1986)  1975-1981 Insiders purchase stocks before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stocks 
before an abnormal decline in stock prices. 
Lin and Howe (1990) 1/75-4/83 Insiders purchase stocks before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stocks 
before an abnormal decline in stock prices. Once transaction costs were 
controlled, the abnormal returns to insiders’ trades disappeared 
Seyhun (1992)   Insiders purchase stocks before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stocks 
before an abnormal decline in stock prices. 
Wu (1963)  No relationship between insider trading activities and stock market movements.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) 1957-1961 No abnormal returns to insiders’ trades once transaction costs are controlled.  
Directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. insiders in small firms with high earning to price ratio tend to buy, 
whereas insiders in large firms tend to sell. Directors’ buy transactions are 
positively related to both future earnings performance and book to market ratio, 
but negatively related to past returns. 
Barclay and Warner (1993) 1981- 1984 Medium-size trades are more informative than other-size trades (small or large 
trades). 
Seyhun (2000)  Insiders broke up their large trades into smaller medium-size trades to avoid 
being caught by regulation authorities. 
Chakravarty (2001) 6/84 to 8/84 Medium-size trades are more informative than other-size trades (small or large 
trades). Lebedeva et al., (2009)  
Abad and Pascual (2011) 7/00-12/06 
Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008) 2002-2007 Small volume trades reveal more information about the firm value than large 
volume trades do. Buy transactions are more informative than sell transactions. 
Directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 1975-1995 Buy transactions are more informative than sell transactions. 
Aktas, De Boot and Oppens, (2008) 1/99-11/05 Financial markets’ response does not significant for purchases and that the 
abnormal returns associated with the sales does not have the expected sign. 
Scott and Xu (2004) 1987-2002 When insiders have negative information about their firms’ future prospects, 
their sells are likely to be large in volume and to stand for a large portion of their 
holdings.  
Aussenegg and Ranzi (2010) 2002-2007 Positive abnormal returns associated with buy trades. 
Degryse et al., (2009) 9/02-12/07 Large abnormal returns associated with insiders’ buys and significantly low 
abnormal returns associated with insiders’ sells. Top executive purchases in 
small and value firms are more informative than top executive purchases in large 
firms. less liquid market, insiders trade more slowly if they compete with other 
insiders, and trade faster under private information assumption. 
Meulbroek (1992) 1980-1989 Trade-specific characteristics such as trade size, number of trades, or trade 
direction, as well as the total volume traded by the insider, lead to the 
incorporation of inside information into price. 
Tavakoli et al.,, (2012) 1/00-3/07 When net buys are positive (negative), future returns are positive (negative) 
because of the belief that future firm value would increase. Directors’ trades in 
small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in large firms. 
William (1986)  Directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. 
Seyhun (1988a) 1/75 to 10/81 Directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. Undervalued firms experience net insider buying and have capital 
structures that reflect such undervaluation. 
Hotsen et al. (2008) 7-12/ 2005 Directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades in 
large firms. Ataullah et al., (2012) 7/96-6/06 
Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013)  
Madura and Wiant (1995)  Insiders in small banks are more informative than insiders of large banks. 
Zhang, Cahan and Allen, (2005) 1978-1999 Low (high) insiders’ activities are associated with high (low) pay to performance. 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2003)  trades by insiders are positively associated with the firm’s future earnings 
performance. Directors’ buys are significantly positive and related to next year’s 
earning news. Also, for glamour (value) firms, the relation between directors’ 
buys and earnings are negative (positive). Directors’ buy transactions are 
positively related to both future earnings performance and book to market ratio, 
but negatively related to past returns. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) 1985-1997 Insider trading profits are higher for firms with R&D expenditures.  
Barth et al. (2001) 1993-1995 Increased analyst following for firms with more intangible assets.  
Joseph and Wintoki (2013) 1/86-12/11 Directors’ trades at firms characterised by high advertising investment are more 
informative than directors’ trades at firms characterised by low or no advertising 
investments. 
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Frankel and Li (2002)  Increasing the informativeness of financial statements has an impact on 
managers’ ability to predict future returns. Insiders buy less frequently when 
financial statements are more informative and when more analysts follow the 
firm. 
Wu and Zhu (2011) 1986-2005 Insiders trade, at least in part, on superior knowledge, and that the returns from 
insider trading are highly related to measures of firm level information 
asymmetry. 
Jenter (2005) 1992 - 2000 Undervalued firms experience net insider buying and have capital structures that 
reflect such undervaluation. 
Knewtson (2011) 1992-2009 Buy trades by CFOs are more informative than those by CEOs .i.e. Abnormal 
returns associated with CFOs buy trades are higher than abnormal returns 
associated with CEOs buy trades. 
Wang, Shin and Francis, (2012) 1/92-7/02 
Jeng et al., (2003) 1969-1972 No impact of director’s type upon the informativeness of directors’ trades. 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) 1986- 2003 Abnormal returns associated with independent (non-executive) directors’ buy 
transactions are positive. 
Hillier, Korczak and Korczak, 
(2013) 
 Individual characteristics have a much greater influence on insider trading 
performance than the firm or observable characteristics. Also, superior return 
performance of top executives (CEOs and CFOs) can be due to their better 
expertise and skills and not preferential access to firm information. 
Lebedeva (2012) 1997-2008 Less liquid market, insiders trade more slowly if they compete with other 
insiders, and trade faster under private information assumption. 
UK Evidence 
King and Roll (1988) 1986-1987 Ignoring transaction costs, investors using this published information were able 
to gain abnormal profits. abnormal returns for buy trades were greater than the 
abnormal returns for sell trades. 
Pope, Morris and Peel, (1990) 1977-1984 Positive average returns associated with insider purchases and negative 
average returns tend to follow insider sales. Nonetheless, only the insider sales 
tend to be significantly different from zero. 
Gregory et al. (1994) 1984-1986 Abnormal returns tend to be associated with small firms. 
Gregory et al. (1997) 1986-1990 There is a size effect over the period under examination, and this effect was 
indeed variable (positive during 1986-1988 and negative during 1989-1990). 
Directors of small companies are more informative than their counterparts in 
large companies. 
Friederich and Tonks (2004) 2/86-11/94 Buy trades appear more informative than sells. Also, large abnormal returns 
are associated with buy trades that occur close to earning announcements.  
Hillier and Marshall (2002b) I/l/92 - 12/96 Purchases by directors are more informative than sales.  
Calvo and Lasfer (2002) 1997-2001 Insiders buy shares before price decreases and sell before the price increases, 
and abnormal returns associated with buy transactions are positive on the event 
date (and up to ten days event window) while abnormal returns associated with 
sell trades are negative for the same event windows. 
Hamill et al., (2002) 1990-2000 Buy trades produce significantly positive signals, whereas sell trades produce 
insignificantly negative signals. Therefore, outside investors may response 
positively to directors’ buys. 
Fidrmuc et al., (2004) 1986-1990 buy trades in firms with large directors’ holdings is less positive than that for 
buy trades in firms with low directors’ holdings, whereas sell trades in firms 
with large directors’ holdings is less negative. The informativeness of 
chairman executive officers’ trades is lower than that of other directors. 
Abnormal returns associated with buy trades are positive, whereas abnormal 
returns associated with sell trades are negative. 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 1991-1998 Abnormal returns in UK are higher than those in US.  
Gregory et al. (2009) 1/94-9/06 Directors buy after a decrease in prices and sell after an increase in prices. 
Director’s gender has no impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades, 
whereas director’s type has an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ 
trades.  
Gregory et al. (2012) 1/94-9/06 Abnormal returns associated with female executive trades are significantly 
higher than abnormal returns associated with male executive trades up to 
twenty days after the announcement dates (when controlling for the firm and 
trade characteristics). 
Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks, (2011) 1997-2003 With buys (sells) following price falls (rises), directors buy (sell) more value 
(glamour) shares; buy (sell) signals in value (glamour) shares produce 
significantly positive (insignificantly negative) abnormal returns. Larger 
abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller value stocks in particular.  
Ajlouni and Toms (2008) 1999 -2000 Positive abnormal returns associated with buy trades, and negative abnormal 
returns associated with sell trades. In long run (short run) event windows, 
directors of small firms earn significantly more returns than their counterparts 
in large firms. 
Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2011) 1/99-12/03 Insiders are able to predict future returns; based on market to book ratio, 
insiders tend to buy shares with poor past performance. Market reaction to 
insiders’ trades in small firms is stronger than that in large firms, and insiders’ 
buy transactions convey information, whereas insiders’ sell transactions are 
not. 
Lambe (2011) 2001-2010 Significant abnormal returns prior to the public release of information. 
Fidrmuc et al. (2012)  Positive impact of shareholder protection on cumulative abnormal returns for 
both purchases and sales. Besides, the information content of insider sales is 
less than for purchases 
Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) 2000-2010 Trades conducted by CEOs are more informative than trades conducted by 
CFOs. 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
28 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of the Literature Relating to the timing behaviour of Directors’ Trades 
Author(s) Sample Period Main Results 
Elliot et al., (1984) 1975-1979 Insiders with private information should purchase shares before the 
public release of good news that increase prices and should sell shares 
before the public release of bad news that decrease prices. If a speculative 
portfolio position is taken before the public announcement, then 
increased selling should follow the public announcement of good news 
and increased buying should follow the public announcement of bad 
news. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) 1973-1975 No link between insider trading profits and subsequent disclosure events 
(including earnings and dividend announcements) 
Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988)   
John and Lang (1991)  1/75-10/85 Dividend increases accompanied by unusual insider buying signal good 
news, resulting in positive abnormal returns. The opposite is also true. 
Del Brio and Miguel (2008) 1992-1996  
LaPorta et al. (1997) 2/79-1/93 Value (growth) firms tend to have positive (negative) future earnings 
announcement period returns. 
Betzer and Theissen (2007) 1992–2001 Trading prior to earning announcements has a large impact on prices. 
Jaggi and Tsui (2007)  Executive directors reported earnings to maximise their private benefits 
from insider selling. Thus, the relationship between insider selling and 
earnings can be moderated by the proportion of independent directors. 
Chiang and Chang (2012) 1/96-10/10 Investors who take advantage of insider trading information can earn a 
return premium by holding option contracts even after controlling for 
systematic risk, volatility risk, and transaction cost. 
Jeng et al. (1999) 5/75 -12/96 The purchase portfolio does better than the market by about 7.4% per 
year. About one-sixth of the abnormal returns arise within the first five 
days of a trade, one-third within the first month, and three-quarters within 
the first six months. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 1975-1995 There is no relationship between pre-issue insider trading and the post-
issue long-run performance of primary seasoned equity issuing firms 
after controlling for exogenous consumption shocks. 
Ke et al., , (2003) 1989 to 1993 Stock sales by insiders increase three to nine quarters prior to a break in a 
string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings. Besides, there is 
little abnormal selling in the two quarters immediately prior to the break. 
Agarwal and Singh (2006) 1996-1999 High levels of share trading volume before the public announcement of 
merger. 
Li and Zhang (2006) 1/97-6/02 net insider selling before the restatement announcements, little net insider 
selling immediately around the announcements, and net insider buying 
after the announcements 
Ching et al. (2006) 1993 - 1998 Positive (negative) abnormal returns associated with the announcement of 
placing (rights offerings). 
Noe (1999) 7/79-12/87 Trading patterns are unrelated to the forecasted earnings news. 
Seyhun (1990)  Insiders in bidder firms traded more prior to the announcement of a 
takeover bid. 
Muller et al. (2009) 2002–2007 Insiders of goodwill impairment firms engage in abnormal selling of their 
shares quarters prior to the announcement of such losses. 
Gosnell et al. (1992)  1985-1987 insiders sell prior to bankruptcy. 
Loderer and Sheehan (1989) 1971-1985 No evidence of selling prior to bankruptcy. 
   
Hillier and Marshall (2002c)  Insiders buy after abnormally bad earnings news and sell after good 
news. 
 Kavussanos and Tsounia (2007) 6/00 to 6/05 insiders tend to trade regarding proceeding mergers. 
 
2.2.3  Methodological Issues 
Some researchers have considered the role of empirical methodology in 
detecting insider trading performance. For example, the choice of insider 
trading event window differs across most empirical studies. A long event 
window of several months is likely to reflect information from subsequent 
events, and so a shorter event window is preferable (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001; Seyhun, 1986; Clacher et al., 2009). 
Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) used the market-model in 
measuring the abnormal returns of individual stocks, whereas Chowdhury, 
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Howe and Lin, (1993) used vector autoregressive (VAR) model to examine the 
relation between collective insider transactions and stock market returns.  
Using three different measures of abnormal performance, Lin and Howe (1990) 
reported conflicting evidence on abnormal returns accruing to insiders after 
they trade.  
Eckbo and Smith (1998) estimated the performance of insider trades on the 
closely held Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). They formed portfolios of monthly 
aggregate insider holdings, which reflected the insiders' actual holding periods 
in their respective stocks, and then subjected these portfolios to modern 
techniques of performance measurement. Moreover, they compared the 
performance estimates for the aggregate insider portfolios to the performance 
of managed mutual fund portfolios on the OSE over the same time period. The 
performance analysis rejected the hypothesis of positive abnormal performance 
by insiders.  
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) showed, with an inter-temporal model of 
individual as well as aggregate liquidity shocks to uninformed agents, that 
insider trading can improve outsiders’ welfare.  
Using a conditional event study framework, Li and McNally (1999) examined 
the determinants of firms’ repurchase decision and the market reaction to the 
decision. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser, (2003) resolved the problems included 
in event studies by using a value-weighted portfolio approach to analyse all 
insider trades that took place in the US between 1975 and 1996. For each day, 
a value-weighted portfolio of insider purchases (sales) was created and one-
year holding period returns were computed for each portfolio, and then 
compared to a target portfolio in order to examine the profitability of insider 
trades.  
Iqbal and Shetty (2002) used Granger-causal tests to examine the relationship 
between aggregate insider trading and stock market returns. Beny (2006) 
described the relationship between corporate valuation and insider trading laws 
using a simple agency model, and then examined the model’s three testable 
hypotheses using firm-level data from a cross-section of developed countries.  
Agarwal and Singh (2006) investigated insider trading activity prior to merger 
announcement in Indian capital market. To examine the behaviour of stock 
prices a modified market model was used to estimate the parameters for the 
estimation window. These estimates were used to compute average return and 
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cumulative average returns for the event window, which are measures of 
abnormal returns. Caldentey and Stacchetti (2007) used a model of strategic 
trading with asymmetric information of an asset whose value follows a 
Brownian motion; Del Brio et al. (2008) used panel data estimation. Fidrmuc et 
al. (2006), Ajlouni and Toms (2008), and Gregory et al. (2009) explored the 
informativeness of directors’ trades using event study methodology based on 
Market Model, Capital Asset Pricing Model, Market Adjust Return Model 
respectively. In addition to using event study methodology, Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006) and Gregory et al. (2009) employed a Multivariate Regression Model to 
capture all the possible factors that might have an impact on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. However, in this section, we only 
reviewed the methodologies that were used to test various hypotheses 
regarding insider trading activities.  
Tables (2.3) summarises the methodologies used to examine various 
hypotheses relating to insider trading activities.  
Table 2.3: Summary of the Literature According to Methodology Used 
Author(s) Methodology  
Seyhun (1986)  Market-model in measuring the abnormal returns of individual 
stocks Rozeff and Zaman (1988) 
Chowdhury, Howe and Lin, (1993) Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model to examine the relation 
between collective insider transactions and stock market returns 
Lin and Howe (1990) Three different measures of abnormal performance 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) They compared the performance estimates for the aggregate insider 
portfolios to the performance of managed mutual fund portfolios on 
the OSE over the same time period 
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) Inter-temporal model of individual as well as aggregate liquidity 
shocks to uninformed agents 
Li and McNally (1999) Conditional event study 
Jeng et al., (2003) Value-weighted portfolio approach 
Iqbal and Shetty (2002) Granger-causal tests 
Beny (2006) Agency model 
Agarwal and Singh (2006) Modified market model was used to estimate the parameters for the 
estimation window 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006)  Event study methodology based on Market Model and Multivariate 
Regression Model 
Ajlouni and Toms (2008) Event study methodology based on Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Gregory et al. (2009) Event study methodology based on Market Adjust Return Model 
and Multivariate Regression Model 
 
2.2.4  Other Evidences  
This section reviews the literature on insider trading based on research 
different from those discussed above.  
Larcker, Reder and Simon, (1983) examined the impact of FASB statement 
No.19 on insiders’ transactions. They found that insiders in those firms who 
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expected to be adversely affected by the accounting change were net sellers in 
the period preceding the pronouncement. 
Seyhun (1992b) examined the seasonal patterns of US aggregate insider trading 
activities in order to highlight the nature of seasonal patterns in stock returns. 
The results indicated that some insiders in small firms tend to accelerate their 
planned stock purchases and postpone their stock sales in December in contrast 
with an opposite pattern of insider trading in larger firms. Therefore, this 
enables insiders in small firms to capture more of the positive return in 
January. Besides, insider trading activity in small firms does not significantly 
increase in January. Thus, an uninformed trader in small firms is not more 
likely to trade against an informed insider in January than in other months. In 
contrast to the US studies, but using UK data, Hillier and Marshall (2002a) 
examined the January effect in UK listed securities and found that it was 
significant but not persistent through the time. Also, the results showed that the 
seasonalities in insider trading were not the main determinant of the turn of the 
year effect. 
Carpenter and Rimerez (2001) examined whether insiders use private 
information when they exercise options and reported two main findings; 
abnormal returns associated with insiders’ exercises are positive (when insiders 
had to hold the stock acquired through option exercise for six months). 
Abnormal returns associated with top directors’ exercises are negative in small 
companies (when insiders had to sell the stock acquired through option 
exercise immediately). Similarly, Kyriacou and Mase (2003) examined 
whether there is information content in executive directors when they exercise 
options and found that insiders use their private information when they decide 
to exercise stock option, and how much of the stock acquired through this 
exercise they should sell. Also, the sale of low proportion of share (categorised 
as a sale) is less informative than the sale of high proportion of share 
(categorised as a buy).  
Yu and Bricker (2007) explored insider trading as a function of differences 
between managers’ and the market’s assessment of company earning 
components – specifically operating cash flows and accruals. This study also 
built a perspective of managers as sophisticated investors who, while engaging 
in earnings management, ultimately make insider trading decisions based on 
the divergence between their private valuation of earnings components and the 
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market’s. Thus managers may, seemingly counter-intuitively, engage in 
income-increasing earnings management and insider buying in the same 
period. They found strong evidence that insider buying, but not selling, 
behaviour is consistent with managerial insider trading based on a market 
valuation divergence of both operating cash flows and accruals, rather than on 
either element individually, or on managers’ use of accounting discretion.  
Jiang and Zaman (2010) examined whether insiders trade on the basis of 
contrarian beliefs or superior information. Using vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model, they decomposed market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-
flow news, and unexpected discount rate. If insiders trade on the basis of 
superior knowledge, the relationship between aggregate insider trading and 
unexpected cash-flow news will be positive. In contrast, if insiders trade on the 
basis of contrarian beliefs, the relationship between aggregate insider trading 
and past expected returns will be negative. The results showed that insiders 
trade on the basis of superior information and therefore predict market returns 
because of having superior knowledge about future cash-flow news. Further, 
they split the firms into high information uncertainty and low information 
uncertainty firms using firm size and analyst following as proxies for 
information uncertainty. They found that “the predictive ability of aggregate 
insider trading in high information uncertainty firms is due to superior 
knowledge”. 
Marin and Olivier (2008) explored the relationship between insider trading and 
stock price crashes and reported high insiders’ sales many months prior to a 
large drop in stock prices, whereas high insiders’ buys only one month before a 
large jump in stock prices. Also, uninformed investors may react more strongly 
to the absence of insider sales than to their presence. These patterns might be 
due to different reasons such as patterns of insider trading driven by earnings 
announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution. 
Moreover, any insider who wishes to exploit private information related to 
poor company earnings has to trade significantly before the actual earnings 
announcement and hence significantly before the crash. 
Gider and Westheide (2009) examined whether insider time their trades in a 
way that enable them to exploit high amount of information asymmetry, and 
indicated that insiders - based on short term information advantage - tend to 
trade more frequently during times expected to have private information being 
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impounded into stock prices (when idiosyncratic volatility is high). Moreover, 
in times of high information asymmetry, former directors are able to earn high 
abnormal returns.  
Cziraki (2012) investigated whether bank executives took excessive risks in the 
run-up to the recent financial crisis by analysing their trading in their own 
bank’s stock. Cziraki examined whether insiders of banks with the highest 
exposure to subprime risk changed their insider trading before the onset of the 
crisis. Two main findings emerged. First, there were large differences in insider 
trading patterns between high- and low-exposure banks starting in mid-2006, 
when US housing prices first declined. The economic effect is sizeable: 
insiders of high-exposure banks sold 30% more equity than insiders of low-
exposure banks. This increase in insider sales proceeded the fall of bank stock 
prices. Second, there was no difference in insider trading patterns between 
banks with high and low exposure in 2004-2005. Thus, Cziraki concluded that 
insiders of high-exposure banks revised their views on the profitability of their 
banks’ investments following the reversal in the housing market. 
Chiang and Chang (2012) studied the relation between insider trading and 
option returns around earnings announcements. The results indicated that 
investors who take advantage of insider trading information can earn a return 
premium by holding option contracts even after controlling for systematic risk, 
volatility risk, and transaction cost. 
Similar to Fidrmuc et al., (2012), Von Koch et al., (2013) showed more 
positive and stronger impact of firm-level shareholder protection (rather than 
country-level shareholder protection) on cumulative abnormal returns for 
directors’ buy transactions.  
Tang et al., (2012) suggested that informative financial reporting and stock 
price environment lead to less informative directors’ trades.  
Rong (2013) found that insider trading patterns within the firm explain the 
contemporary changes in its R&D productivity. Moreover, managers have 
more superior knowledge about R&D productivity than outside investors 
which might suggest that they are more able to benefit from this knowledge.  
Tables (2.3) summarises the studies that used insider trading data to test other 
hypotheses different from those discussed earlier in sections (2.2.1), (2.2.2) and 
(2.2.3).  
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Table 2.4: Summary of Other Studies that Examined Different Hypotheses of Insider Trading 
Activities 
Author(s) Sample Period Main Results 
Larcker et al., (1983) 6-8/77 insiders in those firms who expected to be adversely affected by 
the accounting change are net sellers in the period preceding the 
pronouncement 
Seyhun (1992b)  Some insiders in small firms tend to accelerate their planned stock 
purchases and postpone their stock sales in December in contrast 
with an opposite pattern of insider trading in larger firms. 
Therefore, this enables insiders in small firms to capture more of 
the positive return in January. Besides, insider trading activity in 
small firms does not significantly increase in January 
Hillier and Marshall (2002a)  The seasonalities in insider trading were not the main determinant 
of the turn of the year effect. 
Carpenter and Rimerez 
(2001) 
1/84-11/95 Abnormal returns associated with insiders’ exercises are positive 
(when insiders had to hold the stock acquired through option 
exercise for six months). Abnormal returns associated with top 
directors’ exercises are negative in small companies (when insiders 
had to sell the stock acquired through option exercise 
immediately). 
Kyriacou and Mase (2003) 7/95-7/98 Insiders use their private information when they decide to exercise 
stock option, and how much of the stock acquired through this 
exercise they should sell. Also, the sale of low proportion of share 
(categorised as a sale) is less informative than the sale of high 
proportion of share (categorised as a buy). 
Yu and Bricker (2007) 1996-2005 Insider buying, but not selling, behaviour is consistent with 
managerial insider trading based on a market valuation divergence 
of both operating cash flows and accruals, rather than on either 
element individually, or on managers’ use of accounting discretion 
Marin and Olivier (2008) 1/85-12/02 High insiders’ sales many months prior to a large drop in stock 
prices, whereas high insiders’ buys only one month before a large 
jump in stock prices. Also, uninformed investors may react more 
strongly to the absence of insider sales than to their presence. 
Jiang and Zaman (2010) 1975-2000 Insiders trade on the basis of superior information and therefore 
predict market returns because of having superior knowledge about 
future cash-flow news. 
Gider and Westheide (2009) Starts at 1992 Insiders - based on short term information advantage - tend to trade 
more frequently during times expected to have private information 
being impounded into stock prices (when idiosyncratic volatility is 
high). 
Cziraki (2012)  There are large differences in insider trading patterns between 
high- and low-exposure banks starting in mid-2006, when US 
housing prices first declined. There was no difference in insider 
trading patterns between banks with high and low exposure in 
2004-2005. 
Chiang and Chang (2012) 1995-2009 Investors who take advantage of insider trading information can 
earn a return premium by holding option contracts even after 
controlling for systematic risk, volatility risk, and transaction cost. 
Rong (2013) 1986-2002 Managers have more superior knowledge about R&D productivity 
than outside investors which might suggest that they are more able 
to benefit from this knowledge. 
2.3 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to review the relevant literature of insider trading 
activities and to analyse the increasing body of the literature considering the 
information content of insider trading, the timing behaviour of insiders’ 
activities, and other issues in order to provide readers, researchers, and 
newcomers with an insight into how these concepts have been researched, been 
developed, and been linked over time.  
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Results from previous empirical studies strongly suggested that insiders can detect and 
exploit mispricing in their own company’s securities. Also, the previous empirical 
literature in the general area of information contents of directors’ trades found that the 
informativeness of directors’ trades depends on firm, trade, and director 
characteristics. More specifically, buy trades are more informative than sell trades 
(Seyhun, 1988b; King and Roll, 1988; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Gregory et al., 2009), 
medium-size trades are more informative than other-size trades (Barclay and Warner, 
1993; Chakravarty, 2001; Abad and Pascual, 2010), insiders in small firms (with high 
price to earnings ratio) are more informative than insiders in large firms (with low 
price to earnings ratio) [Williams, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Pope et al., 1990; 
Ajlouni and Toms, 2008]; trades by executive directors are more informative than 
trades by other types of directors (Seyhun, 1988b; Jenter, 2005; Knewtson, 2011), 
female executive directors are more informative than male executive directors 
(Gregory et al., 2012) and trades conducted by CEOs are more informative than trades 
conducted by CFOs (Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz, 2012).  
Besides, the previous empirical literature in the timing behaviour of insider trading 
found that directors who trade prior to the disclosure of price sensitive news inform 
the market of mispricing, and as such the market will react correspondingly. In 
examining different hypothesis regarding insider trading activities, previous studies 
employed different methodological approaches. For example, event study 
methodology based on Market Model or Capital Asset Pricing Model was used to 
calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns in order to examine the 
informativeness of directors’ trades (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Ajlouni and Toms, 2008).  
Finally, other insider trading studies examined whether high returns in January and 
April can be explained by insider trading activities (Seyhun, 1992b; Hillier and 
Marshall, 2002a), whether insiders use private information when they exercise options 
(Carpenter and Rimerez, 2001; Kyriacou and Mase, 2003), whether insiders trade on 
the basis of contrarian beliefs or superior information (Jiang and Zaman, 2010), the 
relationship between insider trading and stock price crashes (Marin and Olivier, 2007), 
or whether the changes in R&D productivity can be explained by insider trading 
patterns within the firm (Rong, 2013).  
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Chapter 3:  Patterns and Characteristics of 
Aggregate Insider Transactions in the 
UK 1991-2010 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the dataset used in this thesis to analyse the information 
content of insider trading. The objective is to familiarise the reader with some 
important characteristics of insider trading activities.  
Previous studies used directors’ trades to examine various hypotheses in the 
general area of insider trading. One aim of this literature has been to examine 
how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, firm, and 
director characteristics. For example, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Barclay 
and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001), and Friederich et al. (2002) examined 
how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade size. Medium-
sized trades are more informative than other sized trades. King and Roll 
(1988), Pope et al. (1990), Hillier and Marshall (2002b), and Gregory et al. 
(2009) studied how the informativeness varies with transaction type. Directors’ 
buys are positive and significant (informative) whilst sales are negative and 
insignificant (uninformative). Seyhun (1986), Gregory et al. (1994), Fidrmuc et 
al. (2006), Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008), and Gregory et al. (2012) reported 
that directors’ trades in small firms are more informative than directors’ trades 
in large firms. Degryse et al. (2009), Gregory et al. (2009), and Knewtson 
(2011) documented higher abnormal returns associated with executives’ trades, 
whereas Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Jeng et al. (2003) found that there is no 
impact of the directors’ type on the informativeness of directors’ trades (for 
example, there is no difference in the informativeness between executive and 
non-executive directors).  
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Depending on the findings of the literature that attempted to distinguish 
between the information driven from noisy insider trades, we present and 
examine insider trading characteristics and patterns based on the type and size 
of transaction, the type and age of directors (type and age), and the 
characteristics of the firm i.e. the industry which the firm belongs to).  
Seyhun (2000) devoted a chapter of his book to examining the historical 
statistical characteristics and patterns of directors’ trades in the US. By 
identifying these characteristics and patterns, he says that investors might be 
more able to make better decisions. For example, suppose an investor would 
like to use insider trading to help guide a portfolio decision. The first question 
the investor would ask is how often do insiders’ trades occur for a typical 
stock? If an insider trade is expected to occur once in every other month, then 
the investor would have a sufficient buy and sell signals to monitor his/her 
portfolio decision. In other words, the examination of insider trading patterns 
can help us interpret such insider signals. Also, in order to identify a 
particularly unusual insider trading activity, Seyhun suggested knowing 
“usual” or “normal” insider trading patterns in different type of firms. For 
example, if insiders typically sell 10,000 shares per month in a given firm, a 
new purchase activity could signal a significant turning point. He concluded 
that in large firms, insiders tend to sell twice as frequent as they buy, whereas 
in small firms, they tend to execute four purchases for each three sale 
transactions.  
This chapter comprehensively reviews insider trading behaviour, describing the 
general characteristics, patterns and activities of UK directors over the period 
1991-2010. To the best of our knowledge, such an exercise has never been 
conducted before. Such an analysis may shed light on insider trading 
behaviour.  
This study is based on data supplied by two different data sources for the 
period January 1991 to December 2010. 
 1) Directus Ltd compiled a complete record of director’s trades in the 
United Kingdom (1991-2001).  
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2) Directors Deals, which monitors and analyses share transactions 
made by directors in their own companies (sometimes known as Insider Deals).  
This period yields a sample of 181,275 trades for every publicly disclosed 
transaction by UK directors in their own firms.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section (3.2) explains the procedures 
applied in order to obtain the final sample, particularly the inclusion criteria, 
and how missing entries are dealt with. Section (3.3) defines some of the 
variables in our sample, such as executives’ status. Section (3.4) presents and 
describes the general features and characteristics of UK directors’ trades for the 
whole sample; while the conclusions are presented in Section (3.5). 
3.2 Constructing the Final Sample 
The purpose of this section is to explain the procedures applied to construct the 
final sample which we use in our analysis. For that reason, we identified the 
basic inclusion criteria that determine the minimum standards which each 
transaction should contain to be accepted as a suitable entry in our sample.  
3.2.1  Inclusion Criteria  
Inclusion criteria are minimum standards that must be adhered to by each 
transaction in order to be accepted as an entry in our final sample. One 
example of these criteria is that it is necessary to have, as a minimum, a 
company name, transaction price, amount (number of shares) and value (the 
price of the transaction is multiplied by its amount) of the transaction, 
transaction date, transaction class (A type or category of a security, such as 
ordinary share or executive share option), and type of the transaction (buy or 
sell of ordinary shares, exercise or sell post exercise of options).  
Table (3.1) presents a deliberately selected sample of transactions that need 
either to be removed or to be modified based on above criteria. This table 
highlights the main information that each transaction should contain to be 
consistent with the inclusion criteria.  
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Table 3.1: A Sample of Selected Number of Transactions That Might or Might not Consistent with Inclusion Criteria 
N Sector Company Name Transaction Date Announcement Date Price (£) Amount Value' Transaction Type Class Exec Status 
1  Portals 10/06/94 13/06/94 6.63 5000  Take Up Rights  
2  Pearson 23/08/96 23/08/96 6.64 24423  Take Up Rights  
3 Engineering and Machinery Whatman 14/04/98 14/04/98 - 7396 - Sell Ordinary  
4 Media and Photography WPP Group 09/03/99 11/03/99 - 24719 - Buy Ord  
5 Distributors WF Electrical 25/08/99 26/08/99 - 2000 - Gift Given Ord  
6 Personal Care and Household Prod Reckitt Benckiser 19/11/00 19/11/00    Options Granted OPT  
7 Banks Royal Bank of Scotland 18/12/00 20/12/00 - 194,080  Sale post Ex Ordinary  
8 Electronic and Electrical Equip Xaar 06/03/01 07/03/01 NULL 500000  Exercise OPT  
9 Media and Photography Totally PLC 27/12/01 27/12/01 129769 0.01 1298 Buy Ord  
10 Media and Photography Totally PLC 27/12/01 27/12/01 129769 0.01 1298 Buy Ordinary  
11 Telecomms KT Corporation 23/05/02 31/05/02 46 310 9834 Subscribe Ord Former 
12 Media and Photo WILink 21/01/03 23/01/03 0 33816 263765 Given Away Ord Executive 
13 Banks Barclays 01/10/03 06/10/03 4.7519 3975 18889 Div Re Ord Former 
14 Banks Abbey National 24/03/04 29/03/04 4.405 3747 16506 Award Ord Former 
15 Media and Photo WILink 04/05/05 05/05/05 2.75 105100 289025 Transfer Ord Executive 
16 Health Smith and Nephew 31/03/06 19/04/06 7.584 675 2918 Contract Buy Ord PDMR 
17 Mining Rio Tinto 28/04/06 17/05/06 30.38 98 2977 Transfer In Ord PDMR 
18 Life Assurance Prudential 31/12/07 31/12/07 0 23495 166932 Award Ord PDMR 
19   27/04/98 05/05/98 0.45 50000  Sale post Ex ordimary  
N refers to transaction number for the purpose of the analysis.  
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Table (3.1) presents the main variables of the sample, which every entry should have. 
Those variables are the company name, transaction and announcement date, transaction 
price, transaction amount, transaction value, transaction type and transaction class. For 
transaction number (19), an unknown director exercised an option (sell) on the 27th of 
April 1998, but the name of the company was missing. Thus, this transaction was removed 
from the sample because the company name is one of the inclusion criteria. This was the 
case for a number of transactions during the sample period, for which the company name 
was unavailable; ultimately, 2060 trades with no company name were excluded from the 
sample. This left a sample of 186,683 trades over the period 1991-2010.  
Since transaction value is equal to the number of shares multiplied by the transaction price, 
it is necessary to have (at least) both transaction price and number of shares, or both 
transaction price and transaction value. Some trades within the sample included no 
transaction price and no transaction value. For example, Royal Bank of Scotland exercised 
an option (sell) in December 2000, but the transaction price and transaction value were 
unknown (see transaction number 6). Such transactions are inconsistent with the inclusion 
criteria. Therefore, more than 5200 transactions with both no price and no value were 
removed from the sample.  
After cleaning the dataset for duplicate and inaccurate or incomplete transactions, a total of 
181,275 trades by directors over the sample period remain. 
3.3 Variable Definition  
As it is mentioned previously, the sample contains 181,275 observations. The variables 
considered in this chapter are the company’s name, transaction and announcement date, 
transaction price, amount, transaction value, transaction type and transaction class. In 
addition to the company’s name, the dataset includes for each transaction the director’s 
name, company’s name, executive’s status (describing the orientation of a director to the 
board of a company), and the date of birth (to allow calculation of age at the day of the 
transaction). Table (3.2) shows the different types of directors with a definition for each 
type. 
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Table 3.2: A Brief Definition for Each Type of Directors 
Executive status Definition 
Executive The orientation of a director to the board of a company; usually a 
full-time employee 
Former No longer a board member 
Non-Executive A member of the full board who only dictates part of his 
available time to the company in an advisory capacity 
PDMR (Person Dispensing 
Managerial Responsibility) 
Not a member of the board but an employee considered being a 
party to price sensitive information and therefore subject to the 
same rules as Board members 
Supervisory Member of the 
Supervisory board 
Usually used for Continental companies; not a direct equivalent 
of Non-Executive, since it is a different board structure 
 
The information about directors’ types was only available for the period 2001-2010 and it 
includes 105,639 trades (this number constitutes 58% of the total sample number of 
trades). 
Because of the variety of the variables, it is possible to categorise the data in different 
ways. One of these ways is by the type of transaction that directors engage in. Table (3.3) 
describes the different types of directors’ trades related to our sample during the period 
1991-2010. For each firm we have the sector, and for each transaction we also have 
transaction date (the day in which the transaction occurred), announcement date (the day 
on which the information about the transaction is released, the price, the amount (the 
number of shares bought or sold or exercised or traded), the value (the number of shares 
traded multiplied by the price), the type, and the class. 
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Table 3.3: Transaction’s Types 
Award Usually acquired below the market price or for nil consideration as part of 
a director’s remuneration package. Awards are reported when they are 
vested. That is when they are given to the director and form part of his 
beneficial holding. In rare cases, there may be conditions to this holding 
and will be reported in the note 
 
Buy Discretionary purchase of shares. In almost all cases, this would be at the 
prevailing market price, exceptions are explained in the notes. 
 
Sell Sale of part or all of the director beneficial holding at the prevailing 
market price unless otherwise stated in the notes 
 
Contract Buy Director buys shares on the market as part of a contractual agreement. 
This may be to qualify for a matching award or under a regular share 
purchase plan. Although these are ‘on-market’ they are not considered to 
be indicative trades 
Transfer in Director acquires Shares generally without direct monetary payment. This can be for a 
number of reasons 
Transfer Out Director holding is reduced after shares have been transferred to a third 
party. This may occur when a director’s minor children come of age, for 
example. 
 
Transfer All or part of a 
Directors holding 
Transferred between two parties in which the director has an interest. The 
beneficial holding of the director remains unchanged. For example a 
director may sell shares from a company in which he is a beneficiary to a 
Pension Fund in which he is also a beneficiary. He may not be the 
exclusive beneficiary of either or both parties and his beneficial interest 
will be stated in the note where possible. 
 
Dividend Reinvested Purchase of further shares with the proceeds of dividends payable on 
directors existing holding. This may take the form of a [scrip] issue of 
new shares to all shareholders 
 
Exercise Vesting of options which form part of the directors beneficial holding 
after the event. Unless in exceptional circumstances the exercise price is 
below the market price and may even be nil 
Sale Post-Exercise Shares sold at prevailing market price after acquiring them through the 
exercise of an option. May be also used where shares have been sold after 
being acquired by award 
Given Away Usually a charitable donation. Shares are no longer part of the directors 
beneficial holding but are not sold at the prevailing market price. 
Subscribe Subscription to the new issue. As a director or as an existing shareholder 
directors may be allocated rights to subscribe to new shares which are 
generally just below the prevailing market price 
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In addition to the previous information which each trade should contain as a 
minimum, the period between 2002 and 2010 included more detailed 
information about each trade, such as holdings (owning a controlling quantity 
of shares in one or more other companies), holding change (the changes in 
holding percentage during the time), holding comment (refers to another 
transaction by the director made on the same day), holding percentage 
(percentage of total shares owned by the director), personal ID (proprietary 
reference which identifies the person trading; person A may have directorships 
at more than one company), diseases, and many other information.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the general features, characteristics and patterns of 
directors’ trades. In section (3.4.1), summary statistics are presented to 
highlight the trends and patterns of UK directors’ trades whilst considering all 
trades conducted by UK directors over the period of study. In section (3.4.2), 
we repeat the previous analysis by focusing only on ordinary buys and sales 
and by dividing the sample according to transaction’s size, director’s age, 
director’s type, director’s company, and director’s sector (or industry). To 
examine this, a quantitative analysis is employed.  
3.4.1  Summary Statistics Related to all Transaction 
Types 
After applying the exclusion criteria and cleaning the dataset for duplicate and 
inaccurate or incomplete transactions, missing announcement dates and 
company names, there is a total of 181,275 trades by directors over the sample 
period.  
Table (3.4) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by 
transaction type during the period 1991-2010. The table shows that the 181,275 
transactions within our sample are related to 20 different transaction types. The 
total number of shares traded was 126 billion with a total value of £59.1 
billion.  
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The most frequent transactions were on ordinary shares (buys and sales) and the 
exercise of options (exercises and sale post exercises): 98,087 trades (54% of all 
insider transactions) and 45,926 transactions (23%), respectively. Approximately, 41% 
of our sample is buys, 14% is exercises, 13% is sales and 11% is sale post exercises. 
Hence, directors’ buys are more frequent than other directors’ trades.  
Additionally, in term of the total number of shares traded, the most frequent 
transactions were subscribes, buys, sales, exercises and sale post exercises. The total 
number of shares subscribed by insiders constitutes approximately 70% of total shares 
traded over the sample period. This is due to three transactions on November 2008 
with a total number of shares of 61 billion. Excluding these trades would lead the total 
number of subscribed shares constitute only 14% of the total traded shares. On the 
other hand, the total number of shares for transactions such as buys, exercises, sale 
post exercises, and sells constitutes 7%, 4%, 9%, and 2% of the total shares trades 
respectively. These percentages would change after excluding large trades. For 
example, the total number of shares bought and sold would constitute roughly 50% of 
total shares traded over the sample period. The total number of shares for transactions 
such as buys, exercises, sale post exercises, and sells constitutes 25%, 14%, 8%, and 
24% of total shares trades respectively. 
The total monetary value of directors’ trades is £59.1 billion. Of these, approximately, 
16% is for buy transactions, 10% is for exercise transactions, 37% is for sale 
transactions, 15% is for sale post exercise transactions, and 21% is for other 
transactions. 
There are approximately three times as many buy trades as sells. Although buy trades 
are more frequent than sell trades, the average value of sell trades is approximately 
eight times larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently but more in value 
(a similar argument can be said to the number of shares).  
There is one exercise transaction for each sale post exercise transaction. Although 
there is approximately slightly more frequent exercises than sale post exercise trades, 
the average value of sale post exercise trades are approximately two times larger, 
which suggests that directors sell the shares acquired from exercising options less 
frequently but more in value (similar argument can be said to the number of shares).  
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics Categorised by Transaction Type  
1991-2010 
Transaction Type No of Trades Average Value (£) Average No of Shares Total Value (£) Total No of Shares Median Value (£) Median No of Shares SD Value (£) SD No of Shares 
Award 12,662 231,728 70,804 2,930,000,000 897,000,000 49,711 13,646 772,035 335,143 
Buy 73,972 125,716 124,269 9,300,000,000 9,190,000,000 10,800 10,000 1,000,379 422,763 
Bed and Breakfast 579 99,573 60,647 57,700,000 35,100,000 15,040 10,000 5,482,214 1,211,483 
Contract Buy 7,046 39,873 72,513 281,000,000 511,000,000 5,459 2,029 480,933 856,258 
Dividend Received 5,025 62,750 15,973 315,000,000 80,300,000 4,551 1,075 500,914 136,915 
Exercise 25,798 232,520 187,069 6,000,000,000 4,830,000,000 59,843 35,000 1,022,741 1,205,459 
Gift Given 19 128,526 119,580 2,441,996 2,272,018 64,980 30,000 223,240 271,334 
Gift Received 104 120,554 48,480 12,500,000 5,041,962 19,969 9,676 259,864 133,266 
Given Away 558 1,363,439 495,422 761,000,000 276,000,000 118,638 50,000 8,154,248 3,089,015 
Inherited 3 16,098 71,833 48,295 215,500 5,700 2,000 21,182 122,256 
Options Granted 103 113,539 68,913 11,700,000 7,098,074 74,998 38,778 122,477 84,674 
Sell 24,115 899,811 480,888 21,700,000,000 11,600,000,000 61,235 28,000 1,238,505 517,074 
Sale post Exercise 19,831 455,285 124,936 9,030,000,000 2,480,000,000 157,060 37,000 276,972 86,643 
Scrip Dividend 1,825 16,887 6,479 30,800,000 11,800,000 250 90 9,337 3,906 
Scrip Issue 6 5,763 2,411 34,575 14,468 1,065 446 9,955,669 4,295,015 
Subscribe 5,642 278,965 15,800,000 1,570,000,000 89,300,000,000 25,000 90,352 2,771,441 491,833,002 
Take Up 1,074 84,561 127,548 90,800,000 137,000,000 7,125 5,066 457,494 580,732 
Transfer 248 2,036,925 4,311,376 505,000,000 1,070,000,000 82,130 60,308 8,804,919 22,136,201 
Transfer In 1,558 1,442,100 2,583,042 2,250,000,000 4,020,000,000 41,183 82,754 8,327,558 9,828,810 
Transfer Out 1,107 3,857,636 1,868,565 4,270,000,000 2,070,000,000 83,386 75,000 55,415,608 8,993,277 
Total 181,275 326,130 697,783 59,100,000,000 126,000,000,000 22,143 15,667   
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. Average number of shares for each type represents the total number of shares for 
that type divided by the number of trades.  
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Figures (3.1) and (3.2) show the distribution of the average value (and number of 
shares) and the standard deviation of trades’ value (and number of shares) across 
directors’ buy, exercise, sell and sell-post exercise trades. Figure (3.1) shows that the 
standard deviation of trades’ value of directors’ buy and exercise transactions is, at 
least, four times higher than the average value of those transactions (buy and exercise). 
This indicates that some values are deviated highly from the mean. In other words, this 
might be explained by the presence of extremely high or extremely small values. 
Excluding these values might lower the deviation between the values and the mean, 
and therefore, the standard deviation, but it will not change the results. Unlike the 
previous pattern, the average value of sell post exercise transactions is higher than the 
standard deviation, which indicates that the deviation between values is small.  
Figure 3.1: The Distribution of the Average Value and the Standard Deviation of Trades’ value  
 
For trades’ number of shares, the same pattern can be seen .i.e. the standard deviation 
for buy and exercise transactions is higher than the average value by, at least, three 
times, whereas the opposite pattern can be seen for directors’ sell post exercise trades. 
For sell trades, there is no big difference between the average and the standard 
deviation of number of shares.  
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Figure 3.2: The Distribution of the Average Number of Sharesand the Standard Deviation of 
Trades’ Number of Shares 
 
 
Since the data comes from two different data sources, we find that it is useful to split 
the sample into two sub-samples. The first sub-sample covers the period 1991 to 2001 
while the other sub-sample covers the period 2002 to 2010. This division is important 
for two reasons: firstly, to capture any change in transaction’s types, total number of 
trades, total value, and the total number of shares, and, secondly, to confirm the 
patterns found in table (3.4).  
Table (3.5) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by transaction 
type during the period 1991-2001. The table shows that the 75,349 transactions within 
this period were related to 13 different types. The total number of shares traded was 
over 7 billion, with a total value of £12.4 billion. Approximately, 53% of our sample 
is buys, 14% is exercises, 19% is sales and 9% is sales post exercise. Hence, directors’ 
buys are more frequent than other directors’ trades.  
The total number of the traded shares is over 7 billion. Approximately, 32% of these 
shares are for buy trades, 13% are for exercise trades, 44% are for sale trades, and 9% 
are for sales post exercise trades. The total monetary value of directors’ trades is £12.4 
billion. Of these, approximately, 12% is for buy transactions, 10% is for exercise 
transactions, 55% is for sale transactions, 21% is for sale post exercise transactions, 
and 12% is for other transactions. 
There are approximately two times as many buy trades as sells. Again, although buy 
trades are more frequent than sell trades, the average value of sell trades are 
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approximately twelve times larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently 
but more in value (similar argument can be said about the number of shares).  
There is one exercise transaction for each sale post exercise transaction. Although 
there is approximately slightly more frequent exercises than sale post exercise trades, 
the average value of sale post exercise trades are approximately three times larger, 
which suggests that directors sell the shares acquired from exercising options less 
frequently but more in value (similar argument can be said to the number of shares).  
These results confirm the pattern found in table (5.4). Directors’ sells are two times 
less than directors’ buys, but they are greater in value. In other words, UK directors 
are net seller of their firms’ shares.  
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics Related to our Sample Categorised by Transaction Type  
1991-2001 
Transaction Type No of Trades Average Value (£) Average No of Shares Total Value (£) Total No of Shares Median Value (£) Median No of Shares SD Value (£) SD No of Shares 
Buy 40,057 38,129 60,251 1,530,000,000 2,410,000,000 8,160 6,000 992,767 423,636 
Bed and Breakfast 579 99,573 60,647 57,700,000 35,100,000 15,040 10,000 277,818 511,759 
Dividend Received 20 944 810 18,886 16,203 671 568 1,082 949 
Exercise 10,622 117,602 95,503 1,250,000,000 1,010,000,000 40,114 30,000 424,887 293,294 
Gift Given 19 128,526 119,580 2,441,996 2,272,018 64,980 30,000 74,908 278,165 
Gift Received 104 120,554 48,480 12,500,000 5,041,962 19,969 9,676 266,991 135,019 
Inherited 3 16,098 71,833 48,295 215,500 5,700 2,000 21,182 122,256 
Options Granted 103 113,539 68,913 11,700,000 7,098,074 74,998 38,778 123,822 85,786 
Sell 14,337 479,391 233,339 6,870,000,000 3,350,000,000 36,270 20,000 1,063,356 206,791 
Sale post Exercise 6,600 387,150 102,087 2,560,000,000 674,000,000 172,063 45,000 275,908 86,278 
Scrip Dividend 1,825 16,887 6,479 30,800,000 11,800,000 250 90 9,337 3,906 
Scrip Issue 6 5,763 2,411 34,575 14,468 1,065 446 3,470,035 1,656,887 
Take Up 1,074 84,561 127,548 90,800,000 137,000,000 7,125 5,066 456,659 578,748 
Total 75,349 164,711 101,470 12,400,000,000 7,650,000,000     
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. Average number of share for each type represents the total number of shares for that 
type divided by the number of trades. 
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Turning to the second sub-sample, Table (3.6) reports summary statistics 
related to our sample categorised by transaction type during the period 2001-
2010. The table shows that the 105,926 transactions within this period were 
related to 12 different types. Approximately, 32% of our sample is buys, 14% 
is exercises, 9% is sales and 12% is sales post exercise. Hence, directors’ buys 
are more frequent than other directors’ trades.  
Additionally, the total number of shares subscribed by insiders constitutes 
approximately 70% of total shares traded over the sample period. On the other 
hand, the total number of shares for transactions such as buys, exercises, sale 
post exercises, and sells constitutes 6%, 3%, 7%, and 2% of total shares trades 
respectively. These percentages would change after excluding large trades. For 
example, the total number of shares bought and sold would constitute roughly 
50% of total shares traded over the sample period.  
The total monetary value of directors’ trades is £47.4 billion. Of these, 
approximately, 17% is for buy transactions, 10% is for exercise transactions, 
32% is for sale transactions, 14% is for sale post exercise transactions, and 
27% is for other transactions. 
There are approximately three times as many buy trades as sells. Again, 
although buy trades are more frequent than sell trades, the average value of sell 
trades are approximately four times larger, which suggests that directors sell 
less frequently but more in value (similar argument can be said to the number 
of shares). There is one exercise transaction for each sale post exercise 
transaction.  
These results confirm the pattern found in table (3.4). Directors’ sells are less 
than directors’ buys, but they are greater in value. In other words, UK directors 
are net seller of their firms’ shares. Also, directors’ sale-post exercises are one 
time less than directors’ exercises, but they are greater in value.  
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics Related to our Sample Categorised by Transaction Type  
2001-2010 
Transaction Type No of Trades Average Value (£) Average No of Shares Total Value (£) Total No of Shares Median Value (£) Median No of Shares SD Value (£) SD No of Shares 
Award 12,662 231,728 70,804 2,930,000,000 897,000,000 49,711 13,646 768,251 334,305 
Buy 33,915 217,805 192,480 7,920,000,000 7,000,000,000 16,200 18,895 122 5,613 
Contract Buy 7,046 39,873 72,513 281,000,000 511,000,000 5,459 2,029 7,799,461 1,651,150 
Dividend Received 5,005 62,972 16,028 315,000,000 80,200,000 4,582 1,077 478,827 860,244 
Exercise 15,176 304,914 245,210 4,810,000,000 3,870,000,000 75,106 40,000 505,225 136,697 
Given Away 558 1,363,439 495,422 761,000,000 276,000,000 118,638 50,000 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
SELL 9,978 1,469,815 811,111 15,200,000,000 8,380,000,000 126,000 50,000 1,257,789 1,516,602 
Sale post Exercise 13,231 490,380 136,640 6,620,000,000 1,840,000,000 149,522 32,475 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
Subscribe 5,642 278,965 15,800,000 1,570,000,000 89,300,000,000 25,000 90,352 1,501 843 
Transfer 248 2,036,925 4,311,376 505,000,000 1,070,000,000 82,130 60,308 8,115,223 3,095,012 
Transfer In 1,558 1,442,100 2,583,042 2,250,000,000 4,020,000,000 41,183 82,754 28,233 15,207 
Transfer Out 1,107 3,857,636 1,868,565 4,270,000,000 2,070,000,000 83,386 75,000 929,183 263,760 
Total 105,926 431,879 1,086,467 47,400,000,000 119,000,000,000 30,009 20,000   
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. Average number of share for each type represents the total number of shares for that 
type divided by the number of trades.  
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Comparing table (3.5) with table (3.6) reveals the following results; the total 
number of trades during the period 2002-2010 exceeded the total number of 
trades during the period 1991-2001 (only 31% of trades occurred between 1991 
and 2001). The total value of directors’ trades in 2002-2010 is approximately 
four times higher than the total value of directors’ trades in 1991-2001.  
The total number of buy trades over the period 1991-2001 exceeded the total 
number of buy trades over the period 2002-2010. Approximately 54% of buy 
trades occurred during the period 1991-2001 while 46% of those trades 
occurred during the period 2002-2010. The same can be said for directors’ 
sells. For directors’ exercises, roughly 58% of exercise trades happened 
between 2002-2010, compared to 42% of trades between 1991 and 2001. On 
the other hand, it appears that sale post-exercise trades are higher for the 
second sub-sample than for the first sub-sample. The total number of trades for 
that period constituted 66% of the total number of sale post-exercise trades 
during the whole period. For both sub-samples, directors were net sellers of 
their company shares; therefore, directors’ sales were fewer in number but 
much larger in value.  
In our sample, the main transaction types are buys, sells, exercises, sale-post 
exercises, and dividend received. Other transactions’ type varies between the 
two periods. For example, transactions such as Awards, Transfer In, Transfer 
Out, and Subscribe were firstly introduced in 2002, whereas other transactions’ 
types such as Bed and Breakfast, Gift Received, and Gift Given were lastly 
shown in 2001. This variation might be due to the difference in data sources or 
to changes in disclosure criteria for such types of transactions.  
Given that there are more years in the first sample, we calculated the average 
value per year for the two samples. Moreover, Figure (3.3) shows the average 
value per year for buy, sell, exercise, and sale post exercise transactions before 
and after 2002. This figure indicates that the average value per year of buy 
trades before 2002 was less than the average value per year of buy trades after 
2002. The same can be noticed for director’s sells, sale post-exercise and 
exercise before and after 2002.  
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Figure 3.3: Director’s total number of trades before and after 2002 
3.4.1.1 Summary Statistics Categorised by Directors’ Types  
In this section, the general features and characteristics of directors’ trades are 
categorised by directors’ position in the firm (director type). The data on 
director type was only available for the period 2002 -- 2010. The total number 
of trades by different types of directors was 105,639 trades (this number 
presents 58% of the total sample number of trades). 
Table (3.7) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by 
both transaction type and director type during the sample period. In our sample, 
the main directors’ types are executive directors, non-executive directors, 
former directors and Person Dispensing Managerial Responsibility directors 
(PDMR). Also, there is a total of 105,639 transactions. The majority of these 
are by former directors followed by executive and PDMR directors.  
Table (3.7) also shows that the total number of trades by formers is higher than 
the total number of trades by other types of directors. On the other hand, the 
total value of trades by executives is more than the total value of trades by 
formers. Therefore, trades by formers were larger in number but smaller in 
value. Formers’ buys (exercises) are higher than other directors’ buys 
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(exercises), but the total value of Executive sells (sale-post exercises) is the 
highest.  
Table 3.7: Summary Statistics Categorised by Both Transaction and 
Director Types  
Type No of Trades Total Value £m 
Executive Former Non-Executive PDMR Executive Former Non-Executive PDMR 
Award 3,702 4,210 826 3,928 1,276 815 71 769 
BUY 8,610 11,586 10,923 2,655 4,092 876 1,052 738 
Contract Buy 1,352 1,778 2,440 1,475 140 49 31 61 
Dividend Received 1,229 1,849 710 1,208 116 58 114 27 
Exercise 4,678 4,835 880 4,765 1,529 1,638 384 1,197 
Given Away 171 204 106 77 279 205 70 204 
Sale post Exercise 3,932 3,563 461 5,262 2,131 2,231 345 1,763 
SELL 2,391 3,528 1,429 2,323 3,999 7,391 1,577 1,572 
Subscribe 1,476 1,655 1,928 586 572 476 432 93 
Transfer 92 98 43 15 268 176 64 2 
Transfer In 482 469 425 178 676 585 919 71 
Transfer Out 363 352 257 134 2,950 489 717 110 
Total 28,478 34,127 20,428 22,606 18,029 14,990 5,776 6,606 
Executive directors typically perform operational and strategic functions and are full-time employees of 
the firm. Non-executives are not generally involved with the operations of the firm; they are mainly 
hired for their experience and expertise in specific areas to provide advice and objectivity. PDMR or 
Person Dispensing Managerial Responsibility is not a member of the board but an employee considered 
being a party to price sensitive information and therefore subject to the same rules as Board members. 
Former refers to directors who are no longer board members. 
Table (3.8) constitutes an additional summary statistics related to sample of all 
transaction types categorised by the director type. In term of the number of 
trades, approximately, 32% of our sample is for Formers, 27% is for 
Executives, 19% is for Non-Executives, and 21% is for PDMRs.  
For the total value of trades, approximately, 33% of our sample is for Formers, 
40% is for Executives, 13% is for Non-Executives, and 15% is for PDMRs.  
Also, Formers’ total number of shares presents 64% of the total sample number 
of shares which is three times as large as non-executives’ total number of 
shares and five times as large as executives’ total number of shares.  
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics Categorised by Director Types  
Type No of Trades Total Value £m No of Shares #m Average No of Shares Average Value £ 
Executive 28,478 18,029 13,776 483,731 633,086 
Former 34,127 14,990 74,913 2,195,135 439,244 
Non-Executive 20,428 5,776 25,759 1,260,942 282,741 
PDMR 22,606 6,606 3,258 144,122 292,202 
Total 105,639 45,400 117,706 
  Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. 
Average number of share for each type represents the total number of shares for that type divided by 
the number of trades.  
Diagrammatically, some of the results of table (3.8) can be seen below in 
Figure (3.4) which shows the distribution of the total number of trades over 
directors’ types during the period of study. As can be noticed, the total number 
of trades by formers constitutes 32% of the total sample trades, whereas the 
total numbers of trades by non-executives and PDMRs are almost the same 
(19% and 21% respectively). 
 
Figure 3.4: Total Number of Trades by Director Type  
To summarise, after examining the general patterns of UK directors’ trades, the 
results show that, compared to directors’ buys, sells are fewer in number but 
much larger in value. Therefore, UK directors are net sellers of their firms’ 
shares. This pattern is repeated for formers’ trades, non-executives’ trades, and 
PDMRs’ trades. Formers’ trades are larger in number, whilst executives’ trades 
are larger in value.  
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3.4.2  Ordinary Buy and Sale 
The original dataset provides information on various transaction types. The 
focus of this section is to highlight the main features of the data set related only 
to the ordinary shares purchases and sales by UK directors over the period 
1991-2010. To do this, we removed trades
9
 other than open market purchases 
and sales of ordinary shares by directors. Open market sales and purchases are 
more likely to represent actions taken because of special insider information 
(Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et al., 1994; and Friederich et al., 2002).  
Table (3.9) presents summary statistics categorised by transaction type (buys 
and sales only) during the sample period. The sample includes 92,093 trades 
divided into 70,067 buy trades and 22,026 sale ones over the period 1991 to 
2010, with a total monetary value of £29 billion. There are approximately three 
times as many buy trades as sells. Although buy trades are more frequent than 
sell trades, the average value of sell trades is approximately seven times larger, 
which suggests that directors sell less frequently but in larger monetary 
amounts (a similar argument can be said to volume). The average value of 
directors’ purchases was £122,047 (with the maximum buy of £575 million in 
2007), but the average value of sales was £927,866 (with the maximum sell of 
£437 million in 2006), so directors’ sales are fewer in number but much larger 
in value. 
The last column of table (3.9) shows the number of days during the period in 
which at least one buy (sell) takes place. There are approximately 5,010 event 
dates (99% of sample days) for buy trades and 4,595 event dates (91% of 
sample days) for sell trades. During our sample period, there are trades of on 
average of thirteen buy trades (five sell trades) per event date. There is no day 
during the sample period that has neither buy nor sale.  
Table (3.9) also shows that in our sample, the 92,093 trades (buys and sells) are 
related to more than 5000 separate firms. Specifically, the 70,067 buy 
transactions were conducted by directors in 5,427 separate firms. Thus, each 
firm had an average of just over twelve transactions. On the other hand, the 
                                                          
9
 We removed trades such as option exercise, derivative, script dividends or bonus shares, 
rights issue, awards made to directors under Incentive plans or reinvestment plans, gifts, 
transfers and purchase, and sales of shares under personal equity plans, operations derived 
from tax or “bed & breakfast” 
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22,026 sell transactions were conducted by directors in 3,263 separate firms. 
Thus, each firm had an average of seven transactions. 
Although it is not reported in table (3.9), the 90% of the value of buy trades are 
under £85,100, whereas 25% of buy values are under £4,800. For trades’ 
volume, the 90% of trades’ volume are under 142,000 shares.  
Turning to directors’ sells, the 90% of the sells’ values are under £1.3 million, 
whereas only 25% are under £16,491. For trades’ volume, the 90% of trades’ 
volume are under 600,000 shares.  
Table 3.9: Summary Statistics Categorised by Transaction Type  
1991-2010 
Type No of Trades No of Shares  Total Value (£)  Average Value (£) Average No of Shares No of 
Firms 
No of 
Days 
BUY 70,067 8,620,000,000 8,550,000,000 122,047 123,064 5,427 5010 
SELL 22,026 11,000,000,000 20,400,000,000 927,866 501,459 3,263 4595 
Total 92,093 19,700,000,000 29,000,000,000     
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. 
Average number of share for each type represents the total number of shares for that type divided by 
the number of trades.  
Diagrammatically, some of the results of table (3.9) can be seen below in 
Figure (3.5). Figure (3.5) shows the breakdown of trades and value by 
transaction type (buy and sale). Figure (3.3) indicates that directors’ buys are 
three times larger than directors’ sells in terms of the total number of trades, 
but the average value of directors’ sells is greater than the average value of 
their buys.  
 
Figure 3.5: Directors’ number of trades and average value for directors’ buys and sells 
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It is also interesting to examine how these types of transactions have varied 
over time. To this purpose, table (3.10) presents yearly summary statistics for 
directors’ trades (buys and sells) during the sample period.  
To illustrate: in 1991 there were 1,708 buy transactions by UK directors. This 
is related to 95.6 million shares purchased at a total value of £64.3 million. 
Thus, the average number of shares traded per transaction was approximately 
56,000 whereas the average transaction value was about £37,617. The rest of 
table shows this information by year and by transaction type (buy and sale), 
looking first, at the number of trades purchased every year. Initially, buy 
volume increases and becomes 250.5 million shares in 1996 which corresponds 
to £120.5 million pounds. In 1998, the total number of shares purchased 
became three times as large as the number of shares purchased in 1997. Three 
years later, in 2002, there was another jump in the number of shares. The total 
number of shares jumped over 801 million, with a total value of £304 million. 
For the years 2004 to 2008, directors’ purchases increased from 278 million 
shares in 2004 to 1,073 billion shares in 2008. The value of the shares bought 
peaked in 2007 and gradually fell.  
Diagrammatically, figure (3.6) highlights the key features of our time series. 
Figure (3.6) shows how the number of shares bought and the total value of 
shares bought vary over the sample period. Both of these variables moved in 
the same direction during the sample years. In 2007, the total value of shares 
purchased reached a peak, and it was four times as large as the previous year. 
In 2009, the total value of shares purchased was three times less than the total 
value of shares purchased in 2007.  
For directors’ sells, the total number of shares sold in 1991 was 299.3 million, 
which was approximately three times as large as the total number of shares 
sold in 1992. After a number of ups and downs in directors sell between 1993 
and 1995, an increase in total shares number occurred in 1996, when the total 
number of shares sold became 448.3 million. During the period 2001-2003, the 
total number of shares sold increased significantly from 126.5 million to 1.279 
billion, which was ten times higher. On the other hand, there was a decrease in 
number of shares sold between 2006 and 2008. The total value peaked in 2007. 
This is perhaps due to the financial crisis which occurred in that year. 
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Interestingly, the value of shares sold was similar to that in 2006, perhaps 
indicating that directors, collectively, were anticipating the crisis. 
Cziraki (2013) examined insider trading behavior of high- and low-exposure 
banks starting in 2006, when US housing prices indices first declined. During 
2006, insiders of high-exposure banks increased their selling by 20% compared 
to those of low-exposure banks. This increase in insider sales precedes the drop 
in banks’ stock prices and the increase in banks’ Credit Default Swap spreads 
by at least 12 months. This study linked trading by bank insiders (executives 
and independent directors) to the developments in the housing market, which 
played a crucial role in starting the crisis. The results showed that bank 
executives did sell large amounts of stock in 2006, when housing prices started 
to decline and that high-exposure bank managers exposed to the housing 
market sold more than low-exposure bank managers. Moreover, executives of 
high-exposure banks increased their selling as a anticipation, before housing 
prices started to fall.  
Based on this study, the peak in insider trading sales during 2006-2007 might 
be explained by insiders anticipating the crisis before housing prices started to 
decline.  
Another study by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) indicated that CEOs did not 
reduce their ownership in 2007 or during the peak of the crisis in 2008 because 
they believed that the risks they took before the crisis would pay off.  Hence, 
their trading behaviour might not change before the crisis hits.  
Diagrammatically, figure (3.7) shows how the number of sold shares and the 
total value of sold shares vary over the sample period. Both of these variables 
moved in the same direction during the sample years. In 2006 and 2007, the 
total value of shares sold reached its maximum.  
Comparing the total number of trades over the sample period, one can see that 
the number of buy trades is always greater than the number of sell trades. 
Although it is not shown in table (3.10) directly, the number of buy trades per 
year is approximately three times the total number of sell trades per year. The 
difference reached its peak in 2008 when there were approximately eight times 
as many buy trades as sell trades.  
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Table 3.10: The Distribution of Directors’ Trades by Year 
Year  Buy Sell % 
Volume 
No of Trades No of Shares  Total Value (£) Average No of Shares Average Value (£) No of Trades No of Shares  Total Value (£) Average No of Shares Average Value (£) 
1991 1,708 95,614,544 64,341,927 37,671 55,980 1,269 299,318,039 317,737,382 250,384 235,869 0.09% 
1992 2,109 100,493,466 51,637,563 24,484 47,650 932 92,186,673 190,805,229 204,727 98,913 0.05% 
1993 1,686 108,172,945 69,494,648 41,219 64,160 1,236 205,937,472 293,652,786 237,583 166,616 0.07% 
1994 2,848 146,551,712 76,021,211 26,693 51,458 1,074 177,115,135 301,980,796 281,174 164,912 0.07% 
1995 3,793 206,199,818 74,255,353 19,577 54,363 1,311 254,918,966 376,609,974 287,269 194,446 0.08% 
1996 2,890 250,592,303 120,583,946 41,725 86,710 1,287 448,315,575 806,407,306 626,579 348,342 0.13% 
1997 3,531 183,865,328 138,782,400 39,304 52,072 1,075 288,719,996 515,576,102 479,606 268,577 0.07% 
1998 7,559 572,626,393 313,766,666 41,509 75,754 2,061 455,929,284 1,112,061,558 539,574 221,218 0.14% 
1999 4,968 211,181,732 185,235,048 37,286 42,508 1,337 401,250,521 932,458,312 697,426 300,113 0.07% 
2000 4,590 207,755,503 206,328,854 44,952 45,263 977 336,981,560 1,458,003,663 1,492,327 344,915 0.06% 
2001 2,417 216,692,983 143,530,703 59,384 89,654 546 126,555,677 356,275,463 652,519 231,787 0.03% 
2002 3,669 801,453,229 304,067,833 82,875 218,439 607 493,703,558 609,991,793 1,004,929 813,350 0.12% 
2003 2,967 477,454,635 224,323,761 75,606 160,922 881 1,279,062,261 573,687,333 651,177 1,451,830 0.19% 
2004 2,899 278,141,782 165,897,839 57,226 95,944 869 1,062,830,881 804,914,938 926,254 1,223,050 0.19% 
2005 2,990 397,137,203 225,348,411 75,367 132,822 1,042 1,143,302,783 1,481,037,778 1,421,341 1,097,220 0.19% 
2006 3,446 560,064,252 712,519,215 206,767 162,526 1,475 1,153,601,537 3,018,040,073 2,046,129 782,103 0.19% 
2007 4,344 953,644,124 3,333,334,666 767,342 219,531 1,378 971,584,250 3,146,448,157 2,283,344 705,068 0.19% 
2008 5,737 1,073,337,765 1,596,899,252 278,351 187,090 717 439,250,467 762,555,397 1,063,536 612,623 0.13% 
2009 3,110 958,349,221 262,280,702 84,335 308,151 856 611,106,793 962,882,481 1,124,863 713,910 0.13% 
2010 2,805 823,361,555 282,821,289 100,828 293,534 1,096 803,462,222 2,416,058,327 2,204,433 733,086 0.13% 
Total 70,067 8,622,693,193 8,551,474,796   22,026 11,045,133,650 20,437,184,847    
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. Average number of share for each type represents the total number of shares for that 
type divided by the number of trades. % volume is the average number of shares (bought and sold) as a percentage of FTSE All Shares average volume. 
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Figure 3.6: The Total Number of Shares Bought and the Total Value of Directors’ Buy 
Trades over Time 
 
Figure 3.7: The Total Number of Shares Sold and the Total Value of Directors’ Sell 
trades over Time 
 
Table (3.11) provides additional yearly summary statistics for directors’ trades 
(buys and sells). This table shows that the standard deviation is higher than the 
mean for both value and volume of trades. This means that some observations 
are far away from the mean. This results are not surprising since both insiders’ 
value and volume include very small and very high observations starting from 
£1 (or 1 share) to more than ten million pounds (or shares). Generally, the 
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percentiles statistics provides information about the impact the subject under 
interest has had compared with other subjects in the same area and in the same 
year (Bornmann, 2012). Statistically,   percentile finds the value under which X 
percent of the numbers lie and tells us how spread apart our numbers are. For 
example, table (3.11) shows that 75% of directors’ buys as measured by value 
are under £12,330 for the year 1991 and only 25% of trades’ value are under 
£2,452 for the same year (the same argument can be made for the volume of 
buy trades). Although it is not reported in table (3.11), the 90% of the value of 
buy trades are under £32,100. Hence, the upper 10% of directors’ value of buys 
have large values.  Interestingly, the 75% of the volume of buy trades for years 
2008 and 2009 are under 100,000 shares which are, at least, twice as large as 
the 75% of the volume of buy trades of other years.  
Similarly, table (3.11) shows that 75% of directors’ sells as measured by value 
are under £117,000 for the year 1991 and only 25% of trades’ value are under 
£10,433 for the same year.  
However, table (3.11) shows that the upper 10% of directors’ trades have large 
values which drive the standard deviation to be higher than the mean. 
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Table 3.11: Additional Yearly Summary Statistics for Directors’ Trades (Buys and Sells) 
Year Buy Sell 
Value Volume Value Volume 
Percentile Standard Deviation  Percentile Standard Deviation  Percentile Standard Deviation  Percentile Standard Deviation  
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
1991 2,452 5,400 12,330 486,960 2,000 5,000 20,000 295,178 10,433 27,520 117,000 1,350,696 5,000 17,000 70,000 1,762,427 
1992 2,960 6,000 14,250 154,110 2,500 10,000 25,000 239,001 10,057 25,224 108,400 787,693 5,000 15,000 50,800 325,068 
1993 3,600 8,250 20,007 237,964 2,214 9,569 25,000 275,802 11,090 29,000 120,945 984,457 5,000 15,000 66,420 1,273,345 
1994 1,800 5,876 15,695 137,303 1,000 5,000 15,000 404,997 10,038 23,972 101,600 2,489,298 4,411 15,000 60,000 740,129 
1995 733 4,700 11,674 110,393 241 2,684 11,993 822,083 9,620 25,000 126,276 1,217,512 3,906 12,000 70,000 1,972,656 
1996 4,000 8,350 19,250 343,071 2,239 6,102 20,000 1,033,993 15,000 46,760 249,000 5,514,542 5,500 24,359 125,000 3,162,381 
1997 4,650 9,900 23,575 197,890 3,000 9,000 21,227 274,323 14,850 48,500 220,000 2,946,687 5,500 20,189 100,000 1,834,281 
1998 5,100 11,001 27,400 167,282 3,328 10,000 30,000 540,197 16,575 52,500 322,000 1,876,747 6,100 25,000 100,000 1,204,236 
1999 2,975 9,000 22,000 212,492 1,103 5,000 20,000 192,621 16,000 66,665 320,000 2,822,347 6,414 26,500 130,000 1,105,839 
2000 1,050 6,947 19,938 528,433 300 3,026 15,000 333,811 20,700 110,300 580,000 9,229,150 10,000 37,639 165,000 1,854,409 
2001 5,800 12,500 29,000 306,339 5,000 10,261 40,000 696,355 13,990 45,363 233,100 5,321,366 5,000 19,970 100,000 1,499,249 
2002 5,625 11,925 29,835 1,177,586 5,000 15,000 60,000 1,595,282 16,199 59,863 313,901 ######## 8,260 35,847 225,000 4,562,390 
2003 5,000 11,590 30,400 698,070 4,800 13,000 50,000 1,030,258 23,920 94,950 457,950 1,950,285 12,000 70,000 308,112 8,539,101 
2004 5,649 13,000 32,650 323,438 3,500 10,000 43,105 605,272 31,517 126,144 540,000 4,022,094 12,729 60,000 340,991 ######## 
2005 6,297 15,000 40,000 638,972 4,060 12,270 50,000 1,130,204 23,578 119,654 600,000 ######## 9,436 49,430 250,000 ######## 
2006 7,582 17,400 42,500 6,501,517 5,000 18,584 61,724 1,174,216 28,812 121,275 552,500 ######## 7,149 40,000 200,000 5,376,912 
2007 9,874 21,261 53,460 ######## 5,000 15,000 50,000 2,212,263 40,000 173,182 770,250 ######## 10,175 55,000 300,000 3,719,684 
2008 8,125 19,360 49,627 8,262,725 8,600 25,000 100,000 1,002,329 44,163 178,391 639,899 3,363,891 13,809 58,152 254,597 2,286,556 
2009 6,338 15,470 39,604 598,271 7,500 25,000 100,000 2,075,130 44,029 140,012 558,062 4,371,144 12,216 50,000 200,000 3,670,763 
2010 9,400 19,868 49,706 834,677 8,414 24,069 83,333 2,996,531 54,533 232,000 866,100 ######## 18,739 65,000 250,000 3,321,670 
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3.4.2.1 Directors’ Age 
It is also interesting to see how directors’ trades vary with the age of the 
director. This section presents summary statistics as well as it highlights how 
directors’ trades vary with age. Due to the lack of available data on director 
age, we are only able to cover the periods 1991-1997 and 2002-2010. There are 
a total of 37,743 trades by directors over the sample period, divided into 26,839 
purchases of company stock and 10,904 sales – meaning there are 
approximately two times more buy trades than sale trades. This covers 
approximately 42% of total number of trades
10
.  
Table (3.12) presents summary statistics related to our sample. There are 
approximately two times as many buy trades as sells (26,839 buy trades versus 
10,904 sell trades). Although buy trades are more than sell trades, the average 
value of sell trades is approximately eight times bigger, which suggests that 
directors sell less frequently but in larger monetary amounts (a similar 
argument can be made for volume).  
The average age of directors who buy (measured by mean and median) is 55 
years old. This is slightly higher than the average for sell which is 54 years old.  
The most frequent age of directors who buy (measured by mode) is 59 years 
old. This is slightly higher than the mode for sell which is 57 years old. 
 
Table 3.12: Summary Statistics Categorised by Transaction Type 
Transaction type No Of Trades Average Value Average No of 
Shares  
Max Age Min 
Age 
Mean Age Median 
Age 
Mode 
Age 
Buy 10,904 119,790 142,205 92 20 55 55 59 
Sell 26,839 856,977 476,358 87 20 54 54 57 
Total 37,743        
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. The 
number of event days is the number of days during the period in which at least one trade takes place. Age 
presents the mean age for each type. Number of shares in the table is in terms of billions. 
Table (3.13) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by 
both age groups and transaction type during the sample period. There are more 
buy trades than sell trades in all age groups. The majority of buys and sales 
                                                          
10
 There will be further examination on the impact of director’s age upon the informativeness 
of directors’ trades in chapter five.  
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occurred between the age 45 and 65. Buys and sales under 40 and over 70 are 
much less frequent. Directors engage in buy transactions most frequently 
between the age 55 and 59, but sell more often between 50 and 54.  
The average value of directors’ buy transactions (and sell transactions) above 
the age of 65 is the highest. This is perhaps driven by a greater requirement for 
liquidity after 65 (sales) and an increased desire for the income from 
investments (i.e. dividends) at retirement age (hence greater value buys)
11
.  
 
Table (3.14) reports additional statistics related to our sample categorised by 
both age groups and transaction type during the sample period. This table also 
shows that .the standard deviation is higher than the mean for both value and 
volume of trades. 
table (3.14) also shows that 75% of directors’ buys as measured by value are 
under £25,000 for the age group 40-44 and only 25% of trades’ value are under 
£5,112 for the same age group (the same argument can be made for the volume 
of buy trades).  
Similarly, table (3.14) shows that 75% of directors’ sells as measured by value 
are under £275,000 for the age group 40-44 and only 25% of trades’ value are 
under £11,680 for the same age group.  
                                                          
11
 Psychology, cognitive abilities and finance studies provide two opposing views on the 
impact of age on decision making.  In one hand, studies by Baltes and Lindenberger (1997), 
Spaniol and Bayen (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) suggest that older people are 
less able to make right decisions. On the other hand, studies by Korniotis and Kumar (2011) 
and Graham et al., (2013) suggest that older people are more able to make right decisions 
because of experience and more knowledge of financial fundamentals. Besides, Fidrmuc et 
al., (2006) and Gregory et al., (2009) implies that sell trades by insiders are likely to be driven 
by liquidity/diversification needs, whereas buy trades are likely to be driven by advanced 
knowledge of future firm’s prospective. However, a further illustration and discussion is going 
to be made in Chapter 5 when examining the impact of director’s age on the informativeness 
of directors’ trades.  
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Table 3.13: Summary Statistics Categorised by Age and Transaction Type 
Age Buy Sell 
 No of Trades Average Value (£) Average No of Shares No of Trades Average Value (£) Average No of Shares 
Age under 40 1,427 78,372 181,844 621 544,682 779,494 
Age between 40 And 44 2,579 96,365 179,697 1,192 656,252 481,517 
Age between 45 And 49 4,336 63,469 169,742 2,067 624,021 392,346 
Age between 50 And 54 5,032 178,132 160,612 2,382 609,613 371,791 
Age between 55 And 59 5,697 67,428 98,541 2,046 1,076,722 536,632 
Age between 60 And 64 4,770 59,849 117,058 1,477 943,970 329,375 
Age between 65 And 69 2,182 324,446 125,450 728 1,194,823 558,369 
Age over 70 816 374,482 191,206 391 2,595,841 1,147,463 
Total 26,839     10,904   
Volume represents the number of traded stocks for each age and type during the sample period, so the average volume represents the total number of shares over the number of trades. 
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. 
 
Table 3.14: Additional Summary Statistics Categorised by Age and Transaction Type 
Age  Buy Sell 
Value Volume Value Volume 
Percentile S Dev Percentile S Dev Percentile S Dev Percentile S Dev 
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
Age under 40 4,300 14,489 60,000  4,995 10,000 20,000  10,500 21,376 135,000  5,000 20,000 200,000  
Age between 40 And 44 5,112 10,593 25,000 617,560 3,540 10,000 40,000 1,183,794 11,860 30,199 275,000 3080770 5,000 15,756 146,023 2309404 
Age between 45 And 49 5,000 10,300 24,825 279,238 3,219 10,000 32,752 1,303,289 10,480 22,500 221,600 3368961 4,000 12,500 100,000 2037661 
Age between 50 And 54 4,830 10,000 22,005 6,729,804 2,500 10,000 25,872 1,335,448 10,700 26,460 263,713 3186612 4,108 13,711 100,000 4718626 
Age between 55 And 59 4,884 9,975 21,750 495,475 2,500 8,865 25,000 540,014 10,970 36,757 303,000 1.24E+07 4,439 15,000 100,000 3842617 
Age between 60 And 64 4,860 10,146 26,232 7,664,507 2,500 10,000 27,100 1,104,093 11,663 45,000 335,602 1.39E+07 5,000 20,000 100,000 3496005 
Age between 65 And 69 4,350 9,800 24,500 230,857 2,441 9,966 30,000 360,317 13,000 51,860 450,432 6819579 5,000 20,000 166,837 3763818 
Age over 70 4,500 12,250 37,715 6,651,693 3,000 10,000 50,000 1,308,531 23,426 83,250 361,528 1.14E+07 10,000 37,000 170,750 4900369 
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3.4.2.2 Transaction Size 
Previous empirical studies suggest that the informativeness of directors’ trades 
varies with trade size (Barclay and Warner, 1993). More specifically, medium-
sized trades (where the information exists) are more informative than other-
sized trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993, and Friederich et al.et al., 2002). 
Seyhun (2000) assumed that insiders worry about the regulatory implications 
of their large transactions (more so purchases than sales), so they might break 
up their large transactions into smaller lots and spread these over a period of 
time. By breaking up their purchases orders into smaller lots over longer time 
horizons, insiders make it harder for regulators to detect unusual purchasing 
activity. In contrast, insiders are less concerned about the size of their sell 
transactions. Again, a possible explanation for this finding is that insiders can 
easily come up with reasons as to why they need cash due to liquidity reasons. 
Making the same argument for purchases could be more difficult (Seyhun, 
2000).  
To address these issues, the relation between trade size and buy-sell activities 
need be analysed. If regulatory concerns are not important at all, there should 
be no relation between buy and sell transactions and volume of trades. Our data 
shows that small transactions tend to be purchases while large transactions tend 
to be sells (Table 3.15). For those trades where the number of shares is less 
than 100, about 78% are buys. In contrast, when the trading volume (number of 
shares) increases, selling becomes more predominant. For those trades where 
the volume exceeds 10 million shares, only 35% are purchases and 65% are 
sells.  
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Table 3.15: Summary Statistics Categorised by Transaction Types  
1991-2010 
No of Shares BUY SELL Buy Proportion 
No Of Trades Total Value (£) No Of Trades Total Value (£) 
1-100 2,376 901,171 97 258,322 77.72 (%) 
101-1000 5,254 14,300,000 542 3,302,693 81.24 (%) 
1001-10000 24,048 283,000,000 6,008 130,000,000 68.52 (%) 
10001-100000 27,850 1,070,000,000 8,303 1,260,000,000 45.92 (%) 
100001-1000000 9,049 1,510,000,000 5,482 4,970,000,000 23.30 (%) 
 1000001-10000000 1,372 1,710,000,000 1,419 6,760,000,000 20.19 (%) 
Over 10000000 118 3,960,000,000 175 7,310,000,000 35.14 (%) 
Buy proportion is equal to the total value of buy trades divided by the total value of buy and 
sale trades combined. 
For those trades where the volume is less than 100 shares, the total value of 
directors’ purchases was over £900,000, but the cumulated total value of sell 
transactions was £258,322, making directors net buyers of corporate equity for 
this category. This continued to be the case for less than 10,000 shares where 
the total value of purchases exceeded the total value of cells. In contrast, 
directors who trade more than 10,000 shares are net sellers since the total value 
of their sells are higher than the total value of their purchases.  
3.4.2.3 Directors’ Type 
The general features and characteristics of UK directors’ transactions 
categorised by director type are examined in this section. Because of data 
availability, the analysed sample covers only 37% of total available trades 
during the sample period. More specifically, the period under examination 
starts at January 2002 and ends at December 2010.  
Table (3.16) shows how trades are distributed across directors’ types and also 
highlights this by transaction type (buy and sale). There are a total of 35,300 
transactions. The majority of these are by former directors (for both transaction 
types) followed by executive and non- executive directors. This pattern is 
repeated for buy transactions but not for sales. PDMRs account for 24% of sell 
transactions and only 10% of buy transactions.  
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Another interesting observation is that, whereas there are five times as many 
non-executive buys as there are sales, for PDMRs, they are roughly equal.  
Table 3.16: The Total Number of Trades Categorised by Director Type for 
Buy and Sell Trades 
Type Executive Former Non-Executive PDMR Total 
Buy 5,816 12,007 6,125 2,538 26,486 (76%) 
Sell 2,178 3,280 1,217 2,139 8,814 (24%) 
Total 7,994 (23%) 15,287 (45%) 7,342 (22%) 4,677 (10%) 35,300 
 
Table (3.17) gives more detailed information on how directors’ trades vary 
with director types. In particular, we show how the total (and average) value as 
well as volume of shares varies with director type for both buy and sell 
transactions. Focusing on the average value of transactions reveals immediately 
that the average value of sell transactions is much higher than that of buys. 
This is true for all directors’ categories except for PDMRs. For buy 
transactions, the average amount per trade of executive and PDMR directors 
dominate those of former and non-executive directors (about three times 
larger).  
For sell transactions, the average money spent per trade by executive directors 
is approximately six times than that of PDMRs. 
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Table 3.17: Additional Summary Statistics Categorised by Director Type  
Type Buy Sell 
 No of Trades Total Value £m No of Shares #m Average Value £ No of Trades No of Shares #m Total Value £m Average Value £ 
Executive 5,816 2,134 4,266 27001 2,178 5,237 3,603 318,389 
Former 12,007 1,368 1,063 11385 3,280 5,835 6,668 210,793 
Non-Executive 6,125 1,393 1,482 12203 1217 1,559 1,421 140,960 
PDMR 2,538 611 312 31025 2,139 1,005 1,407 50,044 
Total 26,486 5,506 7,123   8,814 13,635 13,099   
Average value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. 
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3.4.2.4 Directors’ Industries/Sectors 
Categorising directors’ trades by the industry (and sector) in which the firm 
operates may shed light on directors’ activities across industries (and sectors)12. 
Therefore, this section looks at general patterns and characteristics of directors’ 
trades across industries
13
.  
Again, due to the lack of available data on director industry/sector, we are able 
only to cover the period 2000-2010. There is a total of 59,123 trades by 
directors over the sample period, divided into 47,434 buy trades and 12,689 
sale trades – meaning there are approximately three times more buy trades than 
sale trades. This covers approximately 64% of total available trades.  
Table (3.18) provides summary statistics related to our sample categorised by 
industry (and sector) groups and transaction type during the sample period. 
There are more buy trades than sell trades in all industry (and sector) groups. 
The majority of buys and sales occurred in Financials industry (and Industrial 
Goods and Services sector). Buys and sales in Utilities industry (and 
Automobiles sector) are much less frequent.  
Another interesting observation is that, whereas the total value of buy trades in 
all industries (and sectors) is lower than those of sales for oil and gas industry, 
they are not (the same argument can be made for the volume).  
                                                          
12
 Industry refers to a few general segments in the economy within which a large group of 
companies can be categorised, whereas sector describes a much more specific grouping of 
companies with highly similar business activities. In other words, industry contains many 
sectors.  
13
 The impact of industry classifications on the informativeness of directors’ trades are 
examined further in chapter six.  
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Table 3.18: Summary Statistics Categorised by Directors’ Trades in Different Sectors and Industries 
Industry Sector BUY SELL 
No of Trades Total Value £m No of Shares #m No of Trades Total Value £m No of Shares #m 
Basic Materials Basic Resources 1,709 635 541 485 2,799 521 
Chemicals 789 14 22 153 40 18 
Total  2,498 649 563 638 2,839 539 
Consumer Goods Automobiles 245 7 7 46 10 8 
Food and Beverage 1,691 97 119 515 340 146 
Personal and Household Goods 1,169 66 140 398 348 145 
Total  3,105 170 266 959 698 299 
Consumer Services Media 2,786 217 739 762 731 677 
Retail 2,523 1,413 333 818 1,641 627 
Travel and Leisure 2,622 406 768 789 1,580 1,328 
Total  7,931 2,036 1,840 2,369 3,952 2,632 
Financials Banks 1,142 970 120 272 415 50 
Financial Services 7,669 493 1,105 1,714 1,739 1,172 
Insurance 1,677 81 65 365 366 91 
Real Estate 2,538 299 412 655 490 301 
Total   13,026 1,843 1,702 3,006 3,010 1,614 
Health Care Health Care 1,826 96 207 472 351 190 
Industrials Construction 1,908 107 160 364 291 100 
Engineering 1,101 25 50 118 30 13 
Industrial Goods and Services 9,013 371 989 2,431 2,369 1,599 
Total   12,022 503 1,199 2,913 2,690 1,712 
Oil and Gas Distributors 588 31 104 127 104 31 
Oil and Gas 1,646 2,090 395 450 1,451 425 
Total   2,234 2,121 499 577 1,555 456 
Technology Technology 3,397 256 807 1,246 1,251 1,096 
Telecommunications Telecommunications 763 60 91 236 263 289 
Utilities Utilities 632 46 17 273 206 114 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the dataset used in this thesis to 
analyse the information content of director trading. The objective was to 
familiarise the reader with some important characteristics of insider trading 
activities.  
Previous studies have used directors’ trades to examine various hypotheses in 
the general area of insider trading. One focus of previous literature has been to 
examine how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, firm 
and director characteristics.  
Based on the findings of the literature that has attempted to distinguish between 
information driven from noisy insider trades, we presented and examined 
insider trading characteristics and patterns based on transaction (type and size), 
director (type and age), and firm characteristics (industry to which the firm 
belongs).  
These effects are comprehensively reviewed insider trading behaviour, 
describing the general characteristics, patterns, and activities of UK directors 
over the period 1991-2010. To the best of our knowledge, this exercise has 
never been conducted before.  
Using a dataset of more than 5,000 UK companies covering the period January 
1991 to December 2010 comprising a total of 181,276 transactions distributed 
over 20 different transaction types, we present quantitative statistics to 
highlight insider trading patterns.  
Focusing only on ordinary buys and sales, we observed certain patterns; 
Directors buy more frequently than they sell but the average value of sell trades 
is approximately seven times larger, which suggests that directors sell less 
frequently but in larger monetary amounts (a similar argument was made for 
volume). Also, the total value of shares sold peaked in 2007. This is perhaps 
due to the financial crisis which occurred at that year. Interestingly, the value 
of shares sold was similar in 2006, perhaps indicating that directors, 
collectively, were anticipating the crisis. 
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Categorising directors’ trades by the age of the director showed that the 
majority of buys and sales occurred between the age 45 and 65. Buys and sales 
under 40 and over 70 are much less frequent. Directors engage in buy 
transactions most frequently between the age 55 and 59, but sell more often 
between 50 and 54. The average value of directors’ buy transactions (and sell 
transactions) above the age of 65 is highest. This may be driven by a greater 
requirement for liquidity after 65 (sales) and an increased desire for the income 
from investments (i.e. dividends) at retirement age (hence greater value buys). 
Another pattern can be seen where small transactions tend to be purchases 
while large transactions tend to be sells.  
Categorising directors’ trades by directors’ types showed that the majority of 
the trades were by former directors (for both transaction types) followed by 
executive and non- executive directors. This pattern is repeated for buy 
transactions but not for sales. For buy transactions, the average amount per 
trade of executive and PDMR directors dominate those of former and non-
executive directors (about three times larger). For sell transactions, the average 
money spent per trade by executive directors is approximately six times that of 
PDMRs.  
Accounting for the industry (and the sector) in which the firm operates 
revealed the following. The majority of buys and sales occurred in the financial 
industry (and Industrial Goods and Services sector). Buys and sales in Utilities 
industry (and Automobiles sector) are much less frequent. Another interesting 
observation is that, whereas the total value of buy trades in all industries (and 
sectors) is higher than those of sales, for Oil and Gas industry, they are not (the 
same argument can be made for the volume).  
As well as these general findings, a few unexplained patterns have identified; 
firstly, there are five times as many non-executive buys as there are sales, for 
PDMRs, they are slightly equal. Secondly, the total value of shares sold 
reached a peak in 2007. We suggest that this could be an avenue for future 
researches. 
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Chapter 4:  Seasonal Patterns in Aggregate 
Directors’ Trades 
4.1 Introduction  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that at any given time, prices 
fully reflect all available information on a particular stock market. The weak 
form of the market efficiency hypothesis suggests that the current price fully 
incorporates all the information contained in the record of past share prices. 
Thus, no investor can gain an advantage in predicting the return on a stock 
using past price observations. The empirical literature in this area is vast. For 
example, a number of seasonality or calendar anomalies in equity trading, such 
as the Day-of-the Week
14
, Month-of-the Year, or turn of the year
15
 (January 
effect), amongst others, have challenged the weak form of the EMH. The 
existence of these anomalies may indicate market inefficiency, which in turn 
provides a possibility for market participants to gain abnormal returns by 
creating a set of trading rules.  
Two of the most documented anomalies in equity markets are the day of the 
week effect (also known as Monday effect) and turn of the year effect (known 
as the January effect). The Monday effect occurs when returns are lower, or 
negative, on Monday in comparison with returns on other days of the week. 
The January effect is another common anomaly that is inconsistent with the 
EMH. This calendar effect happens when certain stocks generate higher returns 
in January compared to other months of the year. 
Following on from the previous chapter, which examined the patterns and 
characteristics of insider trading activities, one aim of this chapter is to 
specifically test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions 
                                                          
14
 See for example Cross (1973), French (1980), and Dalvi and Nath (2004).  
15
 See for example Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Choudhry (2001).  
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(as measured by the aggregate insider number and value of insider 
transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to trade on any particular day of 
the week or month of the year?  
The previous literature on calendar anomalies has been on returns i.e. do 
returns vary by month of the year or day of the week. This literature has 
attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exist and/or to try to 
explain their existence. For example, Cross (1973) and French (1980) reported 
negative returns on Monday. This may be due to the methodology employed or 
the way of calculating returns (Connolly, 1989), investor psychology (Rystrom 
and Benson, 1989), the difference in trading patterns of individual and 
institutional investors (Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990), or settlement 
procedures (Keef and McGuinness, 2001)
16
.  
The day of the week anomalies in trading volume has also been examined by 
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) and Sias and Starks (1995) with the aim of 
explaining calendar anomalies in stock returns. These studies suggested that 
Monday trading volume is higher compared to other days of the week. More 
specifically, there are more tendencies to sell on Mondays than to buy for 
individual investors or more tendencies to buy than to sell for institutional 
investors (Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990). The reason for this anomaly, as 
given by these studies, is related to the private information hypothesis and the 
behaviour of individual and institutional investors
17
. To the best of our 
knowledge, no examination of the day of the week effects in aggregate insider 
activities as measured by the aggregate number of directors’ trades has yet 
been carried out.  
Similarly, studies by Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Keim (1983) and Gu (2003) 
documented positive returns on January. The existence of this anomaly can be 
explained by a tax loss selling hypothesis (Fountas and Segredakis, 2002), 
window dressing hypothesis (Haugen and Lakonishok, 1987), new information 
provided by the firms at the end of the financial year (Barry and Brown, 1984), 
or insider trading activities (Seyhun, 1988b, and Hillier and Marshall, 2002a)
18
.  
                                                          
16
 These explanations are discussed further in literature review section.  
17
 This is further discussed in literature review section.  
18
 These explanations are also highlighted and discussed in literature review section.  
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Trading volume anomalies in aggregate insider activities was also examined by 
Seyhun (1988b) and Hillier and Marshall (2002a). Seyhun (1988b) examined 
the monthly pattern of aggregate insider transactions in the US over the period 
1975-1981with the aim of testing two competing explanations of the January 
effect (the price pressure hypothesis
19
 and the risk premium hypothesis
20
). The 
results indicated that some insiders tend to accelerate their planned stock 
purchases and postpone their stock sales in December. Therefore, this enables 
insiders to capture a return that is more positive in January. Also, using 
aggregate insider trading, Hillier and Marshall (2002a) examined the January 
effect in UK securities and found that it was significant, but not persistent 
through time. Furthermore, the results showed that the seasonality in insider 
trading was not the main determinant of the turn of the year effect. Both of 
these studies used the aggregate number of insider trades as their measure of 
insider trading activity. Hillier and Marshall (2002a) used only six years insider 
trading data. We re-examined this in the UK by using a much longer time 
period (20 years), which may allow us to test for the persistence of this effect. 
Furthermore, we introduced another measure of insider trading activities, 
namely, the aggregate value of directors’ trades. To the best of our knowledge, 
the day of the week effect in aggregate insider trading activity has not been 
examined yet.  
A second aim of this chapter, given that such seasonal patterns exist, is to 
attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on 
calendar anomalies (in returns and volumes).  
Although the purpose of this chapter is purely to identify whether such 
anomalies exist, we do not attempt to explain why they do. We suggest this is 
an avenue for further research in this area.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section (4.2) reviews previous studies on 
stock market anomalies and the explanations provided for both daily and 
monthly patterns in these anomalies. Section (4.3) sets the hypotheses. Sections 
                                                          
19
 This hypothesis states that the large positive return at the turn of the year arises due to price 
pressure from predictable: seasonal changes in the demand for different securities. 
20
 This hypothesis states that the large positive returns in January observed among small firms 
compensate for the increased risk of trading against informed traders. 
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(3.4) and (3.5) present the data and methodology. Section (3.6) discusses the 
results while Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
4.2 Literature Review 
The previous literature in calendar anomalies has focused on returns (and 
volumes) i.e. whether returns (and volumes) vary by month of the year or day 
of the week. This section reviews the literature which identifies whether these 
anomalies exist and/or tries to explain their existence. More specifically, 
Section (4.2.1) reviews the literature which identify whether day of the week 
anomalies exist and/or tries to explain their existence, whereas Section (4.2.2) 
reviews the literature which identifies whether month of the year anomalies 
exist and/or tries to explain their existence. Section (4.2.3) reviews the 
existence literature of calendar anomalies in trading volume which aims of 
explaining stock returns anomalies. This literature will help us, later, setting 
our hypotheses in section (4.3).  
4.2.1  Day of the Week Effects in Returns  
The day of the week anomaly (known as Monday effect) refers to the tendency 
of stocks to exhibit relatively negative returns on Mondays compared to other 
days of the week. This section reviews the studies which identified the 
existence of the day of the week anomalies and/or studies which try to explain 
their existence.  
When examining US markets, Cross (1973), French (1980), Gibbons and Hess 
(1981), Keim and Stambaugh (1984), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), 
Bessembinder and Hertzel(1993) and Siegel (1998)  reported significantly 
negative mean return on Mondays and high mean returns at the end of the week 
(Friday). 
Using data collected from the US, Canada, and the UK stock markets, Jaffe and 
Westerfield (1985 a, b) reported negative  returns on Mondays, whereas the 
data collected from Japanese and Australian stock markets showed negative 
returns on Tuesdays. In Paris Stock Exchange, Solnik and Bousquer (1990) 
reported similar strong and negative returns on Tuesday. Agrawal and Tandon 
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(1994) examined the seasonality patterns in stock returns considering eighteen 
countries other than the US such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK 
and found lower (or negative) mean returns on Mondays and Tuesdays and 
higher (and positive) returns from Wednesdays to Fridays in almost all of these 
countries. Additionally, Arsad and Coutts (1997), Mehdian and Perry (2001), 
Gregoriou, Kontonikas and Tsitsianis, (2004), and Linton (2006)   examined 
the day of the week effect in the UK and found negative Monday returns.  
Also, when examining emerging markets, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989) and 
Wong et al., (1992) noticed lower mean stock returns on Mondays and 
Tuesdays in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Balaban (1995, 1996) and Dicle and Hassan (2007) found that the lowest, and 
negative, mean returns were on Tuesdays, and the highest returns and the 
lowest standard deviations were on Fridays in Turkish stock market. 
Martikainen and Puttonen (1996) reported negative and statistically significant 
average return on Tuesdays and Wednesdays in Finnish stock market. This 
pattern was repeated in studies by Goswami and Anshuman (2000), Kumari 
and Mahendra (2006), Elango and Al Macki (2008) and Hussain et al. (2011) 
for Indian Stock Exchange, whereas Lian and Chen (2004) and Ajayi et al. 
(2004) analysed the calendar behaviour of Vietnamese, Estonia and Lithuania 
stock market respectively and confirmed the same pattern (i.e. negative average 
returns on Tuesday).  
These studies, however, contradicted the presence of Day of the Week 
anomalies in stock market returns.  
Another strand of literature tried to explain these seasonal patterns by 
examining various hypotheses such as calendar time hypothesis, trading time 
hypothesis, and time zone hypothesis. According to calendar time hypothesis, 
Monday’s average return is three times higher than other days’ average returns. 
This is because Monday’s average return is estimated from the closing price on 
Friday until the closing price on Monday. (French, 1980). On the other hand, 
Trading Time Hypothesis states that all days average return (Monday through 
Friday) should be the same because each day’s return represents one day’s 
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investment (Draper and Paudyal) whereas Time Zone Hypothesis states that 
Tuesday’s effect is due to time difference between US market and other 
markets (Jaffe and Westerfield, 1985; and Condoyanni, O’Hanlon, and Ward, 
1987).  
Other studies (e.g., Connolly, 1989; Sullivan, Timmerman, and White 2001; 
Hansen, Lunde and Nason, 2005) assumed that the day of the week effect 
might be a result of used methodology of estimation and testing. Investor’s 
psychology is, as well, viewed as a cause of Day of the Week anomalies 
(Rystrom and Benson, 1989). Specifically, investors would be more likely to 
sell (buy)more stocks on Monday (Friday) if they felt pessimistic (optimistic) 
and, therefore, create downward (upward ) pressure in prices. Similarly, Nath 
and Dalvi (2004) suggested that investors avoid trading against informed 
traders on Mondays who might have more information received during the 
weekend. Thus, investors would likely to buy less on Monday.  
 
Based on these priors, one aim of this chapter is to examine the presence of 
Day of the Week effect in insider trading activities as measured by aggregate 
number and value of insiders’ trades.  
 
4.2.2  Month of the Year Effects in Returns 
The month-of-the-year effect is a calendar anomaly according to which stock 
returns show a rise or fall during certain months as compared to the mean. 
These seasonal effects are modelled using time series data and tend to be 
repeated every calendar year. Month of the year is also called January effect; 
this is particularly due to the tendency of stocks to perform better in January 
compared to any other time of the year (Rozeff and Kenney, 1976). This 
section reviews the studies which identified the existence of the month of the 
year anomaly  and/or studies which try to explain their existence.  
 
Using different US indices, Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988), Haugen and Jorion (1996), Mehdian and Perry (2002), Moosa (2007) 
and Sharma and Narayan (2011) found that the mean January return is higher 
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than mean return of other months.  Similarly, but using UK data, Reinganum 
and Shapiro (1987), Arsad and Coutts (1997) and Hillier and Marshall (2002a) 
showed significantly positive returns in January for the entire period under 
examination and positive returns also in the months of April and December. 
 
January effect is also conducted by Choudhry (2001) and Gu (2003) using data 
from the pre-World War I era for the US, UK, and Germany, Canada, France, 
and Japan.  
The January effect has also been detected in many other countries, India 
(Pandey, 2002; Bodla and Jindal, 2006), Greece (Mills et al., 2000; Flores, 
2008), Nepal (Bahadur and Joshi, 2005), Poland, Romania, Hungary and 
Slovakia (Asteriou and Kovetsos, 2006), and Argentina (Rossi, 2007).  
Empirical literature on stock return anomalies provided many explanations to 
the turn of the year effect (the January effect). Among these explanations are 
tax loss selling, capital gains taxation, and new information release hypotheses.  
Tax loss selling hypothesis is the most frequent explanation to the turn of the 
year anomalies. According to this hypothesis, investors, in order to avoid taxes 
on capital gains, realise capital losses to offset capital gains by selling losers 
stocks in December. This would cause high selling pressure in December 
which is relieved in January bringing about large capital gains for losers 
(Fountas and Segredakis, 2002; and Chen and Singal, 2004).  
Another related explanation is called capital gains taxation hypothesis. This 
hypothesis states that if investors realise capital losses to offset capital gains, it 
is also possible to delay capital gains realisation, so that they can delay tax 
payment on capital gains. By doing so, investors might postpone tax payment 
by one year. Thus, investors would sell winners (shares) in January. Hence, the 
selling pressure in December would be small causing the price to rise.  
Both of these hypotheses are based on tax purposes .i.e. investors, in order to 
avoid taxation, sell more in December or delay selling to January causing an 
increase in January returns.  
Studies by Roll (1983), Reiganum (1983), Brown et al. (1983), Eakins and 
Sewll (1993), Johnston and Cox (1996) and Sharma and Narayan (2011) 
suggested that tax loss selling hypothesis is the main driver of high January 
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returns. These studies focused on small firms where price variation is high 
compared to other firm sizes (medium or large).  
Additional evidence for the tax-loss hypothesis in countries such as UK and 
Australia with a tax year-end other than the end of December has been also 
provided by many studies. For example, Brown, Kleidon and Marsh, (1983) 
reported July effect in Australia following a June tax year end. Reinganum and 
Shapiro (1987), Arsad and Coutts (1997), Draper and Paudyal (1996), and 
Baker and Limmack (1998) reported April effect in UK following 5
th
 of April 
tax year end for individuals. These studies concluded that January (and April) 
anomaly may be due in part to a tax-loss-selling hypothesis.  
Constantinides (1984) and Chen and Singal (2004) suggested that rational 
investors should realise long-term capital gains to re-establish a short-term 
status to make short-term capital losses in the future. Moreover, investors 
should sell losers in December to realise capital losses and sell winners in 
December to re-establish a short-term status. Similarly, Poterba and 
Weisbenner (2001) examined whether January anomaly is driven by capital 
gains hypothesis. They found that the turn-of-the-year return is positively 
related to the difference between short-term and long-term capital gain tax 
rates.  
Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Chen (1988) provided another explanation to 
January anomalies  which is the information release hypothesis. This 
hypothesis states that January effect is caused by the information released by 
the company at the end of the financial year. The release of information in 1
st
 
of January creates and then resolves uncertainty and lead to (temporary) risk. 
Penman (1987) hypothesised that firms release good news in the beginning of 
each quarter and delay the releasing of bad news until the second half of the 
quarter. Thus, if the market reacts automatically to the news, stocks should 
earn higher returns in the first few days of each quarter. Also, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1995) suggested that stocks with high information suffer less 
compared to stocks with poor information.. That is to say, if the information 
hypothesis is true, the January effect should relate negatively to the number of 
analysts forecasts. Hence, the smaller the number of analysts’ forecasts, the 
greater the January returns.  
Based on these priors, another aim of this chapter is to examine the presence 
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of Month of the Year effect in insider trading activities as measured by 
aggregate number and value of insiders’ trades.  
 
4.2.3  Calendar Anomalies in Trading Volume 
The purpose of this section is to review the literature on calendar anomalies in 
trading volume in order to provide a rationale to our research. Lakonishok and 
Maberly (1990) provided another reason for the negative Monday returns. 
They argued that the difference in trading patterns of individual and 
institutional investors
21
 is one of the driving forces behind the negative 
Monday returns. They documented low trading volume on Monday for 
institutional investors and the opposite pattern for individual investors (.i.e. 
high trading volume on Monday). For buy and sell transactions, the increase in 
individuals activity on Mondays is not symmetric. Hence, individuals tend to 
sell more than to buy on Monday which, partially, might explain weekend 
effect. Osborne (1962) and Kamara (1997) predicted that, individual investors 
spend more time on financial decisions during the weekend, whereas 
institutional investors are less active in the market on Monday because Monday 
tends to be a day of strategic planning. Therefore, individual investors are 
relatively more active in the market on Monday. Another reason why 
individual investors tend to sell more at the beginning of the week than to buy 
is that individual investors might decide to not engages in a buy transaction 
before his or her sell transactions are executed. Similarly, Abraham and 
Ikenberry (1994) studied the trading patterns of individual investors and 
supported the results of Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) that individual 
investors tend to sell more on Mondays. Based on the hypothesis that private 
information is received throughout the week while public information is 
received only on working days, informed trader might have more information 
on Monday than on other days of the week (Sias and Starks, 1995). Hence, 
more informed trading would occur on Monday than on other days of the week 
leading liquidity trades to avoid Mondays.  
                                                          
21
 This study differentiates between institutional and individual investors based on trade size. 
Moreover, large stocks are mostly be held by institutional investors, whereas small stocks are 
likely to be held by individual investors.   
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Furthermore, without public information, informed traders carry information 
from Monday to other days, so that price sensitivity is the same each day (to 
the order flow). The presence of public information reduces the effects of 
private information. Thus, more information is released through trading early 
in the week (Monday) because price sensitivity to the order flow would be low. 
In the presence of liquidity traders, the concentration of the trading is going to 
be on two days each week (Monday and Friday)
22
. In this case, the trading 
volume by liquidity and informed traders might form a U-Shape. The U-Shape 
in intraday and interday trading volume patterns was previously found by 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Jain and Joh (1986), and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988). These studies showed high trading volume on Monday and 
Friday (Foster and Viswanathan, 1990) and in the first and the last hours of the 
trading day (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Similarly, Blau, Van Ness and Van 
Ness, (2009) documented that the U-shaped pattern in intraday returns is 
caused by large trades because changeling in prices from larger (smaller) trades 
are higher (lower) at the beginning and end of the day. This is attributed to the 
fact that smaller trades, in periods of low volume, would move prices because 
informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the market. When 
volume is high, informed traders are able to increase the size of their trades 
because their information would be hidden by high volume. 
Badhani (2006) analysed the intraweek trading patterns of Foreign Institutional 
Investors in India and found low buying and selling volumes on Tuesdays. This 
Tuesday-effect may be a reflection of Monday-effect on institutional investors 
trading activities documented in US.  
Turning to monthly anomalies, the window dressing hypothesis offers another 
explanation of the January effect. According to this hypothesis which is 
developed by Haugen and Lakonishok (1987) and Lakonishok et al. (1991), 
institutional managers’ performance and investment philosophy are used to 
evaluate them. To improve their performance, the institutions buy both risky 
and small stocks but sell them before the year ends. Therefore, their year-end 
holdings will not show these stocks. In January, investment managers replace 
winners, large, and low risk stocks with losers, small and risky stocks. Musto 
                                                          
22
 This is the case when there are high public information signals. When public information 
signals are poor, liquidity traders would concentrate their trading on Friday.  
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(1997) examined the window-dressing among money market instruments and 
found a January effect among those instruments that do not generate capital 
losses. He concluded that window-dressing activities of the institutional 
investors could explain the January effect at least partially. Similarly, Ritter 
and Chopra (1989) and Meier and Schaumburg (2004) provided supporting 
evidence for the window-dressing hypothesis. On the other hand, Sias and 
Starks (1997) evaluated the tax-loss-selling and the window-dressing 
hypotheses by looking at transaction data for stocks dominated by institutional 
investors versus those dominated by individual investors. Although they found 
that institutions tend to buy recent winners, which is consistent with the 
window-dressing hypothesis, they did not find any evidence of institutions 
selling losers, and their data did not show whether the winner buying 
institutions have year-end disclosures. Chen and Singal (2004) found no 
evidence for the window-dressing hypothesis by examining the stocks’ return 
and volume patterns at the end of the semi-annual period (June-July) when tax-
loss-selling is not expected.  
Lower volume of sales tends to be associated with losers (stocks, the prices of 
which have decreased) on December because investors, by postponing their 
sales by a month or two, postpone payments of capital tax by a full year. On 
the other side, the volume of sales for winners stocks tends to be higher on 
December because investors would apply these losses against their taxable 
incomes soon as possible (Dyl, 1977 and Henderson, 1990). Lakonishock and 
Smidt (1986) assumed that there is a positive correlation between price and 
trading volume. Moreover, if the trading volume is affected by the degree of 
attention the company received, thus companies with large increase (decrease) 
in price might experience increase (decrease) in trading volume. Based on that, 
investors, who believe that price and trading volume are positively correlated, 
may be attracted by winners stocks and avoid losers ones.  
Seyhun (1988b) tried to relate January effects with insider trading activities by 
examining two competing hypotheses; price pressure and risk premium 
hypotheses. More specifically, the increase in insiders buying activities in 
December as a response to January’s positive returns would enable insiders to 
capture price increase in January. Hence, price pressure hypothesis assume 
insiders in small firms to be net buyers in December (the opposite pattern can 
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be observed for insiders in large firms). On the other hand, risk premium 
hypothesis assume high buying or selling activities by insiders in january. 
However, the results showed that insiders buy more and delay selling shares in 
December to benefit from price running up in January. In contrast to the US 
studies, Hillier and Marshall (2002a) examined the January effect in the UK 
listed securities and found that it was significant but not persistent through the 
time. Moreover, the results showed that seasonalities in insider trading were 
not the main determinant of the turn of the year effect.  
4.2.4  Summary of the Literature 
To summarise, previous empirical literature in stock returns anomalies supports 
the existence of the day of the week effect i.e. negative returns in the beginning 
of the week and high returns at the end of the week. These anomalies might be 
driven by the methodology employed or the way of calculating returns, 
investor psychology, the difference in trading patterns of individual and 
institutional investors, or settlement procedures. Also, the literature on trading 
volume suggests that Monday’s trading volume is higher compared to other 
days of the week. More specifically, investors sell more on Monday if they are 
individual investors and sell less if they are institutional investors. This is 
perhaps due to the private information hypothesis and the behaviour of 
individual and institutional investors. Similarly, previous empirical literature in 
stock returns anomalies supports the existence of the month of the year effect 
i.e. high returns on January. These anomalies might be driven by the tax loss 
selling hypothesis, window dressing hypothesis, or new information provided 
by the firms at the end of the financial year. Also, the turn of the year effect 
might be due to director trading activities as measured by the aggregate number 
of directors’ trades (Seyhun, 1988b, and Hillier and Marshall, 2002a).  
The first aim of this chapter is to specially test for seasonal patterns in 
aggregate insider trading transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider 
number of trades and the aggregate value of insider transactions). Specifically, 
do insiders prefer to trade on any particular day of the week or month of the 
year? Secondly, given that such seasonal patterns exist, we are going to attempt 
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to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on calendar 
anomalies in returns (and trading volume).  
4.3 Hypotheses 
The previous literature on the day of the week and month of the year anomalies 
in stock returns has attempted to identify whether these anomalies exists and/or 
to try to explain their existence. We examine the existence of the day of the 
week and month of the year anomalies in aggregate director trading activities 
as measured by the aggregate number and value of insider transactions. We 
commence by examining whether insiders have more preference for trading in 
any particular day of the week. In other words, we test the following 
hypothesis; 
Hypothesis (1): There is no day of the week effect in aggregate insider 
activities as measured by the aggregate number and value of directors’ trades  
Sias and Starks (1995) suggested that more informed investors tend to trade on 
Mondays than other days of the week because private information is available 
all days of the week including weekends while public information are only 
available on working days. Given that insider trading literature is ambiguous 
and suggests that informed trades are likely to be buy trades, we might expect;  
Hypothesis (2): The aggregate volume of directors’ buy (sell) trades is higher 
(lower) on Monday than on other days of the week.  
Focusing on the turn of the month, we first examine simple whether directors 
have preferences to trade at any particular month of the year. Therefore;  
Hypothesis (3): There is no month of the year effect in aggregate insider 
activities as measured by the aggregate number and value of directors’ trades  
In the UK, the tax year for the firms corresponds to the calendar year, whereas 
the tax year for the individuals ends at 5
th
 of April. The tax loss selling 
literature, which is often used as an explanation for the turn of the year 
anomaly, suggests that firms and individuals sell more in the month before the 
Chapter Four: Seasonal Patterns in Aggregate Directors Trade 
 
88 
end of the year and buy more after
23
 (Seyhun, 1988b; Hillier and Marshal, 
2002a; and Chen, Jack and Woods, 2007). Thus, our fourth hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis (4): Directors tend to sell more in March and buy more in April 
compared to other months of the year 
4.4 Data 
This study is based on data collected between January 1991 and December 
2010 by two different data sources,  
 1) Directus Ltd compiled a complete record of director’s trades in the 
United Kingdom (1991-2001).  
2) Directors Deals, which monitors and analyses share transactions 
made by directors in their own companies (sometimes known as Insider Deals).  
The original dataset provides information on various transaction types, but we 
removed trades
24
 other than open market purchases and sales of ordinary shares 
by directors. Open market sales and purchases are more likely to represent 
actions taken because of special insider information (Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory 
et al., 1994; and Friederich et al., 2002).  
This period yields a sample of 91,970 trades for every publicly disclosed 
transaction by UK directors in their own firms.  
4.5 Methodology 
This study uses daily values (and numbers) of directors’ trades from 1 January 
1991 to 31 December 2010. Using daily data allows us to examine the 
relationship between the changes of trades’ value (number of trades) from one 
                                                          
23
 Tax loss selling hypothesis states that investors sell stocks that have declined in value in 
December/March (one month before the taxation date) to realise capital loss and offset it 
against capital gain tax. In January, the stocks that have been sold would recover resulting high 
returns in January/April.  
24
 We removed trades such as option exercise, derivative, script dividends or bonus shares, 
rights issue, awards made to directors under Incentive plans or reinvestment plans, gifts, 
transfers and purchase, and sales of shares under personal equity plans, operations derived 
from tax or “bed & breakfast” 
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trading day to the other. In order to avoid possible bias of missing information 
due to public holidays, five observations per week were used.  
The linear regression model and the ordinary least squares-method (OLS) 
were employed. Brooks (2002) suggested several assumptions for the classical 
linear regression model. They included for example homoscedasticity of the 
residuals and zero autocorrelation among residuals. We decided to use the 
OLS method because it has been used largely in anomalies testing. For 
example, Gibbons and Hess (1981) and Ajayi, Mehdian and Perry, (2004) 
used this method while Brooks (2002) suggested that this is the basic method 
for studying calendar anomalies. 
Classical assumptions are necessary for the OLS to be the best linear 
estimation method for the regression model.  
Our sample contains transactions whose values are more than £15 million and 
transactions whose values are £1 or less. These transactions might (or might 
not) have an impact on our results. Thus, to examine whether these 
observations have an influence on regression estimates, we run the OLS 
regression and test for the heteroscedacity of residuals.  
Formally, we used the following regression model; 
                                                            
                                      
  (4.1) 
 
       = insider aggregate value on day t; 
        = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Tuesday and 0 otherwise, 
           = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Wednesday and 0 otherwise, 
          = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Thursday and 0 otherwise, 
        = dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a Friday and 0 otherwise, 
  = Error term 
Table (4.1) shows the results of the regression models of whether aggregate value of 
directors’ trades as a whole (buy and sell combined) varies across days of the week. 
The results indicate high average value for directors’ trades as well as a significant t-
statistics. When testing for heteroscedacity, the results show that the variance is not 
constant and the model perhaps needs to be adjusted.  
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Table 4.1: Day of the Week Effects: the Results of the Dummy Variable 
Regression of Directors’ Trades (Buys and Sales Combined) 
value Coefficients Standard Errors t-statistics 
Monday 6,310,110 1,233,764 5.11 
Tuesday 7,064,410 1,179,178 5.99 
Wednesday 4,707,077 1,173,995 4.01 
Thursday 5,271,727 1,172,853 4.49 
Friday 5,695,275 1,189,754 4.79 
Heteroscedacity Test  0.000 
 
Diagrammatically, figure (4.1) shows the distribution of directors’ aggregate 
value of trade across days of the week. This figure shows that some trades in 
Monday and Tuesday are extremely high in value which might bias our 
results.   
Figure 4.1: The Distribution of Insiders’ Aggregate value across Days of 
the Week 
 
 
Figure (4.2) plots regression residuals against regression leverage
25
. This 
figure shows that some observations have high residuals, some observations 
have high leverage and some of them have the both. For example, there are 
many trades on Tuesday which have high residuals and high leverage (see the 
                                                          
25
 Leverage is a measure of how far an independent variable deviates from its mean. 
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upper right observation). Another example is an observation on the bottom 
right with high residual, but low leverage.  
Figure 4.2: Regression Residuals and Leverages 
 
 
Therefore, to avoid the bias that might occur because of these transactions, we 
are going to:  
1) Re-run the OLS model by using the logarithm value instead of the 
total value (as a dependent variable) to reduce the effects of these 
transactions on our results. This method was previously used by 
Nghiem et al., (2012). 
2) Re-run the OLS model after excluding transactions whose values 
are more than £15 million. In this case, the total value of directors’ 
trades is the dependent variable ; and  
3) Re-run a TOBIT regression model which is a censored form of 
OLS model normally used when the sample is biased to the left or 
to the right. This model would automatically eliminate the values 
that might cause biases to the results
26
. This step is similar to the 
previous one except that it would exclude transactions with small 
values. Thus, the results for the last two methods, sometimes, 
                                                          
26
 In the cases where the values are not biased to the left or to the right, the results are similar to 
those calculated using OLS model.  
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might be the same or might have small differences. Sometimes 
TOBIT Regression Model is considered as a Robust Regression 
Model to control for Heteroscedacity and normality problems.   
However, the methodology used in this chapter is to test whether there is a day 
of the week or month of the year anomalies in aggregate directors’ trades as 
measured by the aggregate value (and number) of insider transactions 
[hypotheses (1) and (3)], whether directors’ buy volume on Monday is higher 
compared to other days of the week [hypothesis (2)] and whether directors sell 
more in March and December [hypothesis (4)] by estimating the following 
regression models: 
 
                                                            
                                      
  (4.2) 
                                                  
                                         
                   
  (4.3) 
 
Where, 
       = the logarithm of insider aggregate value (or the total value of 
directors’ trades) on day t; 
                  = Insider aggregate number of trades on day t; 
To test the linear combination of coefficients of the OLS model, we conducted 
an F-test. The null hypothesis is that all the coefficients in the regression model 
are the same  
                                                  
against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the coefficients is not 
equal.  
Similarly, to test the monthly patterns, we construct almost an identical model. 
This model has been used by, for instance, Mehdian and Perry (2001). 
Therefore, we employ the following regression: 
 
                                                        
                                          
  (4.4) 
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 (4.5) 
 
where        is the logarithm of the aggregate value of directors’ trades (or 
the total value of directors’ trades).          through           are dummy 
variables for each month of the year, such that          takes a value of 1 for 
all January observations and zero otherwise, and so on.    is the disturbance 
term. Again, we can consider our null hypothesis as follows:  
 
                                                    
Our purpose here is to examine whether the aggregate value (and number) of 
directors’ trades is statistically different on a particular month compared to 
other months of the year. The alternative to the null hypothesis would indicate 
statistically significant monthly seasonality. 
Similar to previous studies in colander anomalies such as Chukwuogor-Ndu 
(2006), Lim (2010), Högholm et al., (2011) and Khan et al., (2013), we used 
Kruskal–Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks which is a non-
parametric method To test equality of means across groups and Kruskal–Wallis 
test assumes that the residuals are not necessary to be normally distributed.   
The Kruskal Wallis test statistic is:  
 
(4.6) 
 
Where R is the sum of the ranks for group i.  
The null hypothesis is that the average values (numbers) of directors’ trades 
across all the trading days are equal. If the Kruskal-Wallis statistic is less than 
the critical chi value, it implies that the null hypothesis should not be rejected, 
and that average values (number) of directors’ trades across the week-days are 
not significantly different from each other. 
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4.6 Results 
This section reports the empirical results of the study. First, summary statistics 
is resented to highlight the trends and patterns of UK directors’ trades. Second, 
we test the hypotheses whether directors’ aggregate value (and number) of 
trades are significantly different across days of the week or months of the year 
using the dummy variable regression and K-W statistic test, which was 
discussed earlier in the methodology section. 
4.6.1  Summary Statistics 
Table (4.2) presents summary statistics categorised by transaction type (buys 
and sales only) during the sample period. The sample includes 91,970 trades 
divided into 69,967 buy trades and 22,003 sale ones over the period 1991 to 
2010, with a total monetary value of £28.9 billion. There are approximately 
three times as many buy trades as sells. Although buy trades are more frequent 
than sell trades, the average value of sell trades is approximately seven times 
larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently but in larger monetary 
amounts (a similar argument can be said to volume). The average value of 
directors’ purchases was £122,184, but the average value of sales was 
£928,788, so directors’ sales are fewer in number but much larger in value. 
The last column of table (4.2) shows the number of days during the period in 
which at least one buy (sell) takes place. There are approximately 4,979 event 
dates (99.5% of sample days) for buy trades and 4,583 event dates (91.6% of 
sample days) for sell trades. During our sample period, there are trades of on 
average of thirteen buy trades (five sell trades) per event date. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Categorised by Transaction Type  
1991-2010 
Type No of Trades Total Value (£) Total Volume Average Value £ Average Volume No of Days 
BUY 69,967 8,548,845,389 8,615,507,651 122,184 123,137 4979 
SELL 22,003 20,436,128,362 11,044,602,967 928,788 501,959 4583 
Total 91,970 28,984,973,750 19,660,110,618    
Average value of buy (sell) trades is the total value of buy (sell) trades divided by the total number of buy 
(sell) trades. Volume of buy (sell) trades presents the total number of shares that directors buy (sell). 
Chapter Four: Seasonal Patterns in Aggregate Directors Trade 
 
95 
Average volume of buy (sell) trades the volume of buy (sell) trades divided by the total number of buy 
(sell) trades. 
Table (4.3) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by both 
days and transaction type during the sample period. There are more buy trades 
than sell trades in all days. The majority of buys and sales occurred on Fridays. 
Buys and sales on Mondays are much less frequent. Although it is not shown in 
table (4.3) directly, the number of buy trades by day is approximately three 
times the total number of sell trades per day. The average value (per day) of 
directors’ buy transactions (and sell transactions) on Mondays (and Tuesday) is 
the highest whereas the average value (per trade) of directors’ buy transactions 
(and sell transactions) on Mondays (Tuesdays) is the highest.  
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Daily Directors’ Buys and Sells over the 
Period 1991-2010 
Days  Directors’ Buy Trades Directors’ Sell Trades 
 No of Trades Average Value per Day (£) Average Value per Trade (£) No of Trades Average Value per Day (£) Average Value per Trade (£) 
Monday 12,750 3,086,676 223,693 4,091 3,524,595 735,762 
Tuesday 13,715 2,192,718 161,956 4,327 5,406,626 1,147,049 
Wednesday 14,274 878,470 62,774 4,555 4,180,045 863,539 
Thursday 14,508 935,616 66,037 4,397 4,720,915 1,014,616 
Friday 14,720 1,626,303 110,151 4,633 4,402,765 878,082 
Average value per day is the total value of the trade (buy or sell) divided by the number of days. For 
example, the average value of buy trades on Mondays is equal to the total value of buy trades on that day 
divided by the number of Mondays in our sample. Average value per trade is equal to the total value of 
the trade (buy or sell) on a specific day divided by the number of trades on that day. The same thing can 
be said for the average volume per day and per trade.  
Table (4.4) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by both 
months and transaction type during the sample period. There are more buy 
trades than sell trades in all months. The majority of buys and sales occurred in 
March. Buys and sales on February and August respectively are much less 
frequent.  
Although it is not shown directly in table (4.3), the number of buy trades by 
month is approximately three times the total number of sell trades per month. 
The average value (per month) of directors’ buy transactions (and sell 
transactions) in April (and June) is the highest whereas the average value (per 
trade) of directors’ buy transactions (and sell transactions) on May (October) is 
the highest.  
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Monthly Directors’ Buys and Sells over the Period 1991-2010 
Months Directors’ Buy Trades Directors’ Sell Trades 
 No of Trades Average Value per Month (£) Average Value per Trade (£) No of Trades Average Value per Month (£) Average Value per Trade (£) 
January 5,155 14,900,000 57,841 1,676 47,600,000 568,458 
February 4,099 21,900,000 106,757 1,625 48,900,000 602,434 
March 7,109 27,800,000 78,290 2,907 114,000,000 781,381 
April 6,003 72,500,000 241,460 2,911 74,900,000 514,875 
May 5,254 66,500,000 253,197 1,841 66,100,000 717,934 
June 6,345 20,700,000 65,392 1,974 139,000,000 1,411,424 
July 6,301 51,500,000 163,555 1,508 93,300,000 1,237,655 
August 4,659 49,100,000 210,744 1,198 44,500,000 743,339 
September 6,941 22,100,000 63,701 1,796 106,000,000 1,179,106 
October 6,437 17,000,000 52,673 1,430 119,000,000 1,664,113 
November 5,439 19,100,000 70,065 1,415 88,200,000 1,246,490 
December 6,225 44,400,000 142,508 1,722 80,400,000 933,944 
Average value per month is the total value of the trade (buy or sell) divided by the number of months. For example, the average value of buy trades on January is equal to 
the total value of buy trades on that month divided by the number of January in our sample. Average value per trade is equal to the total value of the trade (buy or sell) on a 
specific month divided by the number of trades on that month. The same thing can be said for the average volume per day and per trade.
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4.6.2  Day of the week effect 
The previous literature on calendar anomalies has been on returns. This 
literature has attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exists 
and/or to try to explain their existence. For example, Cross (1973), French 
(1980), Arsad and Coutts (1997), and Gregoriou, Kontonikas and Tsitsianis 
(2004) reported negative returns on Monday, whereas Solnik and Bousquer 
(1990) indicated strong and negative returns on Tuesday. Also, studies such as 
Agrawal and Tandon (1994) and Balaban (1995, 1996) reported positive 
returns on Friday. These anomalies are perhaps due to the methodology 
employed or the way of calculating returns, investor psychology, the difference 
in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors, or settlement 
procedures.  
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and Sias and 
Starks (1995) found low trading volume on Monday for institutional investors 
and the opposite pattern for individual investors (i.e. high trading volume on 
Monday). They reasoned that individual investors have more time to devote to 
financial decisions during the weekend, whereas institutional investors are less 
active in the market on Monday because Monday tends to be a day of strategic 
planning. Also, Sias and Starks (1995) found that informed investors tend to 
trade more on Mondays because private information is available all days of the 
week including weekends.  
Based on these priors, this section examines the seasonal patterns in aggregate 
insider trading transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider number and 
value of insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to trade on any 
particular day of the week [hypothesis (1) and hypothesis (2)]? Given that such 
seasonal patterns exist, we attempt to relate these patterns to explanations 
drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies.  
We use the regression model discussed earlier in the methodology section 
(Equations 4.2, and 4.3) where the dependent variable is the logarithm value 
(or the total value of directors’ trades) and the aggregate number of directors’ 
trades, whilst the independent variables are dummy variables which present 
days of the week.  
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Beside examining the day effects on directors’ trades as a whole, we deliberately 
chose to split our sample into directors’ buys and sells in order to examine hypothesis 
(2) which indicates that trading volume of directors’ buys on Mondays are higher 
relative to other days of the week. .  
Tables (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7) show the results of the different regressions on the 
aggregate value (and number) of directors’ trades during the sample period. More 
specifically, table (4.5) shows the results of the regression models of whether 
aggregate value (and number) of directors’ trades as a whole (buy and sell combined) 
varies across days of the week, table (4.6) shows the results of the regression models 
of whether aggregate value (and number) of directors’ buys varies across days of the 
week, and table (4.7) shows the results of the regression models of whether aggregate 
value (number) of directors’ sells varies across days of the week.  
One clear pattern emerges from table (4.4) where, for the period 1991-2010, director 
trading value is the lowest on Tuesday relative to other days of the week. The null 
hypothesis that director trading value is the same across all days of the week can be 
rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, director trading 
value appears to be slightly higher on Friday. A comparison of Tuesday versus other 
days indicates a tendency for Tuesday to become less active. Excluding Tuesday, the 
null hypothesis that the trading value is the same can be accepted. These results are 
repeated after excluding trades with more than £15 million and also after using TOBIT 
Model. Moreover, the average value of Tuesday trades is £2.52 which is 
approximately 15% less than the average value of Friday and Monday trades.  
Similarly, Tuesday’s (Friday’s) average number of directors’ trades is the lowest (the 
highest) relative to the other remaining four days. The results of the F-test confirm the 
latter. These results support Hypothesis (1), which states that there is no difference in 
aggregate director trading activities as measured by the aggregate number and value of 
directors’ trades across days of the week. The results show that Tuesday’s number of 
trades (and value) is less frequent, whereas Friday’s number of trades (and value) is 
more frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (1) is rejected for director aggregate value 
and number of directors’ trades. Another pattern emerges from the results of OLS after 
excluding large trades, and from the TOBIT regression model; the pattern is that the 
distribution of the average value of directors’ trades across the week days forms a U 
shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of 
the week (Friday).  
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Table 4.5: Day of the Week Effects: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression of Directors’ Trades (Buys and Sales Combined) 
Day OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of trades 
 Coefficient t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient. t-test 
Monday 14.08 277.41 3.002 21.51 3.003 22.21 18.13 49.98 
Tuesday 13.99 288.39 2.527 18.94 2.527 18.94 17.74 51.17 
Wednesday 14.10 292.13 2.700 20.33 2.700 20.33 18.35 53.17 
Thursday 14.12 292.67 2.934 22.11 2.934 22.11 18.39 53.33 
Friday 14.22 290.59 3.039 22.57 3.036 22.55 19.37 55.38 
Heteroscedacity Test 0.25 
(0.6167) 
7.59  
(0.1077) 
 0.00 
(0.9694) 
 
                                              2.96 2.65 2.65 2.98 
(F-test) 0.0187 0.0313 0.0313 0.018 
The results of OLS Model excluding trades whose values are more than £15 million are similar to those obtained using TOBIT Model except for Friday. This is because 
TOBIT Regression Model excludes small trades in addition to the large ones. The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the 
coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients jointly different from zero.  The F-test, for example, for testing the hypothesis 
whether the coefficients are jointly different from zero is 2.96 (0.0187) for the first regression. The Heteroscedacity test shows that the variance is constant. 
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To summarise, there seems to be a day of the week anomaly in aggregate 
insider transactions as measured by the aggregate value and number of insider 
transactions. More specifically, lower Tuesday and higher Friday trades. 
Therefore, insiders have a preference to trade more on Friday and less on 
Tuesday. The aggregate value of director transactions, which is higher on 
Friday and lower on Tuesday, is consistent with the previous studies such as 
Agrawal and Tandon (1994) and Balaban (1995, 1996) which reported positive 
returns on Friday and negative returns on Tuesdays.  
Previous studies on trading volume anomalies found that informed investors 
tend to trade more on Mondays because private information is available all 
days of the week including weekends, whereas other studies indicates Tuesday 
effect in trading volume in other markets rather than US and reasoned that as a 
reflection of trades by informed investors on Monday. On the other side, 
studies by lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and 
Chan et al. (2004) suggested that individual investors sell more (buy less) on 
Monday because they have more time to think about their decisions during the 
weekends. Our results find Friday and Tuesday effects in average number of 
directors’ trades which reflects the desire for insiders to trade more on Friday 
and less on Tuesday. One possible explanation, based on the previous studies, 
is that insiders act like institutional investors who trade less on Tuesday as a 
reflection of insiders’ trades on Monday in US. Also, bearing in mind that the 
aim of the previous studies in trading volume anomalies is to explain the 
calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results were consistent with studies on 
stock returns anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on 
Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock 
returns.  
The U shape pattern (in average value of directors’ trades) observed when 
running OLS (excluding trades over £15 million) and TOBIT model can be 
attributed to price changes from larger(smaller) trades which are higher (lower) 
at the beginning and end of the day
27
. This is attributed to the view that smaller 
trades would move prices during periods of low volume because informed 
traders do not want to reveal their information to the market. When volume is 
                                                          
27
 In our case, to price changes from larger (smaller) trades are higher (lower) in the beginning 
and at the end of week.  
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low, informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume 
hides their information (Blau et al., 2012). 
Directors’ buys 
Table (4.6) reports the results of the regression models on daily aggregate 
value (number) of directors’ buys during the sample period. One clear pattern 
emerges from Table (4.5) is that the coefficient of Friday is higher than the 
coefficients of other days of the week, whereas the coefficient of Tuesday is 
the lowest compared to other days’ coefficients. The null hypothesis that the 
director trading value is the same across all days of the week cannot be rejected 
at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). Again, the results of OLS Model 
(after excluding outliers) and TOBIT Model confirm the previous findings that 
there is no day of the week anomaly in aggregate value of directors’ buy 
transactions.  
Table (4.6) also shows that the average number of directors’ trades is lowest on 
Tuesday relative to other days of the week. The null hypothesis that the 
average number of directors’ trades is the same across all days of the week can 
be rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). In addition, the 
average number of directors’ trades appears to be slightly higher on Friday. A 
comparison of Tuesday versus other days indicates a tendency for Tuesday to 
become less active and tendency for Friday to be more active.  
These results fail to support Hypothesis (1) since they indicate no day of the 
week effect in aggregate directors’ trading value. The results also show that 
Tuesday’s number of trades is less frequent, whereas Friday’s number of trades 
is more frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (1) is rejected for director 
aggregate number of directors’ trades, but it isaccepted for directors’ aggregate 
value.  
Hypothesis (2) states that buy trading volume is higher on Monday compared 
to other days of the week. Our results show that Friday’s average number of 
trades is higher (and Tuesday average number of trades is lower) compared to 
other days of the week. Hence, we rejected hypothesis (2). Thus, the buy 
trading volume on Friday is higher than other days of the week. Again, the 
distribution of the average value of directors’ buy trades across the week days 
forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) 
and the end of the week (Friday).  
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Table 4.6: Day of the Week Effects: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression of Directors’ Buys 
Day  OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficient  t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficient t-test 
Monday 12.66 240.83 0.824 17.99 0.819 17.83 13.72 43.98 
Tuesday 12.58 250.46 0.697 15.92 0.693 16.12 13.49 45.21 
Wednesday 12.64 252.78 0.731 16.76 0.725 16.59 13.91 46.85 
Thursday 12.65 253.06 0.770 17.68 0.767 17.55 14.11 47.57 
Friday 12.77 251.86 0.794 17.97 0.792 17.88 14.73 48.96 
Heteroscedacity Test 0.14 
(0.7130) 
2.63 
(0.6219) 
  2.36 
(0.1248) 
                                              1.69 1.28 1.31 2.36 
(F-test) 0.1484 0.2757 0.2649 0.0514 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients 
jointly different from zero.  
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To summarise, it looks like there is no day of the week anomaly in aggregate 
value of directors’ trades. Also, the aggregate number of directors’ trades is 
higher on Friday and lower on Tuesday which indicates the existence of the 
day of the week effect in insider aggregate number of trades. This reflects the 
desire of directors to trade more on Friday (and less on Tuesday).  
 
Directors’ sells 
Table (4.7) reports the results of the regression models on the aggregate value 
(number) of directors’ sells during the sample period. One clear pattern 
emerges from table (4.7) is that the coefficient of Friday is higher than the 
coefficients of other days of the week, whereas the coefficient of Tuesday is 
the lowest compared to other days’ coefficients. The null hypothesis that the 
director trading value is the same across all days of the week cannot be rejected 
at the five per cent level (based on an F-test). These results are again repeated 
after excluding trades with more than £15 and also after using TOBIT Model. 
Moreover, the average value of Tuesday sells is £1.55 which is approximately 
20% less than the average value of Friday and Monday trades.  
In the same vein, it appears that there is no day of the week effect in director 
trading selling activities as measured by the aggregate number of directors’ sell 
trades. Back to Hypothesis (1), the results indicate no day of the week effect in 
aggregate directors’ trading value and number. In other words, Hypothesis (1) 
is accepted for directors’ aggregate value, number and volume. Given that 
there is no day of the week anomaly in director trading volume, Hypothesis (2) 
is also rejected.  
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Table 4.7: Day of the Week Effects: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression of Directors’ Sells 
Day  OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
Monday 12.36 95.65 2.177 17.08 1.962 14.7 4.40 32.92 
Tuesday 12.14 98.36 1.830 15.02 1.559 11.89 4.25 33.28 
Wednesday 12.40 100.87 1.969 16.23 1.737 13.34 4.44 34.88 
Thursday 12.42 101.16 2.163 17.85 1.945 14.96 4.28 33.64 
Friday 12.59 101.08 2.244 18.25 2.042 15.5 4.64 35.95 
Heteroscedacity Test 0.03 
(0.8549) 
5.53 
(0.2372) 
  0.02 
(0.8938) 
                                              1.29 1.97 2.26 0.4 
(F-test) 0.2732 0.0964 0.0599 0.7563 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients 
jointly different from zero.  
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To summarise, the aggregate value (number) of sale trades does not vary across 
days of the week. Instead, we can say that directors’ trades, in general, on 
Tuesdays and Wednesdays are the lowest relative to other days of the week.  
 
Summary of Day of the Week Anomalies Results 
To summarise, the results show that there is no day of the week effects in 
aggregate value of directors’ buys and sells, but it looks like there is a Tuesday 
effect in aggregate value of directors ‘trades when buys and sells are combined 
together. An examination of the existence of Tuesday effects was previously 
conducted in stock returns (Agrawal and Tandon, 1994; Martikainen and 
Puttonen, 1996; and Brooks and Persand, 2001) and in trading volume (Badhani, 
2006).  
The distribution of the average value of directors’ trades (buys and sells) across 
the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the beginning of the 
week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). The U shape pattern (in 
average value of directors’ trades) is perhaps due to price changes from larger 
(smaller) trades which are higher (lower) at the beginning and end of the week. 
This is because smaller trades would move prices during periods of low volume 
because informed traders do not want to reveal their information to the market. 
When volume is low, informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes 
because high volume hides their information (Blau et al., 2012). 
Also, the aggregate number of directors’ trades (buy and sell combined and buy 
transactions) is higher on Friday and lower on Tuesday which means that there is 
a day of the week effect in insider aggregate number of trades. One possible 
explanation, based on the previous studies, is that insiders act like institutional 
investors who trade less on Tuesday as a reflection of insiders’ trades on 
Monday in US. Taking into accounts that the aim of the previous studies in 
trading volume anomalies was to explain the calendar anomalies in stock 
returns, our results were consistent with studies on stock returns anomalies that 
show high returns on Friday and lower returns on Tuesdays. Therefore, these 
results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock returns.  
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4.6.3  Results of Monthly Patterns 
The previous literature on calendar anomalies has focused on returns. This 
literature has attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exists and/or 
to try to explain their existence. For example, Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Keim 
(1983), Mehdian and Perry (2002) and Gu (2006) found positive returns in 
January. The existence of this anomaly can be explained by a tax loss selling 
hypothesis, window dressing hypothesis, new information provided by the firms 
at the end of the financial year, or insider trading activities.  
The volume of sales tends to be lower for losers stocks in December because 
investors, by postponing their sales by a month or two, postpone payments of 
capital tax by a full year, whereas the volume of sales for winners stocks in 
December because investors would apply these losses against their taxable 
incomes soon as possible (Dyl, 1977 and Henderson, 1990).  
Seyhun (1988b) examined the monthly pattern of aggregate insider transactions 
in the US over the period 1975-1981, whereas Hillier and Marshall (2002) 
examined the January effect in UK securities. Both of these studies use the 
aggregate number of insider trades as their measure of insider trading activity, 
and both of these studies found that January returns are positive and 
significant
28
. 
Based on these previous findings, this section examines the seasonal patterns in 
aggregate insider trading transactions (as measured by the aggregate insider 
number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, do insiders prefer to 
trade on any particular month of the year [hypothesis (3)]? Given that such 
seasonal patterns exist, we attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn 
from the literature on calendar anomalies in returns (and volumes).  
We use the regression model discussed earlier in the methodology section 
(Equations 4.4, and 4.5) where the dependent variable is the logarithm value 
(and volume) and the aggregate number of directors’ trades, whilst the 
independent variables are dummy variables which represent months of the year. 
In addition to examining the monthly effects on directors’ trades as a whole, we 
                                                          
28
 In case of Hillier and Marshall (2002), the January effect is not persistent over time.  
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deliberately chose to split our sample into directors’ buys and sells in order to 
examine hypothesis (4). 
 
I. Directors’ Trades 
Table (4.8) presents the results of the different regression models on monthly 
aggregate value (number) of directors’ activities during the sample period. 
One clear pattern emerges from table (4.8) which indicates that, for the period 
1991-2010, director trading value in March is the highest relative to other 
months of the year. The null hypothesis that director trading value is the same 
across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent level (based on 
an F-test). In addition, director trading value appears to be slightly lower in 
February. A comparison of March versus other months indicates a tendency for 
March to become more active. The results of OLS Model (when excluding 
outliers) and the results of TOBIT Model show that March trading value is 
higher and significantly different from other months trading value. More 
specifically, the average value of directors’ trades on March is £84 million 
which reflects the tendency for directors to trade more in March.  
Table (4.8) also shows that the average number of directors’ trades in March is 
the highest relative to other months of the year. The average trading number on 
March is 500 transactions, versus an average of 450 transactions for April. This 
implies a decrease of more than ten per cent in trading number in April. March's 
trading number is significantly different from the trading number of the 
remaining months. The null hypothesis that the average number of directors’ 
trades is the same across all months of the year can be rejected at the five per 
cent level (based on an F-test). 
Back to Hypothesis (3), which states that there is no month of the year effect in 
aggregate insider activities as measured by the aggregate number, value and 
volume of directors’ trades, the results indicate no month of the year effect in 
aggregate directors’ trading value when using logarithm value as a depended 
variable, but when excluding large trades and running TOBIT regression the 
results show March anomaly. The results also show that March’s number of 
trades is higher.  
To summarise, the average number of directors’ trades varies across months of 
the year. More specifically, March trades’ number is higher and significantly 
different compared to other months of the year. These results are also confirmed 
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for directors’ aggregate value of trades when excluding trades with sterling value 
more than £15 million and when using the TOBIT regression model. Thus, 
directors prefer to trade more in March (either buy or sell).  
In UK, April is the month of taxation. According to the tax-loss hypothesis, 
investors sell more in the month before the taxation and buy more after taxation. 
Therefore, these results might be due to directors selling more to avoid taxes. 
More details are given in the next two sections when examining directors’ buys 
and sells separately.  
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Table 4.8: Monthly Effect: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression on Directors’ Trades 
Month OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 17.63 77.79 44.600 5.14 43.597 5.14 341.55 9.5 
February 17.59 77.62 46.100 5.31 46.035 5.31 286.2 7.96 
March 18.30 80.74 84.100 9.69 84.140 9.69 500.8 13.93 
April 18.08 79.77 61.900 7.13 62.020 7.13 445.7 12.4 
May 18.15 80.08 65.500 7.55 65.315 7.55 354.75 9.87 
June 18.32 80.8 79.200 9.13 79.923 9.13 415.95 11.57 
July 17.95 79.17 53.300 6.14 53.510 6.14 390.45 10.86 
August 17.64 77.84 39.400 4.54 38.934 4.54 292.85 8.14 
September 18.17 80.15 67.000 7.72 66.900 7.72 436.85 12.15 
October 18.04 79.6 50.000 5.75 50.089 5.75 393.35 10.94 
November 17.99 79.38 54.200 6.24 54.090 6.24 342.7 9.53 
December 18.09 79.79 64.000 7.36 64.120 7.36 397.35 11.05 
Heteroscedacity Test 1.34 
(0.2479) 
 6.03 
(0.8715) 
  19.69 
(0.0498) 
 
                                      1.21 2.51 2.51 3.08 
(F-test) 0.2782 0.0054 0.0054 0.0007 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients 
jointly different from zero.  
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II. Directors’ buys 
Table (4.9) reports the results of the OLS Model (with the usage of the 
logarithm of value as a dependent variable and after excluding the outliers) and 
the TOBIT Model on monthly aggregate value (and number) of Directors’ buys 
during the sample period.  
One clear pattern emerges from table (4.9) which indicates that, for the period 
1991-2010, director trading value in December is the highest relative to other 
months of the year. The null hypothesis that director trading value is the same 
across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent level (based 
on an F-test). In addition, director trading value appears to be slightly lower on 
February. A comparison of December versus other months indicates a tendency 
for December to become more active. These results are repeated (the non-
existence of monthly anomalies) after excluding trades with more than £15 and 
also after using TOBIT Model. 
Table (4.9) also shows that the average number of directors’ trades in March is 
the highest relative to other months of the year. The average trading number for 
March is 355 transactions, versus an average of 321 transactions for October. 
This implies a decrease of approximately ten per cent in trading number in 
October. March's trading number is significantly different from the trading 
number of the remaining months. The null hypothesis which assumes that the 
average number of directors’ trades is the same across all months of the year 
can be rejected at the five percent level (based on an F-test).  
Turning to Hypothesis (3), the results indicate no month of the year effect in 
aggregate directors’ trading value. The results also show that March’s number 
of trades is more frequent, whereas February’s number of trades is less 
frequent. In other words, Hypothesis (3) is rejected for director aggregate 
number of trades, but it is accepted for directors’ aggregate value.  
Also, hypothesis (4), which suggests that Directors tend to sell more in March 
and buy more in April compared to other months of the year, is rejected. Thus, 
insiders have preferences to buy more in March.  
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Table 4.9: Monthly Effect: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression on Directors’ Buys 
Month OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficient (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 16.20 66.92 12.500 4.45 12.465 4.5 257.75 7.91 
February 16.09 66.48 10.100 3.59 10.025 3.62 204.95 6.29 
March 16.73 69.11 19.500 6.95 19.580 7.07 355.45 10.9 
April 16.39 67.73 13.600 4.85 13.670 4.93 300.15 9.21 
May 16.56 68.42 18.400 6.54 18.415 6.65 262.7 8.06 
June 16.46 67.99 19.700 7.03 19.987 7.2 317.25 9.73 
July 16.55 68.38 16.300 5.8 16.300 5.88 315.05 9.67 
August 16.13 66.63 10.700 3.81 10.269 3.68 232.95 7.15 
September 16.44 67.91 17.700 6.29 17.715 6.39 347.05 10.65 
October 16.29 67.3 17.000 6.04 17.049 6.14 321.85 9.87 
November 16.45 67.94 16.300 5.79 16.285 5.88 271.95 8.34 
December 16.85 69.61 18.900 6.72 18.920 6.83 311.25 9.55 
Heteroscedacity Test 0.70 
(0.4026) 
8.81 
(0.6395) 
  5.81 
(0.8858) 
                                      0.90 1.44 1.58 1.97 
(F-test) (0.5435 0.1561 0.1067 0.0321 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients 
jointly different from zero.  
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To summarise, there is no monthly anomalies in aggregate insider buying 
activities as measured by the aggregate value of insider transactions. For 
director trading number of trades, March’s number of buy trades is higher, 
which suggests that directors are more likely to trade on March than on other 
months of the year. According to tax loss hypothesis, we expected to find high 
buy trades in April, but instead we found high buying activities in March. One 
possible explanation is that 5
th
 of April is the taxation date for individuals in 
the UK; therefore, insiders might buy till the last two weeks of March. Hence, 
March effect in the aggregate number of directors’ trades is perhaps due to buy 
activities in the first twenty days of March
29
.  
 
III. Directors’ sells 
Table (4.10) reports the results of the OLS Model (with the usage of the 
logarithm value as dependent variable and after excluding the outliers), and the 
TOBIT Model on monthly aggregate value (and number) of directors’ sells 
during the sample period.  
One clear pattern emerges from table (4.10) which indicates that, for the period 
1991-2010, the director trading value in June is the highest relative to other 
months of the year. The null hypothesis which states that director trading value 
is the same across all months of the year can be accepted at the five per cent 
level (based on an F-test). In addition, director trading value appears to be 
slightly lower in August. A comparison of June versus other months indicates a 
tendency for June to become more active. These results are repeated (the non-
existence of monthly anomalies) after excluding trades with more than £15 but 
not after using TOBIT Model. The results of TOBIT Regression Model show 
that the average value of directors’ selling activities in March is higher and 
significantly different relative to other months of the year. The average value 
of March’s sells is £64 million, which suggests that directors prefer to trade 
more in this month.  
Table (4.10) also shows that the average number of directors’ trades in March 
and April is the highest relative to other months of the year. The average 
trading number on March and April are approximately the same (145 
transactions). March and April’s trading numbers are significantly different 
                                                          
29
 This is examined further in the next section.  
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from the trading numbers of the remaining months. The null hypothesis which 
assumes that the average number of directors’ trades is the same across all 
months of the year can be rejected at the five per cent level (based on an F-
test). 
Excluding March and April, the null hypothesis which assumes that the 
average number of directors’ trades is the same cannot be rejected. Back to 
Hypothesis (3), the results indicate no month of the year effect in aggregate 
directors’ trading value (when using OLS Models). These results changed 
when using TOBIT Model suggesting the existence of March effects. The 
results also show that March’s and April’s number of trades are more frequent. 
In other words, Hypothesis (3) is rejected for director aggregate number of 
trades and accepted for directors’ aggregate value and volume.  
Also, hypothesis (4), which suggests that Directors tend to sell more in March 
compared to other months of the year, is accepted. These results can be 
explained by tax loss selling hypothesis (March sell pressure) which suggests 
that investors sell more in the month prior to taxation date or capital gain 
hypothesis which states that investors delay capital gains realisation so that 
they can delay tax payment on capital gains. By doing so, investors might 
postpone tax payment by one year. Thus, investors would sell winners (shares) 
in April. Hence, the selling pressure in March would be small causing the price 
to rise.  
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Table 4.10: Monthly Effect: the Results of the Dummy Variable Regression on Directors’ Sells  
Month OLS Model (logarithm Values) OLS Model (Total Values Excluding Outliers) TOBIT Model (Total Values) Number of Trades 
 Coefficients t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients (Millions) t-test Coefficients t-test 
January 17.19 68.15 32.100 4.41 31.132 4.32 83.8 8.44 
February 17.25 68.39 36.000 4.94 36.010 5.02 81.25 8.19 
March 17.92 71.04 64.600 8.87 64.560 9.01 145.35 14.64 
April 17.77 70.45 48.300 6.63 48.350 6.74 145.55 14.66 
May 17.72 70.25 47.100 6.47 46.900 6.54 92.05 9.27 
June 18.04 71.52 59.500 8.17 59.936 8.35 98.7 9.94 
July 17.58 69.7 37.000 5.09 37.210 5.19 75.4 7.6 
August 17.13 67.91 28.700 3.94 28.665 4 59.9 6.04 
September 17.81 70.61 49.300 6.78 49.185 6.86 89.8 9.05 
October 17.62 69.86 33.000 4.53 33.040 4.61 71.5 7.2 
November 17.60 69.76 37.900 5.2 37.805 5.27 70.75 7.13 
December 17.56 69.62 45.100 6.19 45.200 6.31 86.1 8.67 
Heteroscedacity Test 0.06 
(0.8139) 
9.30 
(0.5938) 
  8.81 
(0.6393) 
                                      1.28 1.63 2.46 7.53 
(F-test) 0.2350 0.0988 0.0063 0.000 
The results of F-test in the last row represent the test of the hypothesis whether the coefficients are statistically different from each other and not whether the coefficients 
jointly different from zero.  
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Hillier and Marshall (2002a) suggested that insiders sell more 20 days before 
taxation date. In the UK, 5
th
 of April is the taxation date. Therefore, we might 
expect insiders to sell more in the last two weeks of March and first week of 
April. For that reason, we re-examined calendar anomalies in aggregate insider 
activities as measured by the aggregate number of insider transactions in the 
last two weeks of March and First week of April (weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
The evidence indicates, as can be seen from table (4.11), that the average 
number of sell transactions in these weeks is significantly different from the 
average number of sell trades in other weeks. The average trading number on 
weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15 are approximately 53 transactions.  
 
Table 4.11: The Results of Dummy Variable Regression on Directors’ Sells 
on Weekly Basis 
Weeks Coefficients  Standard Error  T-test  P-Value  F-test 
Weeks 12, 13, 14 and 15 52.84 2.15 24.59 0 207.49 
Other Weeks 20.59 0.63 32.75 0  
The estimation equation is;  
                                                                                                 
Where                       is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trade 
occurred in weeks 12, 13, 14, and 15 and 0 otherwise.  
 
Figure (4.3) shows the distribution of the average number of sell trades over 
the weeks of the year. The figure shows that the average number of sell trades 
increase at week 12 and peak at week 15. Thereafter, a decrease in the average 
number of sell trades in the following three weeks (weeks 16, 17, and 18). This 
supports the view that directors sell more before the taxation.  
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Figure 4.3: The Distribution of the Average Number of Directors’ Sells 
over Sample Weeks 
 
To summarise, the results of OLS Regression Model indicate that there is no 
monthly anomalies in aggregate insider selling activities as measured by the 
aggregate value of insider transactions. The results of TOBIT Regression 
Model show that the average value of directors’ selling activities in March is 
higher and significantly different relative to other months of the year. 
In UK, April is the month of taxation. According to the tax-loss hypothesis, 
investors sell more in the month before the taxation and buy more after 
taxation. Therefore, these results might be due to directors selling more to 
avoid taxes. This is confirmed when we looked at directors’ sell 20 days before 
the taxation.  
4.6.4  The results of K-W statistic test 
Table (4.12) reports the results of K-W statistic test for insider aggregate value 
and number of directors’ buys and sells. The table supports the results of the 
OLS regression model and confirms the existence of monthly anomaly in 
aggregate director trading activities (measured by the number of director 
transactions). Also, when considering buy and sell transactions as a whole, the 
results indicate a kind of day of the week anomaly.  
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Unlike the previous findings, there seems to be a day of the week effect in 
director aggregate value of buy trades. This difference might happen normally 
when OLS regression model assumptions are not met completely (Brook, 
2002; and Lim et al., 2010).  
 
Table 4.12: The Results of K-W Statistic Test 
  Buy Sell All Trades 
  Value No of Trades Value No of Trades Value No of Trades 
  Day-Of-The week 
chi-squared 11.05 13.21 7.75 11.72 13.712 18.539 
p-value 0.0259 0.0102 0.101 0.0196 0.0083 0.001 
  Month-Of-The year 
chi-squared 14.81 27.98 13.49 55.62 13.08 43.44 
p-value 0.1912 0.0032 0.2625 0.0001 0.2879 0.0001 
 
 
 
To summarise, the results show the following: 
1) There is a day of the week anomaly in aggregate insider activities 
(as measured by number and value of insider transactions). More 
specifically, insiders tend to trade more on Fridays and less on 
Tuesdays. This anomaly disappeared for directors’ aggregate value 
when splitting the sample to directors’ buys and sells. The existence 
of Tuesday effects was previously conducted in stock returns 
(Agrawal and Tandon, 1994; Martikainen and Puttonen, 1996; and 
Brooks and Persand, 2001) and in trading volume (Badhani, 2006).  
2) The distribution of the average value of directors’ trades (buys and 
sells) across the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value 
on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week 
(Friday).  
3) There is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities 
(as measured by the number of insider transactions). More 
specifically, insiders tend to trade more in March (in the aggregate 
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number) and trade less in August. For directors’ buys, insider 
aggregate buying activities are higher in December and March, 
whereas, for directors’ sells, insider aggregate selling activities are 
higher in April. These results are consistent with Seyhun (1988b) 
and Hillier and Marshall (2002a).  
4) The results of K-W statistic test confirm the nonexistence of 
monthly anomaly in aggregate director trading (measured by value 
of director transactions). Unlike the previous findings, there seems 
to be a day of the week effect in director aggregate value of buy 
trades, which might happen normally when OLS regression model 
assumptions are not met completely.  
4.7 Conclusions 
Following on from the previous chapter, which examined the patterns and 
characteristics of insider trading activities, one aim of this chapter was to test 
for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider trading transactions (as measured by 
the aggregate insider number and value of insider transactions). Specifically, 
do insiders prefer to trade on any particular day of the week or month of the 
year?  
The previous literature on calendar anomalies has focused on returns i.e. do 
returns vary by month of the year or day of the week? This literature has 
attempted to simply identify whether these anomalies exists and/or to try to 
explain their existence. This literature indicates the existence of the day of the 
week effect .i.e. negative returns in the beginning of the week and high returns 
at the end of the week. These anomalies might be driven by the employed 
methodology or the way of calculating returns, investor psychology, the 
difference in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors, or 
settlement procedures. Furthermore, the literature on trading volume suggests 
that Monday’s trading volume is higher compared to other days of the week. 
More specifically, investors sell more on Monday if they are individual 
investors and sell less if they are institutional investors. This is perhaps due to 
private information hypothesis and the behaviour of individual and institutional 
investors. Similarly, previous empirical literature on stock returns anomalies 
Chapter Four: Seasonal Patterns in Aggregate Directors Trade 
 
119 
 
supports the existence of the month of the year effect i.e. high returns in 
January. These anomalies might be driven by the tax loss selling hypothesis, 
window dressing hypothesis, or new information provided by the firms at the 
end of the financial year. Also, the turn of the year effect might be due to 
director trading activities as measured by the aggregate number of directors’ 
trades.  
A second aim of this chapter, given that such seasonal patterns exist, was to 
attempt to relate these patterns to explanations drawn from the literature on 
calendar anomalies. Using a dataset of more than 5,000 UK companies over the 
period January 1991 to December 2010 resulting in 91,970 trades, 70,067 buys 
and 22,026 sells, we carried out a series of parametric (OLS) and non-
parametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests to determine whether there is a calendar 
effects or not.  
Our results indicated the following: There is a day of the week anomaly in 
aggregate insider activities (as measured by number and value of insider 
transactions). Specifically, insiders tend to trade more on Fridays and less on 
Tuesdays. The distribution of the average value of directors’ trades (buys and 
sells) across the week days forms a U shape i.e. high trading value on the 
beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the week (Friday). There is a 
month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as measured by the 
number of insider transactions). Specifically, insiders tend to trade more in 
March (in the aggregate number) and trade less in August. For directors’ buys, 
insider aggregate buying activities are higher in December and March, 
whereas, for directors’ sells, insider aggregate selling activities are higher in 
April. These results are consistent with Seyhun (1988b) and Hillier and 
Marshall (2002a). The average number of sell transactions in the three weeks 
before taxation date is significantly different from the average number of sells 
trades in other weeks 
These results are also confirmed by the results of K-W statistic test which 
supported the non-existence of monthly anomaly in aggregate director trading 
(measured by the value of director transactions). Unlike the previous findings, 
there seems to be a day of the week effect in director aggregate value of buy 
trades.  
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The existence of Friday (Tuesday) effects was previously conducted in stock 
returns (Agrawal and Tandon; Martikainen and Puttonen, 1996; and Brooks 
and Persand, 2001). One possible explanation, based on the previous studies, is 
that insiders act like institutional investors who trade less on Tuesday as a 
reflection of insiders’ trades on Monday in US. Taking into accounts that the 
aim of the previous studies in trading volume anomalies was to explain the 
calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results were consistent with studies on 
stock returns anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on 
Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock 
returns. 
The U shape pattern (in average value of directors’ trades) is perhaps due to 
price changes from larger (smaller) trades which are higher (lower) at the 
beginning and end of the week. This is because smaller trades would move 
prices during periods of low volume because informed traders do not want to 
reveal their information to the market. When volume is low, informed traders 
are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume hides their 
information (Blau et al., 2012). 
The existence of March and April anomalies can be explained by tax loss 
selling hypothesis (March sell pressure) which suggests that investors sell more 
in the month prior to taxation date or capital gain hypothesis which states that 
investors delay capital gains realisation so that they can delay tax payment on 
capital gains. By doing so, investors might postpone tax payment by one year. 
Thus, investors would sell winners (shares) in April. Hence, the selling 
pressure in March would be small causing the price to rise. Tax loss selling 
hypothesis, as an explanation of March and April anomalies, further supported 
when we examined directors’ sell transactions twenty days before taxation 
date. Although the purpose of this chapter is purely to identify whether such 
anomalies exist, we do not attempt to explain why they do. We believe that this 
is an avenue for further research in this area.  
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Chapter 5:  The Informativeness of 
Director’ Age 
5.1 Introduction  
Previous studies have used directors’ trades to examine various hypotheses in 
the general area of insider trading. One focus of this literature has been to 
examine how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, firm, 
and directors characteristics. For example, King and Roll (1988) examined a 
small sample of insider trades and found significant abnormal returns from 
buying. Likewise, with a larger sample over the same period, Pope et al. (1990) 
reported positive, but much smaller, abnormal returns from buying, and 
negative abnormal returns from selling. Hamill et al. (2002) indicated that 
directors’ purchases and sales possess significant information content. In 
general, the literature in this area suggests that the informativeness of directors’ 
trade depends on the type of trade (buy or sell) which directors engage in.  
Furthermore, assuming that insiders in small firms might be more informed 
about their trades than insiders in large firms, Seyhun (1988a) found that 
insiders in small firms earn significantly greater abnormal returns than insiders 
in large firms. In this context, Gregory et al. (1997) also found that firm size 
has a positive impact on UK insider trading. Moreover, insiders in small firms 
earn positive abnormal returns than insiders in other firm size. Similarly, 
Friederich et al. (2002) reported that insider trades in smaller firms are more 
informative over the short term.  
Additionally, considering that executive directors might be more informed 
about their trades or have better access to private information, Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006) tested whether the informativeness of a director’s trade depends on the 
category of the director making the trade, and found no evidence of differences 
in returns across categories of director. Similarly, Gregory et al. (2012) 
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examined whether the category and the gender of the director influence the 
information they possess about their own firms. They found no difference in 
the trading patterns and stock market response to directors’ gender differences, 
after conditioning on the category of director. A thorough review of these 
studies reveals that no one has yet dealt with the issue of whether the 
informativeness of the director varies with age. 
There are many reasons why financial decisions may vary with life cycle. 
Psychological and physical studies concerning age suggested that memory and 
cognitive abilities decline with age (Gunesh, Broihanne and Merli, 2010; Fair 
2007; and Grady and Craik, 2000). Intelligence level also declines with age 
(Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997). Introducing socioeconomic and demographic 
factors such as education, income, wealth, race, ethnicity, and gender can lower 
the adverse effects of cognitive aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). Financial 
literature also suggests there are opposing effects of age. On the one hand, 
older investors who have more experience and greater investment knowledge 
are more likely to make effective financial decisions (Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). On the other hand, the possibility to make 
unsuitable decisions increases as the director gets older due to the decline of 
memory (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij et al. 2007). 
By using certain type of individuals, who are directors, the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades 
varies with age or whether the age has an impact upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. The question is: are directors of a particular age more 
informed about their trades than directors of other ages. 
This study is the first that takes into account the director’s age as a factor in 
determining insider abnormal returns. This is also different from previous 
studies since it uses 2,300 UK firms which are larger than what have been 
examined before. For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) used the FTSE all small 
firms, Gregory et al. (2009) used the FTSE 350 companies, whilst others have 
used the FTSE 100 firms.  
Our sample period covers the years 2002 to 2010. Over this period, there is a 
total of 25,096 trades by directors divided into 20,312 purchases of company 
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stock and 4,784 sales. Standard event study methodology based on the market 
model would be employed using announcement dates as the event dates.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section (5.2) reviews the previous studies 
concerning age using physical, biological, and financial evidence, and presents 
an overview of the literature on insider trading is given. Section (5.3) presents 
the data and methodology. Section (5.4), (5.5), and (5.6) discuss the results 
while the conclusions are presented in Section (5.7). 
5.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature on age, drawing on studies in psychology 
and finance. This literature suggests that the impact of age on informativeness 
may be mixed. Following that, the literature on insider trading in general is 
reviewed in order to rationalise the control variables that are necessary for our 
analysis. 
5.2.1  Age in Psychological and Physical Studies 
Both physical and cognitive abilities, especially memory, decline with age 
(Agarwal et al., 2009). For example, to estimate the rate at which men’s 
physical abilities vary with age, Fair (2007) used a very large sample of athletic 
records. The age range in his study is 35 to 100 years old for swimming and 35 
to 98 years old for long and short distance running
30
. The results showed a 
linear per cent decline between age 35 and about age 70 for all activities 
(swimming and running) and then a quadratic decline after that age. More 
specifically, the rates of decline were larger for the longer distances and, for 
swimming, they were larger for women than for men.  
In the context of cognitive abilities, individual’s ability to process information 
declines with weakening memory, which slows down the ability to distinguish 
conditional probabilities
31
 for older people (Spaniol and Bayen, 2005). For 
                                                          
30
 They used track, field and running records 
31
 An example of conditional probabilities is when people reason with meaningful, causal 
conditionals in daily life (e.g., ‘‘If the brake is pushed, then the car slows down’’) they rely on 
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instance, suppose a company gives the investor the following choice: if you 
buy two stocks, then your gain will be £2 a month, but if you buy more than 
four stocks, you will get £6 within two months. According to Spaniol and 
Bayen (2005), older investors will be less effective in distinguishing these 
conditional statements, and thus less able to make the right decision at the right 
time. Moreover, older people might be less able to concentrate and recognise 
the correct and incorrect information as a result  of declining in attention ability 
(Gunesh et al., 2010). Both studies also implied that, because the abilities to 
process and integrate new information  for older people are slower and less 
efficient, their reaction to this kind of information might not be right. 
In addition, the memory’s ability to perform tasks declines with age from early 
to late adulthood
32
.  This decline in performance, as a result of age increase, is 
much greater for some tasks than others (Grady and Craik, 2000). For example, 
there is a small association between age-related declines and short-term 
memory tasks such as repeating a short string of words, letters or numbers, 
whereas there is a large association between age-related losses and tasks 
involving free or cued recall and those involving recollection of the original 
context in which an event occurred (Grady and Craik, 2000). 
Similarly, Spaniol, Madden and Voss, (2006) examined adult age differences 
in episodic
33
 and semantic
34
 long-term memory tasks, as a test of the 
hypothesis of specific age-related decline in context memory. Examples of 
information stored in episodic memory are: I remember hearing a woman 
screaming a short while ago, followed by a sound of ambulance a few seconds 
later; last month, while on an Easter holiday, I met Roy who knew more about 
statistics than any other person I have ever met. Examples of semantic memory 
information are: I know that springs are usually warm in Mediterranean 
countries; I remember that the chemical formula for water is H2O. The results 
indicated that younger people were faster and exhibited lower episodic 
                                                                                                                                                         
stored background knowledge about the conditional. This kind of background knowledge has 
an impact on the inferences people draw (Neya et al, 2005).
. 
32
 Early 20 to late 90. 
33
 Episodic memory is the name given to the capacity to consciously remember personally 
experienced events and situations. It is one of the major mental (cognitive) capacities enabled 
by the brain. 
34
 Semantic
 
memory refers to the memory of meanings, understandings, and other concept-
based knowledge unrelated to specific experiences
.
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accuracy than older people. They also revealed, for both episodic and semantic 
retrieval, an increase in age-related in time of non-decisional reaction. 
Therefore, consider the following statements: two years ago, at a London 
Accounting Conference, I met a young accountant who knew more about 
accounting principles than any other person I have ever met (episodic 
memory); I know that the abnormal return on the announcement date is equal 
to the normal return minus the expected return on that date (semantic memory). 
Based on the findings of Spaniol et al. (2006), the ability to remember when or 
where I met that accountant would slow down as I get older. Moreover, the 
time spent in calculating the abnormal return (use of semantic memory) would 
increase as age increases.  
Psychological evidence also indicates that intelligence level is likely to decline 
as people get older. Baltes and Lindenberger (1997) examined the relationship 
between measures of sensory functioning (visual and auditory sharpness) and 
intelligence. Intelligence was assessed with 14 tests measuring five cognitive 
abilities (speed, reasoning, memory, knowledge, and fluency). The results 
indicated that age worsens  the sensory (vision and hearing) functions as well 
as intelligence level. The decline in intelligence is much sharper after the age 
of 70; the increase in the age-associated link between sensory and intellectual 
functioning may be due to brain aging. 
In addition to psychological factors, socioeconomic and demographic factors, 
such as education, income, wealth, race, ethnicity, and gender, can lower the 
adverse effects of cognitive aging. For example, people who are more 
educated, more resourceful (have higher income and are wealthier), and 
undertake intellectually stimulating jobs experience a slower decline in 
cognitive abilities because they are able to compensate actively for the adverse 
effects of aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). In their study Korniotis and 
Kumar (2011) demonstrated that cognitive abilities increase with education, 
wealth, and income but decline with age. Moreover, there is a sharp decline 
after the age of 70. The decline of cognitive abilities is higher among older 
individuals who are also less educated and have lower income. In other words, 
Older investors who are more educated and more resourceful (i.e., have higher 
income levels and are wealthier) might be able to better compensate for their 
declining information processing abilities. 
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According to previous literature, we may expect the ability of directors to make 
correct decisions (e.g. whether to buy or to sell shares) to decline with age. 
Older directors may be less effective in recognising different information 
signals, and, therefore, less able to make the correct decision compared to 
younger directors. On the other hand, introducing some factors such as 
education, income, wealth, race, ethnicity, and gender can offset the adverse 
effects of cognitive aging making older directors more able to make better 
decisions.  
Based on these priors, we might expect either older directors to be less 
informed about their trades because of memory and cognitive abilities decline 
with age, or older directors to be more informed about their trades because of 
factors such as race, education, and wealth which lower the cognitive ability 
effects.  
5.2.2  Age in the Finance Literature 
While old age is likely to have an adverse effect on people’s ability to make 
effective investment decisions, older investors are likely to have greater 
investment experience and greater awareness of the fundamental principles of 
investing. Their accumulated investment wisdom could help them make 
efficient investment decisions. Graham, Harvey and Puri, (2013) found that 
past career experience and education
35
 are correlated with corporate decision 
making. They also provided evidence consistent with matching between the 
behavioural traits of executives and the kinds of companies they join; firms 
with high historical or future growth rates are more likely to be run by risk-
tolerant CEOs. These chief executives are likely to be younger. 
In addition to these channels, trading process and experience might lead 
investors to learn more and to be less prone to behavioural biases as they grow 
older. The extant empirical evidence from the individual investor literature 
indicates that older investors exhibit a weaker disposition effect. Portfolio 
diversification could also increase with age because, in addition to experience, 
investors acquire more information about the market (e.g., King and Leape, 
                                                          
35
 They assumed that an MBA degree may represent valuable knowledge gleaned from a good 
business education
. 
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1987). Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) examined the factors that might 
influence portfolio diversification decisions such as age, income, and 
occupation. The results indicated that older investors are more diversified than 
younger investors and high-income investors are better diversified than low-
income investors. Furthermore, investors with greater experience hold better 
diversified portfolios. They used three age categories in their analysis which 
are: investors aged under 45, investors aged between 45 and 65, and investors 
aged over 65. Therefore, investors aged over 65 are more diversified than 
investors of other ages (the same can be said for investors between the ages of 
45 and 65).  
The role of experience was also studied by Korniotis and Kumar (2011). They 
examined the impact of cognitive abilities on financial decisions. The results 
indicated a negative relationship between investment skill and age. Investment 
skill declines with age and this decline is stronger for low income, low 
education investors who cannot successfully compensate for the adverse effects 
of aging. 
 Gunesh et al. (2010) analysed the disposition effect of 20,379 individual 
investors over the period 1999-2006. Using the difference between investors’ 
propensity to realise winning stocks and losing stocks in their portfolios to 
measure investors’ disposition effects, the coefficient of the age was negative 
and significant. Thereby, older investors are less prone to the disposition effect.  
Korniotis and Kumar (2011) examined whether older investors possess greater 
knowledge about investing. The results indicated that older and more 
experienced investors hold less risky portfolios, exhibit stronger preference for 
diversification, trade less frequently, and exhibit weaker behavioural biases 
such as the disposition effect. Thus, their choices reflect greater knowledge 
about investing. Additionally, investment skill of older investors deteriorates 
sharply around the age of 70 due to the adverse effects of cognitive aging. 
Another strand focused on financial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) 
examined three fundamental concepts related to financial literacy, such as the 
working of interest rates, the effects of inflation, and the concept of risk 
diversification. The results also indicated that older individuals exhibit low 
level of financial literacy (their results indicate an inverse U-shape). This 
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means that older individuals are less able to make the correct decisions. Van 
Rooij et al. (2007) found that younger individuals who have financial 
knowledge are more likely to invest in stock markets. Graham et al. (2008) 
found that younger CEOs who have prior experience in finance/accounting are 
in companies that have a high debt ratio. This is because they are more likely to 
see the value in using debt and are more comfortable with this outcome. 
Kyriacou and Mase (2003) investigated the use of private information by 
insiders in their decision to exercise executive stock options. They found that 
younger executives’ signals are more informative than older executives’ 
signals. 
To summarise, the literature suggests there are opposing effects of age. On the 
one hand, older and more experienced directors may use information to trade 
and gain higher abnormal returns. On the other hand, the possibility to make 
unsuitable decisions increases as the director gets older. Therefore, younger 
directors may make more efficient decisions and earn higher returns than older 
directors. 
5.2.3  Insider Trading Studies 
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether the informativeness of directors’ 
trades varies with age. Previous studies have examined how the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, director, and firm 
characteristics. For instance, studies focusing on transaction type find positive 
abnormal returns associated with buy trades, and negative abnormal returns 
associated with sell trades. For example, Finnerty (1976) found that, when 
insiders buy shares of their own firms, they earn positive abnormal returns and 
when they sell their sells generate significantly negative returns. Similarly, 
King and Roll (1988) examined the profitability of insider trading in the UK 
over the period January 1986 to August 1987. They found that the abnormal 
returns for buy trades were greater than the abnormal returns for sell trades. 
This is because insider sell decisions are much more likely to happen for non-
information-based reasons than purchase decisions. Moreover, sell transactions 
by directors are usually viewed by market participants to be driven by liquidity 
or diversification needs, whereas buy transactions are likely to be driven y 
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superior information of firm’s future prospective. For example, Ma and Sun 
(1998) indicates that Insiders might trade (sell) because of portfolio 
diversification or liquidity needs. Pope et al. (1990) reported positive, but much 
smaller, abnormal returns from buying, and negative abnormal returns from 
selling.  
Another variable that determines the informativeness of the trade is firm size. 
Williams (1986) examined directors’ trades in small and large-sized firms. He 
documented that insiders in small firms possess more information, and this can 
give rise to increased returns on the firm’s shares. Also, Seyhun (1988a) 
indicated that firm size and insider returns were negatively related, because 
insiders in small firms are more informed about their trades than insiders in 
large firms. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) found that insiders in small firms with 
high earning-to-price ratios tend to buy, whereas insiders in large firms tend to 
sell. In this context, Gregory et al. (1994) suggested that directors’ trades are 
associated with abnormal returns. Furthermore, insiders in small and medium-
sized firms earn higher abnormal returns than insiders in large firms. 
Jeng et al. (2003) tested the informativeness of three directors’ types. These 
types were top executives
36
, other officers, and directors. The results indicated 
that top executives do not earn higher abnormal returns than do other officers 
and directors. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) added new insight to the literature on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades by considering five types of directors 
(CEOs, other executive directors, chairmen, other incumbent directors, and 
former directors). The results implied that there is no significant difference in 
the cumulative abnormal returns for the various categories. Besides, CEOs 
seem to be less informed about their trades than other directors’ types, though 
they suppose to have more information about their company’s prospects.   
Similarly, Gregory et al. (2012) examined whether director type (executive or 
non-executive) and director gender (male or female) have an impact on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. They found that director gender has no 
impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades, whereas director type 
does. . Knewtson (2011) examined whether trading skills or the ability to 
exploit asymmetric information, which exists between executives and 
                                                          
36
 Top executives include chief executives, chairman, or president.  
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outsiders, can be reflected by the trades of informed executive directors. In 
other words, does the informativeness of directors’ trades due to executives’ 
trading skills or abilities to exploit information asymmetry?  Knewtson 
considered buy activities by three types of directors (CEOs, CFOs and COOs. 
The results indicated higher abnormal returns are associated with CFOs trades 
which might due to that they are either more skilled at trading or are more 
willing to use asymmetric information.  
In summary, insider trading literature implies that directors’ trades depend on 
various factors such as transaction type (buy or sell), director type (executive 
or non-executive), or firm size (small, medium, and large). However, the 
literature on cognition abilities implies that age effects should also be taken 
into account and controlled. Therefore, this study will examine whether age has 
an impact upon the informativeness of UK directors’ trades over the period 
2002-2010. In other words, are directors of a particular age more informed than 
directors of any other ages?  
5.3 Data and Methodology 
This study is based on data collected between January 2002 and December 
2010 for UK companies by the data company Directors Deals. This database 
monitors and analyses share transactions made by directors in their own 
company. This dataset gives details of director’s identity, transaction and 
announcement dates, the volume and the value of directors’ trades, as well as 
trade price, director’s type (Executive, Non-Executive, Former37 or PDMR38), 
the director’s holdings, and the director’s age. Daily returns and daily market 
values for the event firms, and the benchmark FTSE All Share Index returns 
are sourced from DataStream. Additionally, the original dataset includes 
information on various transaction types, but we removed trades
39
 other than 
open market purchases and sales of ordinary shares by directors. Open market 
                                                          
37
 Former is no longer a board member. 
38
 Person Dispensing Managerial Responsibility (PDMR) is not a member of the board but an 
employee considered to be a party to price sensitive information and therefore subject to the 
same rules as Board members 
39
 We removed trades such as option exercise, derivative, script dividends or bonus shares, 
rights issue, awards made to directors under Incentive plans or reinvestment plans, gifts, 
transfers and purchase, and sales of shares under personal equity plans, operations derived 
from tax or “bed & breakfast” 
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sales and purchases are more likely to represent actions taken because of 
special insider information (Seyhun, 1988a). 
Because of data availability on directors’ ages and company ISIN 
(International Securities Identification Number) codes, our sample period is 
limited to nine years. However, there are a total of 25,096 trades by directors 
over the sample period, divided into 20,312 purchases of company stock and 
4,784 sales – meaning there are approximately four times more purchases than 
sales. The methodology we employ is similar to what is used in other studies of 
this type, meaning the event study methodology (Calvin and Lasfer, 2002; 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006; and Gregory et al., 2009).  
When conducting an event study methodology based on daily data, we need to 
decide whether to use single signal or multi-signal for directors’ trades. In 
single signal approach, if more than one director trades on the same day in the 
same firm we aggregate the net number of shares traded by each director on 
that day. Moreover, if insiders’ number of shares bought is higher than 
insiders’ number of shares sold, we will consider insiders to be net purchasers 
of their firm’s shares. However, this approach is not suitable when multiple 
directors with multiple characteristics (age and type) are trading on the same 
day. For example, what if two directors with two different ages are trading on 
the same day and the same direction (buying or selling)? Our approach is, 
therefore, to: 
1. Split the sample according to directors’ trades in ordinary shares into 
ordinary purchases and ordinary sales. 
2. Consider multiple, but similar types of, transactions (e. g. buy) of a given 
director on the same day as one (buy) transaction.  
3. Consider multiple, but similar types of, transactions (e. g. sell) by different 
directors from the same company on the same day not as one (sell) transaction. 
For example, suppose two directors from the same company were selling their 
firm shares on the same day; we have considered this transaction as two 
different sell transactions. 
4. Consider multiple, but different types of, transactions (e. g. buy and sell) of a 
given director on the same day as one transaction. However, the volumes of 
these transactions are subtracted. If the volume of the buy (sell) transactions is 
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more than that of sell (buy), then such a transaction is considered a buy (sell) 
transaction, and the number of buying directors (selling) is reported
40
. 
The use of event study methodology has become more popular after the 
research by Fama et al. (1969). Event study is usually used to assess the impact 
of an event or a particular type of event on firm’s value. Since that, in efficient 
market, share price reflects the impact of an event, using share prices observed 
over a relatively short period around or after the event date can be used to 
measure this impact. This technique measures the difference between the 
observed return in the event and the expected one around or after the event 
date. Any significant difference is defined as abnormal return (or loss). Also, 
this technique is useful because it shows the reaction of a security to a 
particular event, and therefore, predicts the reaction of other securities to 
different events.  
Standard event study methodology based on the market model is employed to 
examine the patterns in daily stock prices around directors’ buys and sell 
signals.  
In our analysis, only restrictions due to data availability are considered. Then, 
we defined the estimation window by using the 200 days prior to the event 
window as the estimation window (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Friederich et al., 
2002). The estimation period does not include event period in order to avoid 
the event from influencing the estimates of model parametes. 
There is also an argument whether to use the announcement date or the 
transaction date as the event date. For example, Hillier and Marshall (2002) 
assumed that some outside investors are expected to have some detailed 
information when directors buy or sell. Thus, they defined the transaction date 
as the event date.  
On the other hand, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) defined the announcement date as the 
event date because it is the date when the information about directors’ trades 
reaches the market Therefore, in this chapter, we consider the announcement 
date as the event date.  
The event period, in our study, ranges from 0 to +10 days after the 
announcement date. The estimation period for the parameters in the market 
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 This case was for a little number of transactions (not more than 20 transactions). 
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model starts on day -1 and is 200 days in length. The abnormal return       is 
obtained by subtracting the realised rate of return from the expected return: 
 
 
                     (5.1) 
 
Where      denotes the realised rate of return for stock i on day t. The realised 
return was calculated as:  
 
       (    )             (5.2) 
 
Where      refers to the closing price of stock i at day t, and          the closing 
price of stock i at day t-1.        denotes the expected return for stock i on day 
t. The simple Market Model (MM), is used to estimate the intercept term α 
and systematic risk β of a security and expected return, by regressing the 
market return at time t, to the security's return during the estimation period [-1, 
-200]. 
We used the FTSE All-Share return index as a proxy of market return. Sharpe's 
(1964) simple Market Model expresses the actual rate of return (R) on the 
security (i) at time (t) as a function of market return (  ), in the context of past 
time series, such that: 
 (    )    ∑  
   
     
       
(5.3) 
Where α is the intercept term, β the systematic risk of security i, and    is the 
error term, with ∑      
We also denote            as the cumulative abnormal return of stock i at day t to 
the day t+T, then            is calculated  
(5.4) 
           ∑     
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When estimating the mean abnormal return across all events for a specific 
event window (t, t+T), we first calculate the abnormal return for each event for 
each day (in calendar time) on which that abnormal return occurs. For every 
calendar day, we calculate a mean abnormal return for a portfolio of firms that 
have qualified abnormal return on that day. This gives a time series of 
abnormal returns for one specific event window:  
 
           ∑
  
 
 (5.5) 
Where N is the number of days with a qualifying abnormal return during the 
event window. To illustrate the previous point, let us consider the following 
example: consider three companies are trading on the same day (day 0) and the 
event window is one day after the announcement date (after day 0). The 
average abnormal return in this case is equal to the sum of abnormal returns for 
each company at the announcement date divided by the number of companies 
(the average abnormal return at day +1 would be calculated similarly). Another 
way to calculate the average abnormal return is to sum the abnormal returns for 
each company at day 0 and day +1 (event window) and divide the output by 
two (number of days in the event window). Average abnormal returns are 
cumulated to yield the cumulative average abnormal return measure centred 
around the event date, denoted CAAR (ṭ, ṭ+T)  
            ∑      
   
 
 
(5.6) 
 Back to the previous example, the cumulative average abnormal return is 
equal to the average abnormal return on the announcement date (day 0) plus 
the average abnormal return at day 1. Also, the cumulative average abnormal 
return can be calculated by summing the average abnormal return for each 
company. Both methods lead to the same results. 
For example, suppose there were three transactions by three companies on 4
th
 
January 2002. To calculate the average and cumulative abnormal returns for 
the event window [0, 1], we sum the abnormal returns for each company on the 
event date which is January 4
th
 and divide the output by the number of 
companies  and we got the average abnormal return for that day. Similarly, we 
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calculated the average abnormal returns for the next day. By summing the 
average abnormal returns for the event day and the day after, we got the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the event window [0, 1].  
However, in this chapter we test whether age has an impact upon the 
informativeness of directors’ trades or whether directors of a particular age are 
more informed than directors of any other ages. 
5.4 Results 
This section reports the empirical results of the study. First, summary statistics 
is presented to highlight the trends and patterns of UK directors’ trades. 
Second, we test whether the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with 
age using a Univariate analysis controlling for only one factor that is likely to 
af 
fect the informativeness, namely transaction type.  
5.4.1  Summary Statistics 
Table (5.1) and table (5.2) present summaries statistics related to our sample. 
Initially, there are approximately four times as many buy trades as sells (20,312 
buy trades against 4,784 sell trades). Although buy trades are more than sell 
trades, but the average value of sell trades are approximately ten times bigger 
which suggests that directors sell less frequently but more in value (similar 
argument can be said to volume). The average value of directors’ purchases 
was almost £147,373 (with the maximum buy being £575 million in 2007), but 
the average value of a sale was over one million pounds (with the maximum 
sell being £437 million in 2006), so directors’ sales are fewer in number but 
much larger in value. 
The number of event days is the number of days during the period in which at 
least one buy (sell) takes place. There are approximately 2,251 event dates 
(99%) for buy trades and 1,756 event dates (78%) for sell trades. Our sample 
average is eight shares buy (four shares sell) per event. 
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Table (5.1) also shows that in our sample the 25,096 events (buys and sells) are 
related to 2300 separate firms. Specifically, the 20,312 buy transactions were 
conducted by directors in 2,314 separate firms. Thus, each firm had an average 
of just over eight transactions. On the other hand, the 4,784 sell transactions 
were conducted by directors in 1,882 separate firms. Thus, each firm had an 
average of two transactions. 
Besides, 6,700 different directors conducted by transactions during our sample 
period that give an average of approximately three buy transactions per director 
(this can be constructed with sells). The median age of directors who buy is 55 
years old and 54 for sell trades – which make these medians the same as the 
means
41
.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics Related to our Sample Categorised by 
Transaction Type 
Transaction 
type 
No Of 
Trades 
Average 
Value (£) 
Volume No of 
Event Days 
No of 
Firms 
Mean Age Median 
Age 
Max Value 
£m 
No of 
Directors 
Buy 20,312 147,373 168,944 2,251 2,314 55 55 575 6,700 
Sell 4,784 1,488,536 834,731 1,756 1,082 54 54 437 2,414 
Total 25,096       2300         
Volume presents the number of stocks traded for each type during the sample period. Average value for 
each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. The number of event 
days is the number of days during the period in which at least one trade takes place. Age represents the 
mean age for each type. Number of shares in the table is in terms of billions. 
 
Table (5.2) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by both 
age and transaction type during the sample period. The total number of buy and 
sell trades by directors between the ages of 55 and 59 was larger than the total 
number of buy and sell trades by directors of any other group. The average 
value of buy trades of directors aged between 60 and 65 is £68,000 – which is 
approximately six times less than the average value of directors over the age of 
65 years. Hence, buy trades by directors aged between 60 and 65 are larger in 
number but much smaller in value. 
                                                          
41
 The average age was equal to the median age. 
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Turning to director’s sells, the average value of director sales over 70 years of 
age is higher than the average value of other age groups. This average value 
was roughly £4.1 million, which was at least twice as much as the nearest 
average value (the second highest value was £1.67 million for directors aged 
between 65 and 69). On the other hand, the average value for directors under 
40 years of age was only £986,948. This means that older directors sell, on 
average, more than younger directors. This may imply greater liquidity 
requirements or more desire to diversify with old age. Consistent with table 
(5.1), the average value of sell transaction is much higher than that of a 
purchase. This is confirmed across all age groups. 
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Table 5.2): Summary Statistics Categorised by Age and Transaction Type 
Age  Buy  Sell 
No of Trades Average Value (£) Average Value Without 
Outliers (£) 
Average Volume  No of Trades Average Value (£) Average Value Without 
Outliers (£)  
Average Volume 
Age under 40 1,008 (5%) 84,043 72,200 188,653 247 (5%) 986,948 670,719 1,774,209 
Age between 40 And 44 1,949 (10%) 124,637 105,273 214,828 483 (10%) 1,314,316 872,421 928,730 
Age between 45 And 49 3,153 (16%) 69,891 71,109 187,355 830 (17%) 1,013,137 690,214 566,505 
Age between 50 And 54 3,547 (17%) 234,513 73,563 216,751 892 (19%) 1,143,304 698,431 804,521 
Age between 55 And 59 4,353 (21%) 74,386 63,991 118,071 924 (19%) 1,651,876 706,647 863,279 
Age between 60 And 64 3,728 (18%) 68,000 61,135 137,081 761 (16%) 1,566,791 175,128 504,095 
Age between 65 And 69 1,858 (9%) 378,755 68,324 144,219 403 (8%) 1,677,346 659,032 762,102 
Age over 70 715 (4%) 409,203 175,128 201,723 244 (5%) 4,045,909 896,072 1,763,527 
Total 20,312    4,784    
Volume presents the number of stocks traded for each age and type during the sample period, so the average volume presents the total number of shares over the number of trades. Average 
value for each type represents the total value for that type divided by the number of trades. 
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The average value of each trade for directors under 40 is £986,948 (sell) and 
£84,043 (buy). As one can see there is a considerable variation in the average 
value per transaction across age groups. For example, group 50 to 54 is 
approximately three times larger than group 60 to 64 although they have 
similar number of trades. These differences may be driven by a small number 
of extreme observations. Since these few transactions are unlikely to affect the 
average abnormal return, we decided not to exclude them.  
The number of trades (buys and sells) also increased positively with directors’ 
age just before the age of 60 (the number of trades reaches its highest point for 
directors who are aged between 55 and 59). After that age, the number of 
trades decreased as the director became older (this is the case for both 
directors’ buys and sells). Therefore, it looks like age distribution according to 
number of trades forms an inverse U shape.  
5.4.2  Univariate Analysis 
Similar to earlier studies (Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; and 
Gregory et al., 2009), we conduct a Univariate analysis to test market reactions 
to directors’ trades. Unlike the previous studies, we measure the 
informativeness of directors’ trades using the CAARs associated with different 
event windows ranging between one and ten days after the announcement date. 
Table (5.3) and table (5.4) show how the informativeness varies with age and 
transaction type. Specifically, table (5.3) shows how the informativeness of 
buy transactions varies with age and table (5.4) examines how the 
informativeness of sell transactions varies with age. Based on previous 
literature which finds, as the whole, only buy transactions are informative, we 
have deliberately split our sample into two. One clear pattern emerges from 
table (5.3) and table (5.4) which is consistent to our previous patterns, and 
indicates that sells are negative and insignificant (uninformative) whereas 
purchases of directors are positive and, as the whole significant. This is 
consistent with the view that directors’ purchases  are motivated by market 
participants containing good information about firm future prospects. 
Furthermore, the insignificance of sell transactions indicates that market 
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participants view this as uninformed trades likely to be motivated by 
liquidity/diversification. 
Turning to our original hypothesis, table (5.3) shows how the informativeness 
of buy transactions varies with director’s age. To examine this, we chose eight 
age categories across five event window.  
Based on the previous literature examined in section (5.2), financial decisions 
are expected to vary with age. On the one hand (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; 
Korniotis and Kumar, 2011; and Graham et al., 2013), the informativeness of 
trades should increase with director’s age and therefore experience is likely to 
be offset by a decline in cognitive ability which may decline with age. By 
empirically examining how the informativeness varies with age, we may be 
able to shed light on the effect which dominates.  
Since our aim is to examine how the informativeness varies with age, our focus 
is only on transactions that are likely to be informed by directors’ buys. One 
clear pattern emerges from table (5.3) - informativeness across all windows for 
the youngest (under 40 age group) is the highest. In general, the 
informativeness then declines with age until 60 to 64 age groups. This is 
consistent with the decline in cognitive ability effects dominating the increase 
in experience. However, this decline in the informativeness seems to stop 
between the age 60 and 64 suggesting that the role of experience is becoming 
more prominent. Turning to the age distribution of CAARs for buy trades, we 
notice that directors who are less than 40 years old generate higher CAARs 
than all other age groups. Moreover, this trend becomes stronger as the event 
window increases.  
To summarise, our results are consistent with the UK studies by King and Roll 
(1988), Gregory et al. (1994), and Pope et al. (1990) which find positive 
(significant) abnormal return associated with buy trades, and negative 
(insignificant) abnormal return associated with sell trades for different event 
windows.  
When focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it appears that the 
market perceives younger directors’ (under 40) trades to be more informed 
than directors’ trades of other ages. This declines until 60 to 64 and then levels 
off. This pattern is perhaps consistent with Agarwal et al. (2009), Fair (2007), 
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and Grady and Craik, (2000) who suggested that directors’ ability to make 
better decisions decline with age.  
Then, the increase in cumulative average abnormal returns after the age of 65 
might be due to factors such as experience, education, income, wealth, race, 
ethnicity, and gender (King and Leape, 1987; Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; 
and Korniotis and Kumar, 2011) which may lower the adverse effects of 
cognitive aging. 
Table 5.3: The Results of the Univariate Analysis for Directors’ Buys 
Age  Event Windows N 
  Announcement Day [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Age under 40 CAARs 2.32% 3.01% 3.39% 3.49% 4.19% 1,008 
T - Student 6.36 9.08 8.33 7.73 7.49  
Age between 40 And 44 CAARs 1.50% 2.20% 2.74% 2.92% 3.78% 1,949 
T - Student 2.54 8.44 8.02 8.44 9.17  
Age between 45 And 49 CAARs 1.31% 2.09% 2.70% 2.90% 3.41% 3,153 
T - Student 1.47 9.4 9.7 10.08 9.84  
Age between 50 And 54 CAARs 1.38% 2.06% 2.67% 2.88% 3.38% 3,547 
T - Student 2.09 9.75 9.91 10.48 10.93  
Age between 55 And 59 CAARs 1.10% 1.72% 2.28% 2.55% 2.95% 4,353 
T - Student 0.12 7.89 8.21 8.62 8.79  
Age between 60 And 64 CAARs 1.12% 1.67% 2.01% 2.09% 2.31% 3,728 
T - Student 2.5 7.64 7.94 6.83 5.13  
Age between 65 And 69 CAARs 1.31% 1.81% 2.39% 2.46% 2.81% 1,858 
T - Student 1.27 6.04 6.65 6.35 6.32  
Age over 70 CAARs 1.30% 2.04% 2.28% 2.28% 2.94% 715 
T - Student 0.85 5.11 4.6 4.42 4.96  
Total CAARs 1.50% 2.09% 2.54% 2.72% 3.26% 20,311 
T - Student 3.58 5.78 6.82 6.71 5.86  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’ buys categorised by different 
age groups for different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and +10 
days after the announcement date. N refers to the number of trades for each age category.  
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Table 5.4: The Results of the Univariate Analysis for Directors’ Sells 
Age  Event Windows N 
   Announcement Day [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Age under 40 CAARs -0.48% -0.53% 0.22% -0.26% -0.81% 247 
T - Student -0.13 -0.15 0.06 -0.07 -0.22  
Age between 40 And 44 CAARs 0.14% -0.39% -0.53% -1.21% -1.71% 483 
T - Student 0.06 -0.16 -0.22 -0.51 -0.72  
Age between 45 And 49 CAARs -0.25% -0.39% -0.57% -0.96% -1.34% 830 
T - Student -0.12 -0.19 -0.28 -0.47 -0.66  
Age between 50 And 54 CAARs -0.27% -0.58% -0.2% -0.45% -0.82% 892 
T - Student -0.14 -0.31 -0.1 -0.24 -0.43  
Age between 55 And 59 CAARs -0.19% -0.32% -0.32% -0.56% -0.96% 924 
T - Student -0.13 -0.22 -0.22 -0.39 -0.67  
Age between 60 And 64 CAARs 0.03% -0.26% -0.48% -0.73% -0.71% 761 
T - Student 0.01 -0.10 -0.18 -0.27 -0.26  
Age between 65 And 69 CAARs -0.14% -0.34% -0.68% -0.63% -1.65% 403 
T - Student -0.07 -0.17 -0.34 -0.32 -0.83  
Age over 70 CAARs -0.42% -0.45% -0.59% -0.88% -1.15% 244 
T - Student -0.19 -0.20 -0.26 -0.39 -0.51  
Total CAARs -0.19 -0.26% 0.07% -0.42% -0.93% 4,784 
 T - Student -0.07 -0.12 0.03 -0.19 -0.43  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’’ sells categorised by different 
age groups for different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and +10 
days after the announcement date. N refers to the number of trades for each age category.  
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5.5 Multivariate Analysis 
Section (5.4) analysed how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with 
age controlling for only one factor that is likely to affect the informativeness, 
namely transaction type. However, the previous literature highlighted many 
factors that may have impact upon the information contained in directors’ 
trades. In this section, our aim is to examine the same hypothesis whilst 
controlling for other factors. The results and conclusions from our Univariate 
analysis should be viewed tentatively and are mainly included for comparison 
with other Univariate studies in this area (Seyhun, 1986; Gregory et al., 1994; 
Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; and Gregory et al., 2009).  
In this section, we examine how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies 
with age controlling not only for transaction type, but also for firm size 
measured by market value (see for example, Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et al., 
1994; and Friederich et al., 2002), trade size measured by the value of the trade 
divided by the market value (Fidrmuc et al., (2006) and Gregory et al., (2009) 
used value of the trade as a measure of trade size), and holding percentage (see 
Gregory et al., 2009). 
Studies, such as Seyhun (1986), Gregory et al.(1994) and Friederich et 
al.(2002), examined the impact of firm size upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. They argued that directors of smaller companies are more 
predictable of their company’s future prospects than directors of larger 
companies. This is perhaps because larger companies tend to include more 
non-executive directors or because directors’ trades of larger companies are 
more public so that stock market reaction is faster (Gregory et al., 1994). 
Therefore, insiders of smaller firms are more informed about their trades than 
insiders of larger firms (Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et al,. 1997; Huddart and Ke, 
2007a; and Gregory et al,. 2009).  
Besides, trade size has an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades. 
Informed traders prefer to trade larger amounts at any given price, whereas 
uninformed traders do not share this quantity bias. The larger the trade size, the 
more likely it is that the market maker is trading with an informed trading 
(Easley and O’Hara, 1987). Informed trades are more concentrated in medium 
sizes and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders’ private 
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information (Barclay and Warner, 1993). Medium-sized trades as a whole seem 
more informative than large ones (Friederich et al, 2002). Gregory et al. (2009) 
used the value of the trade divided by the market value percentage as a measure 
of trade size (that was in their summary table). Similarly, we used this 
percentage to control for trade size effects in our multivariate regression.  
Scott and Xu (2004) used shares traded as a percentage of insiders’ holdings to 
separate sells driven by liquidity or diversification needs from sells driven by 
information advantage. Gregory et al. (2009) found that when directors are 
buying more shares as a percentage of their holdings, buys produce strong 
signals,  
Formally, our hypothesis is tested within the context of the following model; 
 
                                                    
               
(5.7)  
 
The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return for the 
windows (0, 1), (0, 3), (0, 5) and (0, 10). The independent variables are as 
follows: Value of trades is the natural logarithm of the value of the trade; 
Holding is the number of shares transacted as a percentage of total holding; 
Market Value is the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm on the 
event day; Age is a dummy variable which presents different directors’ age 
categories. In this analysis, as with the Univariate, we have eight age groups. 
Transaction type is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
transaction is “Buy” or 0 if the transaction is “Sell”. In our analysis, we interact 
Age with Transaction Type to identify whether the informativeness of 
directors’ trades varies with age. Therefore, we used eight age dummies 
interacted with buy trades and another eight dummies interacted with sell 
trades assuming no constant term to avoid dummy variables trap. This 
regression equation will allows us to clearly interpret the parameter estimates. 
Table (5.5) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ 
trades. On the whole, our results for buy trades confirm the pattern found in the 
Univariate analysis. Namely, ceteris paribus, informativeness is significantly 
positive across all age groups for buy transactions. The following pattern is 
also noticed; across all windows, as witnessed by the size of the coefficient, 
abnormal returns for the younger age group (under 40) are the highest. 
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Thereafter, they decline until the 60 to 65 age group and then begin to level off. 
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across age groups, we preformed the 
following test;  
 
                            
                            
 
As can be seen from table (5.5), the null was rejected across all event windows. 
Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant 
across all age groups, they are also statistically different from each other. For 
example, an F-test of 3.93 for (0, 1) event window confirms the latter. In order 
to examine whether the CAARs for old and young directors’ buy transactions 
are different, we conducted the following F-test;  
 
          
          
 
Where    refers to the coefficients of the first four age groups, whilst    refers 
to the coefficients of the last four age groups. The results in the last row of 
table (5.5) show that there is a significant difference between the CAARs of 
younger directors buy transactions and those of older directors. Giving the size 
of the buy coefficients across age groups, it is safe to say that younger 
directors’ buy transactions produce significantly higher abnormal returns than 
older directors.  
Turning to the sell transactions, the first thing we notice is that, unlike the 
Univariate analysis, there is some evidence of statistically significantly 
negative CAARs for younger directors. For example, across all event windows 
the 40 to 44 age group has statistically significantly negative abnormal returns. 
This pattern is again repeated for longer event window for the 45 to 49 age 
group. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that sell transactions may be 
informative across certain age groups. In order to examine whether the CAARs 
for older (over 70) and young (under 40) directors’ buy transactions are 
different, we conducted the following F-test;  
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The results show that there is a significant difference between the CAARs of 
younger directors (under 40) buy transactions and those of older directors (over 
70). Furthermore, we examine whether directors aged between 60 and 65 buy 
trades are different from directors aged over 70 buy trades. The results show 
that there is no significant difference between the CAARs of directors aged 
between 60 and 65 buy transactions and those of directors aged over 70.  
Table (5.5) also shows the impact of our controlling variables. Consistent to 
our priors, market value is significantly negative i.e. transactions in smaller 
firms are more informative. Additionally, the size of the trade does not have an 
impact. Our post event CAARs do not depend on the size of the transaction
42
. 
Besides, holding percentage is significantly positive. This suggests the larger 
the number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, the higher the 
abnormal return.  
 
 
                                                          
42
 Previous studies used many size categories (small, medium, and large) to examine the impact 
of trade size upon the informativeness of directors’ trades, while in our analysis we used trade 
size as a continuous variable.  
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Table 5.5: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Trades 
  Event Windows N 
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
  coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat  
Buy Age under 40 2.87% 12.45 3.19% 11.76 3.20% 10.67 3.64% 9.76 863 
Age between 40 And 44 2.22% 13.4 2.55% 13.07 2.81% 13.02 3.46% 12.88 1710 
Age between 45 And 49 2.13% 16.48 2.59% 16.98 2.81% 16.66 3.19% 15.25 2742 
Age between 50 And 54 2.11% 17.44 2.53% 17.73 2.79% 17.66 3.34% 17.04 3108 
Age between 55 And 59 1.71% 15.5 2.10% 16.21 2.28% 15.88 2.64% 14.79 3797 
Age between 60 and 65 1.63% 13.77 1.86% 13.34 1.92% 12.46 2.12% 11.07 3268 
Age between 65 And 69 1.80% 10.81 2.26% 11.52 2.34% 10.79 2.65% 9.81 1636 
Age over 70 2.12% 8.13 2.32% 7.55 2.40% 7.05 2.83% 6.69 636 
Sell Age under 40 -0.52% -1.12 -0.19% -0.35 -0.36% -0.6 -0.61% -0.82 208 
Age between 40 And 44 -0.78% -2.3 -0.98% -2.45 -1.09% -2.46 -1.72% -3.13 419 
Age between 45 And 49 -0.36% -1.42 -0.50% -1.65 -0.79% -2.37 -1.23% -2.97 719 
Age between 50 And 54 -0.51% -2.11 -0.38% -1.34 -0.43% -1.37 -0.49% -1.24 751 
Age between 55 And 59 -0.31% -1.27 -0.32% -1.08 -0.51% -1.58 -0.90% -2.24 783 
Age between 60 and 65 -0.18% -0.67 -0.32% -1.04 -0.45% -1.32 -0.78% -1.83 663 
Age between 65 And 69 -0.29% -0.81 -0.42% -1.01 -0.51% -1.1 -1.10% -1.9 351 
Age over 70 -0.60% -1.3 -0.54% -0.99 -0.68% -1.13 -0.41% -0.54 217 
 Market Value -0.12% -5.93 -0.15% -6.34 -0.19% -7.32 -0.18% -5.64  
 Value of trades 0.00% -1.44 0.00% -1.64 0.00% -1.7 0.00% -1.18  
 %Holding 0.04% 3.87 0.05% 3.96 0.06% 3.82 0.07% 3.91  
 Heteroscedacity Test 32.92 (0.6605)  23.76 (0.9548)  30.06 (0.7837)  27.42 (0.8746)   
 Significance across age groups for buys 3.93 (0.003) 3.50 (0.0009) 3.47 (0.001) 3.64 (0.00)  
 Significance across age groups for sells 0.65 (0.713) 0.45 (0.872) 0.29 (0.959) 0.28 (0.961)  
 Under-40 age directors against over-70 age directors 7.86 (0.005) 6.43 (0.011) 3.58 (0.058) 3.48 (0.061)  
 60 to 65 age directors against over-70 age directors 0.00 (0.973) 0.27 (0.602) 0.33 (0.564) 0.08 (0.775)  
 Younger against older (Buy) 4.6 (0.007) 4.47 (0.007) 3.12 (0.008) 2.07 (0.01)  
Value of trades is the value of the trade divided by the market value for each firm on the event date; Holding is the number of shares transacted as a percentage of total holding before the transaction. N refers to the 
number of trades. The Significance across age groups for buys (sells) is an F-test result for the hypothesis whether buy (sell) coefficient across all age groups is significantly different from each other. 
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Diagrammatically, the general pattern found in table (5.5) can be seen below in 
figure (5.1) which shows the distribution of CAAR over different age groups 
for buy trades and for the five-day event window. The figure indicates a 
decline in CAAR up to the age of 60 – which registered the lowest CAAR – 
then an increase in CAAR as directors gets older.  
 
Figure 5.1: The Distribution of CAAR over Different Age Groups for Buy 
Trades and for the Five-Day Event Window 
In conclusion, there appears to be an age-related pattern for buy trades, where 
directors under 40 were more able to gain high abnormal returns. A decline in 
the informativeness of directors’ trades starting at the under-40 age group, 
continuing to decrease up to the age group 60 to 65, and then beginning to 
increase after that age group. Also, there is some evidence of statistically 
significant negative CAARs for younger directors. For example, across all 
event windows, the 40 to 44 age group has statistically significantly negative 
abnormal returns. This pattern is again repeated for longer event window for 
the 45 to 49 age group. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that sell 
transactions are perhaps informative across certain age groups.  
These results are in line with the previous literature. For example, Baltes and 
Lindenberger (1997), and Fair (2007) showed a linear per cent decline in Man 
(Woman) cognitive and physical abilities between the age of 35 and about age 
70 (in our study between ages 40 and 65). After the age of 70, the role of 
experience, education, wealth, and income may lower the effects of cognitive 
abilities leading investors to make better financial decisions (King and Leape, 
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1987; Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; and Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). This 
might explain the pattern found in Univariate and multivariate analyses for buy 
trades when examining the informativeness of directors’ trades. Our results are 
also consistent with Kyriacou and Mase (2003), who suggested that the signals 
generated from executive stock option exercises by younger executives are 
consistently more informative than those generated from the corresponding 
exercises by older executives. 
5.5.1  Controlling For Director’s Type 
Another factor that the literature identified and may affect the informativeness 
of directors’ trades is the type of director, e.g. executive director, non-
executive director, and former director
43
. It was argued that executive directors 
are more involved in the daily management of the firm, and have access to 
more private information than non-executives (Gregory et al., 2009). Using US 
data, Jeng et al. (2003) tested the informativeness of the trades of three 
directors’ types (top executives44, other officers, and directors), whereas 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) tested the informativeness of the trades of five types of 
directors in the UK (CEOs, other executive directors, chairmen, other 
incumbent directors, and former directors). The results implied that the CAARs 
for the various categories are not significantly different from each other. 
Gregory et al. (2009) examined whether directors’ type (executive or non-
executive) has an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. They 
found that the market reaction to a director’s trade is affected by the category 
of the director (seniority). Later, Knewtson (2011) found that, for buy 
activities, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) generate higher excess returns than 
Chief Operating Officers (COOs) and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). This 
superior trading profitability of CFOs suggested that they are either more 
skilled at trading or are more willing to use asymmetric information. Based on 
                                                          
43
 Executive directors typically perform operational and strategic functions and are full-time 
employees of the firm. Non-executives are not generally involved with the operations of the 
firm; they are mainly hired for their experience and expertise in specific areas to provide 
advice and objectivity. Former refers to directors who are no longer board members. 
44
 Top executives include chief executives, chairman, or president.  
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these priors, this section also examines the effect of age on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades, whilst also controlling for the type of director.  
In our sample, the main three types of directors are: executives, non-executives, and 
formers. Approximately, 26% of our sample is executives, 39% is non-Executives, 
and 31% is formers
45
.  
5.5.1.1 Executive Directors 
Table (5.6) shows the results of the multivariate regression for executive directors’ 
trades. On the whole, our results for buy trades confirm the pattern found in the 
Univariate and multivariate (when we control for firm size, trade size, and holding 
percentage effects) analyses. In other words, informativeness is significantly positive 
across all age groups for buy transactions. The following pattern is also noticed; across 
all windows, as witnessed by the size of the coefficient, abnormal returns for the 
younger age group (under 40) are the highest. After that, they decline until the 60 to 
65 age group and then begin to level off. This is confirmed by the F-test which shows 
that there is no significant difference between the 60 to 65 age group and over-70 age 
group.  
Similar to table (5.4), table (5.6) shows insignificantly negative CAARs associated 
with sell trades. Furthermore, table (5.6) indicates the following; market value is 
significantly negative i.e. transactions in smaller firms are more informative. The size 
of the trade does not have an impact. Although abnormal returns associated with buy 
trades are positive and statistically significant across all age groups, they are also 
statistically different from each other. For example, an F-test of 3.67 for (0, 1) event 
window confirms the latter. The results in the last row of table (5.6) show that there is 
a significant difference between the CAARs of younger executives (less than 55) buy 
transactions and those of older executives (over 55). Given the size of the buy 
coefficients across age groups, it is safe to say that younger executives’ buy 
transactions produce significantly higher abnormal returns than older executives.  
Additionally, the results of F-test show that the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions for the youngest age group (under-40) and the oldest age group (over-70) 
executives are significantly different; whereas the abnormal returns associated with 
buy transactions for 60 to 65 and over-70 executives are not.  
 
 
                                                          
45
 4% of our sample is missing or relates to unknown directors’ types. 
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Table 5.6: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Executives’ Trades 
  Event Windows  
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] N 
  coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat  
Buy Age under 40 3.80% 10.68 4.41% 10.62 4.40% 9.59 5.51% 9.72 295 
Age between 40 And 44 2.61% 9.14 3.15% 9.44 3.28% 8.89 4.13% 9.06 553 
Age between 45 And 49 2.53% 12.4 3.13% 12.19 3.15% 12.16 3.74% 10.66 866 
Age between 50 And 54 2.43% 10.45 2.90% 10.27 3.02% 10.3 3.51% 10.12 891 
Age between 55 And 59 2.07% 7.3 2.55% 7.7 2.87% 7.83 3.34% 7.38 924 
Age between 60 and 65 1.69% 3.95 1.56% 3.72 2.23% 4.03 3.29% 4.8 596 
Age between 65 And 69 1.77% 2.61 1.79% 2.75 1.89% 3.04 3.3% 3.02 251 
Age over 70 1.82% 2.8 1.86% 2.39 1.91% 2.16 1.79% 1.74 173 
Sell Age under 40 -0.81% -0.99 -1.10% -1.15 -1.05% -1 -0.08% -0.06 63 
Age between 40 And 44 -0.28% -0.48 -0.65% -0.95 -0.99% -1.3 -1.54% -1.64 100 
Age between 45 And 49 -0.40% -0.94 -0.55% -1.11 -0.90% -1.64 -1.47% -2.16 211 
Age between 50 And 54 -0.65% -1.43 -0.65% -1.23 -0.72% -1.23 -0.70% -0.97 216 
Age between 55 And 59 -0.81% -1.32 -0.86% -1.2 -0.93% -1.17 -1.43% -1.46 171 
Age between 60 and 65 -0.29% -0.33 -0.68% -0.68 -0.63% -0.57 -0.37% -0.27 122 
Age between 65 And 69 -0.37% -0.39 -0.69% -0.62 -0.88% -0.71 -1.38% -0.91 92 
Age over 70 -0.01% 0 -0.33% -0.17 -0.66% -0.31 -2.80% -1.06 38 
 Value of trades 0.00% -1.09 0.00% -0.97 0.00% -0.61 0.00% -0.61  
 Holding 0.01% 2.35 0.05% 1.82 0.02% 2.1 0.06% 1.67  
 Market Value -0.18% -4.41 -0.23% -4.72 -0.27% -5.03 -0.01% -1.77  
 Heteroscedacity Test 28.37 (0.8447) 23.86 (0.9534) 30.83 (0.7526) 55.01 (0.0286)  
 Significance across age groups for buys 3.67 (0.000) 3.45 (0.001) 1.96 (0.056) 1.67 (0.090)  
 Significance across age groups for sells 0.86 (0.534) 1.01 (0.419) 1.00 (0.427) 0.47 (0.855)  
 Under-40 age directors against over-70 age directors 9.02 (0.002) 7.84 (0.005) 3.87 (0.049) 5.58 (0.018)  
 60 to 65 age directors against over-70 age directors 1.10 (0.294) 0.83 (0.360) 0.54 (0.463) 0.86 (0.355)  
 Young against old (Buy) 7.2 (0,004) 9.09 (0.002) 7.42 (0.005) 9.98 (0.002)  
Value of trades is the value of the trade divided by the market value for each firm on the event date; Holding is the number of shares transacted as a percentage of total 
holding before the transaction. N refers to the number of trades. 
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5.5.1.2 Former Directors 
Table (5.7) shows the results of the multivariate regression for former 
directors’ trades. On the whole, our results for buy trades confirm the pattern 
found for executives. In other words, informativeness is significantly positive 
across all age groups for buy transactions. The following pattern is also 
noticed; across all windows, as witnessed by the size of the coefficient, 
abnormal returns for the younger age group (under 40) are the highest. 
Thereafter, they decline until the age group of 60 to 65 years and then they 
begin to level off.  
Similar to table (5.4), table (5.8) shows insignificantly negative CAARs 
associated with sell trades. When testing whether the abnormal returns 
associated with buy trades across all age groups are significantly different, only 
the results of F-test for three and five event windows show that they are 
significantly different. 
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Table 5.7: The Results of the Multivariate Regression for Formers’ Trades 
  Event Windows  
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] N 
Buy  coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat  
Age under 40 2.67% 6.99 2.84% 6.31 2.91% 5.82 3.23% 4.99 343 
Age between 40 And 44 2.33% 8.05 2.58% 7.31 2.76% 7.98 3.19% 7.69 793 
Age between 45 And 49 2.27% 9.79 2.43% 10.41 2.67% 9.81 3.06% 8.95 1125 
Age between 50 And 54 2.15% 9.59 2.28% 10.16 2.59% 9.87 2.70% 9.94 1321 
Age between 55 And 59 1.94% 9.7 2.22% 9.44 2.38% 9.11 2.58% 8.52 1812 
Age between 60 and 65 1.92% 9.26 2.08% 8.27 2.22% 7.97 2.54% 7.6 1465 
Age between 65 And 69 2.12% 7.95 2.38% 7.59 2.52% 7.23 2.63% 6.29 810 
Age over 70 1.78% 4.57 1.90% 4.14 1.97% 3.86 2.76% 4.5 317 
Sell  Age under 40 -1.19% -1.98 -0.95% -1.34 -1.39% -1.77 -1.28% -1.36 123 
Age between 40 And 44 -0.87% -1.73 -0.94% -1.59 -0.93% -1.42 -2.24% -2.84 216 
Age between 45 And 49 -0.01% -0.04 -0.29% -0.6 -0.32% -0.61 -0.74% -1.16 301 
Age between 50 And 54 -0.18% -0.46 -0.09% -0.21 -0.19% -0.39 -0.02% -0.04 360 
Age between 55 And 59 -0.16% -0.5 -0.20% -0.53 -0.05% -0.13 -0.36% -0.71 503 
Age between 60 and 65 -0.11% -0.31 -0.08% -0.19 -0.22% -0.48 -0.62% -1.14 433 
Age between 65 And 69 -0.07% -0.13 -0.39% -0.67 -0.55% -0.86 -1.24% -1.59 191 
Age over 70 -0.15% -0.24 -0.24% -0.33 -0.40% -0.5 -0.84% -0.88 126 
 Market Value -0.08% -2.29 -0.07% -2.05 -0.08% -1.99 -0.07% -1.72  
 Value 0.00% -1.21 0.00% -1.44 0.00% -1.55 0.00% -0.92  
 Holding 0.07% 5.52 0.07% 4.40 0.07% 5.05 0.06% 3.12  
 Heteroscedacity Test 34.26 (0.5982) 35.12 (0.5572) 15.37 (0.9993) 26.03 (0.9114)  
 Significance across age groups for buys 1.22 (0.289) 2.11 (0.039) 2.11 (0.039) 1.17 (0.314)  
 Significance across age groups for sells 1.62 (0.125) 1.02 (0.414) 1.04 (0.399) 0.72 (0.653)  
 Under-40 age directors against over-70 age directors 5.04 (0.024) 3.92 (0.047) 4.62 (0.031) 0.15 (0.701)  
 60 to 65 age directors against over-70 age directors 1.62 (0.203) 1.09 (0.296) 1.13 (0.287) 0.18 (0.668)  
 Young against old (Buy) 4.07 (0.043) 4.43 (0.035) 3.36 (0.066) 2.82 (0.093)  
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5.5.1.3 Non-Executive Directors 
Non-executives are not generally involved with the day-to-day operations of 
the firm; they are mainly hired for their experience and expertise in specific 
areas to provide advice and objectivity. The main role of the non-executives, 
according to Higgs Reports, is to monitor and support the performance of 
executives. Non-executives are also board members.  
Table (5.8) shows the results of the multivariate regression for non-executive 
directors’ trades. The pattern found in the previous two tables is not repeated 
for this type of directors. Informativeness is significantly positive across all age 
groups for buy transactions except for under-40 age group. This is in direct 
contrast to our previous results.  
Secondly, the following pattern is also noticed; across all windows, as 
witnessed by the size of the coefficient, abnormal returns for the older age 
group (over 70) are the highest. Therefore, unlike the previous results of 
Univariate and multivariate analysis, older non-executives’ trades seem to be 
more informative than non-executives of other age groups. This is confirmed 
by the two F-test results. Although abnormal returns associated with buy trades 
are positive and statistically significant across all age groups, they are also 
statistically different from each other. For example, an F-test of 3.80 for (0, 1) 
event window confirms the latter. The results in the last row of table (5.8) show 
that there is a significant difference between the CAARs of younger non-
executives (less than 55) buy transactions and those of older non-executives 
(over 55). Given the size of the buy coefficients across age groups, it is safe to 
say that older non-executives’ buy transactions produce significantly higher 
abnormal returns than younger non-executives. 
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These results are, perhaps, not as surprising as initially thought because of their 
very nature, non-executive directors are not involved in everyday operations, 
but rather employed for expertise and experience the can offer the firm. Our 
results suggest, but we do not prove, that the market does not view the under-
40 group as likely to possess experience or superior expertise. However, the 
market reacts more strongly to buy transactions of the over-70 non-executives 
presumably, because they believe experience and expertise is likely to increase 
with age.  
Our results are also consistent with studies by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), 
Van Rooij et al. (2007), and Korniotis and Kumar (2011) who found that 
investors with more experience and more financial knowledge are better 
decision makers.  
Similar to table (5.4), table (5.8) shows insignificantly negative CAARs 
associated with sell trades.  
Furthermore, table (5.8) indicates the following; market value is significantly 
negative i.e. transactions in smaller firms are more informative. The size of the 
trade does not have an impact. Holding percentage is significantly positive i.e. 
the larger the number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, the higher 
the abnormal return.  
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Table 5.8: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Non-Executives’ Trades 
  Event Windows  
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] N 
Buy  coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat  
Age under 40 0.51% 0.73 0.02% 0.02 0.17% 0.18 -1.32% -1.12 94 
Age between 40 And 44 2.66% 6.08 2.85% 5.43 3.10% 5.35 3.79% 5.16 249 
Age between 45 And 49 1.14% 3.99 1.37% 3.99 1.63% 4.32 1.93% 4.01 583 
Age between 50 And 54 2.06% 9.53 2.44% 9.41 2.70% 9.44 3.02% 8.32 1,069 
Age between 55 And 59 1.57% 9.06 2.00% 9.64 2.20% 9.59 2.51% 8.64 1,681 
Age between 60 and 65 1.51% 9.24 1.79% 9.12 1.78% 8.22 1.66% 6.05 1,823 
Age between 65 And 69 1.86% 7.75 2.54% 8.8 2.62% 8.23 3.30% 8.15 843 
Age over 70 3.46% 7.28 3.88% 6.81 4.08% 6.49 4.17% 5.21 209 
Sell Age under 40 -1.53% -0.72 -2.94% -1.16 -5.12% -1.82 -4.73% -1.33 11 
Age between 40 And 44 -1.23% -1.12 -2.22% -1.69 -1.62% -1.12 -0.26% -0.14 37 
Age between 45 And 49 0.00% 0 -0.15% -0.13 -0.77% -0.62 -1.13% -0.72 50 
Age between 50 And 54 -0.55% -0.77 -0.73% -0.84 -0.66% -0.69 -0.56% -0.46 89 
Age between 55 And 59 -0.45% -0.73 -0.50% -0.68 -0.67% -0.83 -1.07% -1.05 161 
Age between 60 and 65 -0.28% -0.57 -0.66% -1.1 -0.73% -1.1 -1.18% -1.41 191 
Age between 65 And 69 -0.11% -0.16 -0.29% -0.38 -0.46% -0.53 -0.29% -0.27 114 
Age over 70 -1.09% -1.4 -0.96% -1.03 -0.84% -0.81 -0.25% -0.19 82 
 Value 0.00% -0.51 0.00% -0.33 0.00% -0.55 0.00% -0.23  
 Holding 0.06% 2.52 0.08% 3.05 0.09% 3.16 0.15% 4.16  
 Market Value 0.10% -2.97 0.15% -3.69 0.22% -4.83 0.26% -4.44  
 Heteroscedacity Test 57.54 (0.0168) 42.87 (0.2340) 59.23 (0.0116) 38.82 (0.3874)  
 Significance across age groups for buys 3.80 (0.00) 3.49 (0.001) 3.22 (0.002) 3.89 (0.000)  
 Significance across age groups for sells 0.58 (0.773) 0.68 (0.687) 0.77 (0.615) 0.38 (0.914)  
 Under-40 age directors against over-70 age directors 12.29 (0.00) 14.94 (0.00) 14.93 (0.000) 17.48 (0.000)  
 60 to 65 age directors against over-70 age directors 8.50 (0.003) 5.80 (0.016) 5.70 (0.016) 2.98 (0.084)  
 Young against old (Buy) 5.24 (0.022) 4.13 (0.042) 3.7 (0.024) 2.78 (0.062)  
Value of trades is the value of the trade divided by the market value for each firm on the event date; Holding is the number of shares transacted as a percentage of total 
holding before the transaction. N refers to the number of trades. 
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To summarise, for executive directors and former directors, the results for buy 
trades confirm the pattern found in the Univariate and multivariate analysis. In 
other words, abnormal returns for the younger age group (under 40) are the 
highest. Thereafter, they decline until the 60 to 65 age group and then they 
begin to level off.  
For non-executive directors, the results for buy trades are unlike the pattern 
found in the Univariate and multivariate analysis. In other words, older non-
executives (over 70) seem to be more informed about their buy trades than 
younger executives. This result might be due to the older non-executives 
having more experience or greater financial knowledge or being wealthier or 
more educated (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij et al. 2007; and 
Korniotis and Kumar, 2011) so they can lower the effects of cognitive abilities 
and be more informative. Similar to the results of Univariate analysis, the 
CAARs of directors’ sells are insignificant and negative. 
5.6 Robustness Check 
To confirm that our results are as robust to alternative specifications of the 
benchmark model, we used the Market Adjusted Returns Model as a robustness 
check. This robustness check was previously used by Gregory et al. (2009). 
This benchmark model calculates the abnormal return as follows:  
 
Abnormal return = Return (   ) – Market Return (   ) (5, 8) 
 
This model is an important determinant of the abnormal returns around the 
event (Benz, 1981; Lin and Howe, 1990; Gregory et al., 2009). The results are 
presented in table (5.9) only for the multivariate analysis. This is because there 
is no significant difference in the results except for the size of the coefficients. 
For example, in a similar fashion to table (5.5) which shows the results of the 
multivariate regression for directors’ trades, table (5.9) confirms the pattern 
found in the multivariate analysis of directors’ trades. The informativeness is 
significantly positive across all age groups for buy transactions. The following 
pattern is also noticed; across all windows abnormal returns for the younger 
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age group (under 40) are the highest. Thereafter they decline until the 60 to 65 
age group and then begin to level off.  
Turning to the sell transactions, the first thing we notice is that there is some 
evidence of statistically significantly negative CAARs for younger directors. 
For example, across all event windows the 40 to 44 age group has statistically 
significantly negative abnormal returns. This pattern is again repeated for 
longer event window for the 45 to 49 age group. Thus, there is some evidence 
to suggest that sell transactions may be informative across certain age groups. 
Thus, it can be seen the changing in benchmark model has a little impact on 
our results with only a small quantitative difference between the two methods.  
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Table 5.9: Robustness Check Results for Directors’ Trades 
  Event Windows  
    [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] N 
    coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat coefficients T-stat   
Buy Age under 40 2.73% 16.29 2.72% 14.72 2.64% 13.27 2.62% 11.45 863 
Age between 40 And 44 2.16% 17.88 2.29% 16.34 2.39% 14.91 2.55% 12.89 1710 
Age between 45 And 49 2.04% 20.69 2.17% 20.61 2.37% 19.7 2.44% 17.08 2742 
Age between 50 And 54 2.01% 22.25 2.13% 21.86 2.25% 21.23 2.41% 19.07 3108 
Age between 55 And 59 1.69% 20.29 1.79% 20.59 1.90% 19.9 2.07% 17.39 3797 
Age between 60 and 65 1.65% 18.18 1.65% 16.45 1.68% 15.97 1.64% 14.37 3268 
Age between 65 And 69 1.79% 15.05 2.01% 15.34 2.00% 13.92 2.07% 11.66 1636 
Age over 70 2.20% 12.76143 2.19% 11.59 2.23% 10.99 2.47% 9.71 636 
Sell Age under 40 -0.07% -1.02 -0.83% -0.70 -0.37% -0.72 -0.31% -0.96 208 
Age between 40 And 44 -0.92% -3.19 -1.19% -3.67 -1.07% -3.45 -1.20% -3.91 419 
Age between 45 And 49 -0.44% -2.07 -0.57% -2.52 -0.78% -3.27 -1.02% -3.74 719 
Age between 50 And 54 -0.40% -2.54 -0.29% -1.41 -0.17% -1.43 0.06% -1.23 751 
Age between 55 And 59 -0.07% -1.35 -0.21% -1.71 -0.05% -1.59 0.00% -1.82 783 
Age between 60 and 65 -0.06% -0.72 -0.20% -1.23 -0.16% -1.50 -0.15% -1.65 663 
Age between 65 And 69 -0.13% -0.88 -0.34% -1.46 -0.32% -1.36 -0.40% -1.73 351 
Age over 70 -0.46% -1.3 -0.24% -0.93 -0.20% -1.02 0.04% -0.51 217 
  Market Value -0.01% -2.53 -0.01% -2.49 -0.01% -2.76 -0.01% -2.52   
  Value of trades 0.00% -1.38 0.00% -1.62 0.00% -1.65 0.00% -1.11   
  %Holding 0.02% 2.97 0.03% 2.99 0.05% 3.14 0.07% 3.2   
  Significance across age groups for buys 4.59 (0.064) 3.53 (0.097) 3.7 (0.096) 4.12 (0.076)  
  Significance across age groups for sells 0.12 (0.737) 0.1(0.759) 0.19 (0.764) 0.41 (o.539)  
  Younger against older (Sell) 0.33 (0.681) 0.89 (0.373) 1.22 (0.301) 1.68 (0.231)  
  Younger against older (Buy) 3.48 (0.09) 3.61 (0.093) 3.87 (0.08) 3.94 (0.08)   
Chapter Five: the Informativeness of Directors’ Age  
 
160 
5.7 Conclusions 
The previous empirical literature in the general area of information contents of 
directors’ trades has found that the informativeness of directors’ trades depends 
on firm, trade, director characteristics. Regarding the importance of directors’ 
characteristics, to the best of our knowledge, the impact that director’s age has 
on trade informativeness has not yet been examined. 
There are many reasons why financial decisions may vary with life cycle. 
Psychological and physical studies concerning age suggested that memory and 
cognitive abilities decline with age (Gunesh et al., 2010; Fair 2007; and Grady 
and Craik, 2000). Intelligence level also declines with age (Baltes and 
Lindenberger, 1997). Introducing socioeconomic and demographic factors such 
as education, income, wealth, race, ethnicity, and gender can lower the adverse 
effects of cognitive aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). Financial literature 
also suggests there are opposing effects of age. On the one hand, older 
investors who have more experience and greater investment knowledge are 
more likely to make effective financial decisions (Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). On the other hand, the possibility to make 
unsuitable decisions increases as the director gets older and this might be 
attributed to the decline of memory (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij et 
al. 2007). 
Using a dataset of 2,300 UK companies over the period January 2002 to 
December 2010 resulting in 25,096 events, we carried out a series of 
Univariate and multivariate tests to determine the impact of age. Our results 
indicate the following: the informativeness is significantly positive across all 
age groups for buy transactions. The following pattern is also noticed; across 
all windows, as witnessed by the size of the coefficient, abnormal returns for 
the younger age group (under 40) are the highest. Thereafter they decline until 
the 60 to 65 age group and then begin to level off. Although abnormal returns 
are positive and statistically significant across all age groups, they are also 
statistically different from each other. There is a significant difference between 
the CAARs of younger directors buy transactions and those of older directors. 
Giving the size of the buy coefficients across age groups, it is safe to say that 
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younger directors’ buy transactions produce significantly higher abnormal 
returns than older directors. Turning to the sell transactions, the first thing we 
notice is that, unlike the Univariate analysis, there is some evidence of 
statistically significantly negative CAARs for younger directors. For example, 
across all event windows, the 40 to 44 age group has statistically significantly 
negative abnormal returns. This pattern is again repeated for longer event 
window for the 45 to 49 age group. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest 
that sell transactions may be informative across certain age groups. Consistent 
with previous findings, market value is significantly negative i.e. transactions 
in smaller firms are more informative. Also, the size of the trade does not have 
an impact. Our post event CAARs do not depend on the size of the transaction. 
Besides, holding percentage is significantly positive. This suggests the larger 
the number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, the higher the 
abnormal return. When controlling for director type, the same pattern found in 
Univariate and multivariate analysis for buy trades is also identified for 
executives’ and formers’ buy transactions. Hence, younger executives 
(formers) are more informed about their buy trades than executives (formers) 
of other age groups. Unlike the previous pattern older non-executives (over 70) 
seem to be more informed about their buy trades than younger non-executives. 
Regardless the type of director, sells produces insignificantly negative CAARs.  
These results are in line with the previous literature on the impact of age on 
cognitive and physical abilities. For example, Baltes and Lindenberger (1997), 
and Fair (2007) showed a linear per cent decline in Man (Woman) cognitive 
and physical abilities between the age of 35 and about age 70 (in our study 
between ages 40 and 65). After the age of 70, the role of experience, education, 
wealth, and income may lower the effects of cognitive abilities leading 
investors to make better financial decisions (King and Leape, 1987; 
Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; and Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). This might 
explain the pattern found in Univariate and multivariate analyses for buy trades 
when examining the informativeness of directors’ trades. Our results are also 
consistent with Kyriacou and Mase (2003), who suggested that the signals 
generated from executive stock option exercises by younger executives are 
consistently more informative than those generated from the corresponding 
exercises by older executives. 
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The results for non-executive directors’ trades are also consistent with studies 
by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Van Rooij et al. (2007), and Korniotis and 
Kumar (2011) which found that investors with more experience and more 
financial knowledge are better decision-makers. Therefore, this might indicate 
that the market reacts more strongly to buy transactions of the over-70 non-
executives presumably, because they believe experience and expertise is likely 
to increase with age.  
To summarise, although we have identified age of director as an important 
determinant of the informativeness of directors’ trades, we remain uncertain 
why the identified pattern exists. We suggest this as an avenue for future 
researches.  
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Chapter 6:  The informativeness of 
Directors’ Trades: the Impact of 
Industry Classifications 
6.1 Introduction  
Previous empirical literature in the general area of insider trading has found 
that the informativeness of directors’ trades differ with trade, firm, and director 
characteristics. Trade characteristics include the impact of transaction type and 
trade size. Buy trades are more informative than sell trades because market 
participants view the insignificance of sell trades is likely to be motivated by 
liquidity/diversification needs whereas buy trades are likely to be motivated by 
information advantage type (King and Roll, 1988, Pope et al., 1990; Hillier and 
Marshall. 2002b; and Gregory et al., 2009). Also, medium-size trades are more 
informative than other-size trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993; and Friederich 
et al., 2002).  
Firm characteristics include the impact of firm size. For example, insiders’ 
trades in small firms are more informative than insiders’ trades in large firms 
(Seyhun, 1988a, Gregory et al., 1994, Friederich et al., 2002). This is because 
large firms tend to have more non-executive directors than small firms, but also 
because directors’ trades in large firms are more public which makes market 
react faster (Gregory et al., 1997). 
For director characteristics, previous studies examined the impact of director’s 
type on the informativeness of directors’ trades. For example, Jeng et al. (2003) 
and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) found no impact of directors’ types on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades by using US and UK data respectively, 
whilst Gregory et al. (2009) and Knewtson (2011) reported significant 
abnormal returns associated with executive directors’ trades. They reasoned 
that executive directors are more involved in daily firm operations than other 
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directors’ types. Recently, Gregory et al. (2012) examined whether the 
director’s gender has an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades 
and found that female executives’ trades are more informative than male 
executives’ trades.  
To the best of our knowledge, an empirical investigation of the effect of 
industry classification on the informativeness of directors’ trades has yet to be 
examined. 
One particular sector has been examined, namely, the bank sector. For 
example, Madura and Wiant (1995) found that buy transactions by insiders in 
small banks are more informative than buy trades by insiders in large banks. 
Other studies, such as Del Brio, Gómez and Perote, (2005), and Lambe (2010), 
examined whether bank insiders predict future financial crises and found that 
insiders can predict future crises.  
There are many reasons why the informativeness of directors’ trades may vary 
across industries. These are related to information asymmetry differences 
across industries. Many measures of information asymmetry such as Research 
and Development expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 2000), industry regulation 
(Knewtson, 2011), industry concentration (Gugler, 2001; Blair, 1995; Chu and 
song, 2011), and directors pay (Jung, 2013) have been shown to vary across 
industries. This variation may enable directors in certain industries to exploit 
information, trade on the basis of this information and this should manifest 
itself in higher abnormal returns (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we examine whether the 
informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies among different industries. 
Secondly, we investigate whether the level of information asymmetry in an 
industry influences the informativeness of directors’ trades.  
We measured information asymmetry by using Research and Development 
Expenditure, industry volatility, regulation level, competition level, and CEO 
pays.This study is the first study that takes into account the industry (or the 
sector) in which a director is employed as a factor in determining the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. Our sample period covers the years 2002 
to 2010. There is a total of 40,860 trades by directors over the sample period, 
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divided into 31,950 purchases of company stock and 8,910 sales distributed 
over 10 different industries and 19 different super sectors. We examined 
directors’ trades in 3390 UK firms. This is the largest dataset that has ever been 
used in similar UK studies. For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) used the FTSE 
all small firms, Gregory et al. (2009) used the FTSE 350 companies, whilst 
others have used the FTSE 100 firms. Standard event study methodology based 
on the market model is employed using announcement dates as the event dates 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006; and Gregory et al., 2011). However, this study uses both 
industry and sector market indices as proxies for market returns which, to the 
best of our knowledge, have never been used before.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section (6.2) reviews the previous studies 
concerning the information content of directors’ trades and describes the 
motivations behind this chapter. Section (6.3) presents the data and 
methodology. Section (6.4) discusses the results while the conclusions are 
presented in Section (6.5). 
6.2 Literature Review 
Since the aim of this chapter is, firstly, to examine whether the informativeness 
of directors’ trades varies across industries, and, secondly, to investigate 
whether the level of information asymmetry in an industry influences the 
informativeness of directors’ trades, this section is divided into two 
subsections. Section (6.2.1) reviews the literature on insider trading concerning 
the informativeness of directors’ trades, whereas section (6.2.2) discusses the 
reasons why information asymmetry varies with industries.  
6.2.1  The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades 
In this section, we review previous studies that examined whether the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with trade, firm, and director 
characteristics. 
Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Barclay and Warner (1993), Chakravarty 
(2001), Friederich et al., (2002), and Tavakoli et al. (2012) examined whether 
the informativeness of directors’ trades vary with trade size across insider 
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groups, and found that medium-size trades are more informative than other-
size trades. One proposed explanation is that privately informed traders would 
concentrate their trades in medium-size trades because small trades are 
expensive in term of trading cost and large trades might give them away. 
Moreover, Seyhun (2000) argued that insiders broke up their large trades into 
smaller medium-size trades to avoid being caught by regulation authorities. 
However these studies used the number of shares as a measure of trade size. 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Gregory et al. (2012) used trade value to measure the 
impact of trade size on the informativeness of directors’ trades. The results 
showed that large trade values are more informative than small trade values.  
Also, transaction type has been shown to have an impact upon the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. For example, Finnerty (1976), King and 
Roll (1988), Pope et al/. (1990), and Degryse et al. (2009) found that buy 
transactions are more informative than sell transactions. This is because market 
participants view the insignificance of sell trades to be motivated by 
liquidity/diversification needs. On the other side, market participants view the 
significance of buy trades to be motivated by information advantages. Unlike, 
the previous studies, Hamill et al. (2002) reported significantly negative 
abnormal returns associated with sell trades implying that directors might sell 
on the basis of superior knowledge.  
The impact of firm size on the informativeness of directors’ trades is also 
analysed by a number of US and UK studies. For instance, studies by William 
(1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Seyhun (1988), Gregory et al. (1994), and 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) found that directors’ trades in small firms are more 
informative than directors’ trades in large firms. Gregory et al. (1997) reasoned 
that because large firms tend to have more non-executive directors than small 
firms, or because directors’ trades in large firms are more public making stock 
market reactions faster. Also, directors’ trades in small firms are more 
informative because directors in small firms might have more relevant 
information, or because financial analysts have paid less attention to directors’ 
trades in small firms (Ataullah et al., 2012).  
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When focusing only on directors’ trades in the bank sector, Madura and Wiant 
(1995) found that directors’ buys in small banks are more informative than 
directors’ buys in large banks. 
Jeng et al. (2003) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) examined whether the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with director’s type. They found no 
impact of director’s type upon the informativeness of directors’ trades. On the 
other side, Gregory et al. (2009) and Knewtson (2011) showed that executive 
directors’ trades are more informative than other directors’ trades. This is 
because executive directors are more involved in firm’s daily operations than 
other directors.  
Scott and Xu (2004) added new insight to the literature of insider trading by 
examining the impact of number of trades as a percentage of directors holding 
on the informativeness of directors’ trades. The main reason is to split sells 
driven by liquidity needs from sells driven by information advantages. They 
argued that large sales, as a percentage of holding, reflect superior knowledge 
of future firm prospects, whereas small sales indicate that insiders sell because 
of liquidity or diversification needs.  
Recently, Gregory et al. (2012) examined the impact of director’s gender and 
found that female executive trades are more informative than male executive 
trades up to one month event window. Fidrmuc et al. (2012) and Korczak et al. 
(2012) tested whether country-level shareholder protection has an impact on 
abnormal returns after directors’ trade. Both studies documented that insiders 
profit more from buying but less from selling in stronger investor protection 
environments 
To summarise, the previous empirical literature in the general area of 
information contents of directors’ trades has found that the informativeness of 
directors’ trades depends on firm characteristics (firm size), trade 
characteristics (trade size and transaction type), director characteristics 
(director’s type and gender). 
To the best of our knowledge, an empirical investigation of the effect of 
industry classification on the informativeness of directors’ trades has yet to be . 
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Therefore, the first aim of this chapter is to examine whether the 
informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies among different industries. 
6.2.2  Industry and Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry occurs when one or more informed traders have access 
to private information about the firm future prospects, while other traders have 
only access to publicly available information (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). 
There are many reasons why information asymmetry may vary across 
industries. These are related to Research and Development Expenditure, 
industry volatility, competition level, regulation, and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) pays. 
6.2.2.1 Research and Development Expenditure 
One reason why information asymmetry may vary across industries is Research 
and Development Expenditure. According to Aboody and Lev (2000) and 
Joseph and Wintoki (2013), all corporate investments create information 
asymmetry because insiders can observe investment productivity changes on 
an individual asset basis, while outside investors can get this information only 
on specific points in time. Moreover, the extent of information asymmetry is 
likely to vary across investments. For instance, information asymmetry 
associated with Research and Development is likely to be higher than tangible 
and intangible investments. R&D is different from other intangible and 
physical assets because of a number of reasons. Firstly, many R&D projects 
such as software programs are unique to the developing firm, whilst other 
projects related to capital investments such as commercial property share 
common characteristics across firms within an industry. Thus, observing R&D 
performance of other firms might not help investors to exploit any useful 
information about productivity and firm’s value of R&D, whereas observing 
the performance of one retailer would provide investors with valuable 
information about the performance of other retailers. Secondly, since there is 
no organised market for R&D similar to other financial assets, there is no 
specific price to allow investors to exploit information. Thirdly, unlike physical 
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assets, no information on value and productivity changes of R&D is reported in 
financial statements.  
Additionally, industries with large risky investment in inventive activities, such 
as Research and Development, where the outcomes are uncertain, 
idiosyncratic, and long term in nature, exhibit more information asymmetry 
than industries with low risky investment in Research and Development 
(Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000; and Barth et al., 2001). In other 
words, if investment in Research and Development is risky and this risk is 
priced, then this suggests that industries with high Research and Development 
earn higher returns. More specifically, in case of uncertainty about firm value, 
private information held by insiders would be profitable since outsider 
investors’ beliefs about firm value are uncertain (Ke and Huddart, 2007b). In 
case of R&D, the value of an R&D firms is uncertain for outsider investors 
which makes the information asymmetry higher in such firms. .  
Based on that, Barth et al. (2001) reported that analyst coverage (number of 
analysts following a firm) is significantly larger for firms with larger research 
and development and advertising expenses relative to firms with lower or no 
R&D, because of the private information concerning R&D activities. 
Additionally, Aboody and Lev (2000) examined whether R&D, as a measure 
of information asymmetry, can be the source of insider’s information. In other 
words, they examined whether information asymmetry measured by firm’s 
R&D contributes to the relation between insiders and outsider investors which, 
in turn, enable insiders (formers) to earn from insider activities. However, the 
results suggest that insider gains in high R&D industries/sectors are higher than 
insider gains in low or no R&D industries/sectors. Rong (2013) examined insider 
trading patterns in order to evaluate R&D productivity in 88 U.S. listed firms with the 
heaviest patenting for the period 1987 -1998. The results showed that insider trading 
patterns within the firm are significant in explaining the contemporaneous changes in 
its patent output when controlling for R&D input effects. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that management has privileged knowledge about its R&D 
productivity which might come from their earlier access to patent-related information. 
This privileged knowledge increases
46
 the information asymmetry between investors 
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 Also, we were aware of the point that it is possible for managers to have some discretion 
over the allocation of expenses into these categories, for example, increasing R&D expenses 
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and those managers (insiders). Examples of highly and lightly R&D expenditure 
industries was previously set by Chauvin and Hirschey (1993). Highly R&D 
expenditure industries include, for example, industries such as industrial 
machinery and computing equipment, measuring instruments, photography, 
electronic equipment, and chemicals, whereas lightly R&D expenditure 
industries include business and consumer service industries, the financial 
sector, and retailing. 
6.2.2.2 Industry Volatility  
Another reason why information asymmetry may vary across industries is 
industry volatility. The behaviour of stock market volatility is one of the 
central issues faced by individuals who trade equities, manage portfolios, or 
engage in capital budgeting (Sadorsky, 2001). This volatility can be caused by 
private information revealed through trading (French and Roll, 1986; Barclay, 
Litzenberger and Warner, 1990; and Barclay and Warner, 1993). Moreover, 
Barclay and Warner (1993) suggested that most of stock market volatility is 
concentrated in medium-size trades where the private information exists. 
Campbell et al. (2001), and Crouzille, Lepetit and Tarazi, (2004), under private 
information assumption
47
, studied the characteristics of stock returns at the 
industry level. Campbell et al. (2001) examined the volatility in utilities, 
financial services, telecommunications, petroleum/gas, consumer goods, 
retails, computer, auto, pharmaceutical, and chemicals industries, whereas 
Crouzille et al.(2003) looked at the volatility of banks, building and 
construction, chemicals, electrical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and oil engaged 
companies industries. The results of two previous studies suggested that there 
is an increase in volatility level in some industries such as petroleum, gas and 
banks. These results might be due to macro-economic factors or because 
investment in these industries might be more risky.  
To illustrate, a study by Sadorsky (2001) explained why the volatility in sectors 
such as natural resources is higher than other sectors. One reason is that- 
investment cost is high (for example, new mining projects can cost millions of 
                                                                                                                                                         
which may have previously been categorised as selling and that it is difficult to align financial 
numbers with resources used. 
47
 They assumed that insiders in high volatility sectors such as Bank and Petroleum and Gas 
sectors possess large amount of private information.  
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pounds to build). Another Reason is that - natural resources companies are 
product producers (such as silver, oil, and gold) these products may have 
similar properties. For oil and gas, factors such as exchange and interest rates 
and crude oil price may have an impact on oil and gas sectors stock returns. 
Boubacar and Morris (2011) stated that bank industry volatility might be due to 
the nature of their activities and their important role in the economy. However, 
although these factors might not be related to information asymmetry, they 
would help in understanding how trades by insiders of these sectors can create 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.  
Moreover, using the same argument of Research and Development 
Expenditure, investment in high volatile industries is more risky. Thus, 
information asymmetry would be high in high volatility industries leading 
insiders to earn higher abnormal returns. For example, banks collect and 
process information about customers’ loans which imply that insiders in bank 
sector may possess private information, whereas outsiders have limited ability 
to get valuable information. Another example is the investments in petroleum 
and gas sector which are uncertain and risky (similar to investments in R&D). 
Thus, the value of petroleum and gas firms (high volatility firms) is uncertain 
for outsiders which in turn raise the information asymmetry level between 
insiders and outside investors.  
6.2.2.3 Industry Competition Level 
Additional reason why information asymmetry may vary across industries is 
industry competition (Blair, 1995 and Gugler, 2001). Chu and Song (2011) 
examined the relationship between industry competition, information 
asymmetry, and insider trading. They argued that in highly competitive 
industries (lightly concentrated), market competition forces firms to operate 
effectively and competitively, and reduce the information asymmetry between 
minority shareholders and insiders. In low competitive industries (highly 
concentrated), the tendency for insiders to extract private interests would 
increase in order to control firm decisions effectively. They argued that 
information asymmetry is higher in low competitive (highly concentrated) 
industries compared to high competitive (lightly concentrated) industries. This 
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suggests that firms in high competition industries are expected to show higher 
stock returns.  
In low competitive industries, returns are less because there is a lack of 
competition pressure and innovation that motivates firms to become more 
competitive (Hou and Robinson, 2006). Also, low competitive industries are 
less risky because they engage in less innovation, and thus lower return is 
expected (Hou and Robinson, 2006).  
Similarly, Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzales (2005) and Ali, Klasa and Yeung, 
(2009) found that, firms in more concentrated industries provide less 
informative disclosure to prevent the leakage of useful information to 
competitors to avoid competition and new rivalry. Therefore, firms in more 
concentrated industries made less management earning forecasts and less 
quality disclosure. Hence, these firms should have weak information 
environment. 
Chen and Wang (2012) linked these results with ownership structure of the 
firm. The results showed high information asymmetry is associated with highly 
competitive firms if the ownership of managing owners is between 10% and 
30%, and low information asymmetry is associated with highly competitive 
firms if the ownership of managing owners is over 30%.  
In the same context, Thomas (2002) found larger information asymmetry in 
highly concentrated firms. Recently, Ataullah et al. (2012) examined the 
relationship between information asymmetry and insider trading in high and 
low diversification industries. The results supported the previous findings of 
Thomas (2002) and reported that insiders in high concentrated firms may have 
more information than insiders in low concentrated firms, and therefore have 
more opportunities to earn higher abnormal returns. These two studies 
explained the previous findings by the level of forecast errors. Larger forecast 
errors are associated with highly concentrated firms which lead to higher 
information asymmetry.  
Also, competition level might be influenced by the degree of R&D investments 
(Ito and Pucik, 1993). For example, in highly competitive industries such as the 
semiconductor industry, the tendency to invest in R&D is high in order to stay 
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up-to-date with technological change. Furthermore, less competitive industries 
tend to invest less in R&D and innovations (Bundell et al., 1999; Gilbert, 2006; 
and Crespi and Patel, 2008). 
6.2.2.4 Industry Regulation 
Information asymmetry also varies across firms in different regulated 
environment. In a highly regulated environment, greater information released 
to the public reduces the information asymmetry between corporate insiders 
and outside investors (Knewtson, 2011). Hence, directors’ trades are more 
profitable in lightly regulated environment. Amir, Lev and Sougiannis, (1999) 
examined how financial analysts contribute to firm value and found that firms 
in the financial and utilities sectors are considered heavily regulated. Moreover, 
analysts’ contribution is larger in sectors where the informativeness of financial 
reports is low. McLaughlin and Safieddine (2008) examined whether 
regulation reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsider 
investors in industrial and utility companies. In this study, industrial firms are 
likely to be unregulated, whilst utility firms are likely to be regulated. They 
concluded that regulated utility firms have lower level of information 
asymmetry and have superior changes in abnormal return performance than 
unregulated industrial firms which seem to have less negative returns. 
Knewtson (2011) extended the previous classification of regulated firms to 
cover financials, utilities, health, pharmaceuticals, consumer food, drink and 
tobacco. The results indicated that firms in highly regulated industries reduce 
the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders by disclosing more 
information to the markets. Therefore, directors’ trades are less profitable in 
highly regulated industries.  
6.2.2.5 Chief Executive Officers Pay 
It has been argued that the levels and distributions of CEO pay vary across 
industries and this variation might be due to industry characteristics, managers’ 
talent, or product market environment (Jung and Subramanian, 2013). This 
variation is more in industries such as technology, business equipment, and 
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telecommunication because these industries might be characterised by higher 
heterogeneity both in firm quality and in managerial talent. 
Smith and Watts (1982) suggested that executives in highly growth firms are 
paid more because of their ability to manage intangible assets. Jo, Li and Pan, 
(2011) documented that, in highly disclosure environment, CEO are paid more 
compensation. Increased disclosure might force CEO to reveal more 
unfavourable information which in turn would demand more compensation. 
Therefore, firms that pay more compensation to their CEOs have strong 
information environment which lowers the level of information asymmetry.  
Based on a recent study by Demerjian, Lev and McVay, (2012), Wang (2013) 
examined how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies with managerial 
abilities
48
. The discussion was based on two counter prospects. The first 
prospect is that trades by high ability managers are more informative (because 
they might have more private information) and market views their trades to be 
more credible than those of low ability managers. The other prospect is that 
trades by low ability managers are more informative because they might have 
less accurate or less timely reporting and disclosure practices than do high 
ability managers. In poor information environments, where there are less 
accurate reporting and disclosure practices, market assessment of firm 
performance would be poor. Thus, less informative financial reporting leads to 
higher information asymmetry (which in turn increases insiders’ trades).  
Linking with Jo, Li and Pan, (2011), high ability managers are expected to 
receive more share grants as a part of their compensation due to better 
managerial performance.  
The results support the second prospect (trades by low ability managers are 
more informative than trades by high ability managers). This suggests that 
firms’ information environment is important to explain the informativeness of 
low ability managers.  
Roulstone (2003) and Zhang et al. (2005) found that an increased (decreased) 
level of insider trading is associated with decreased (increased) pay level. In 
other words, firms that restrict insider activities pay high compensation rather 
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 Managerial ability is the ability to make accurate and timely assessment of firm future 
prospects.  
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than those not restricting insider activities. Denis and Xu (2013) confirmed the 
previous findings and found that high executive compensation is associated 
with high insider trading restrictions level.  
To summarise, many measures of potential information asymmetry such as 
Research and Development Expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 2000), industry 
regulation (Knutson, 2011), industry concentration (Gugler, 2001; Blair, 1995; 
Chu and song, 2011), and directors pay (Jung and Subramanian, 2013) have 
been shown to vary across industries. This variation may enable directors in 
certain industries to exploit information, trade on the basis of this information 
and this should manifest itself in higher abnormal returns (Aboody and Lev, 
2000).  
Based on these previous points, the second aim of this chapter is to investigate 
whether the level of information asymmetry across industry influences the 
informativeness of directors’ trades.  
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, we examine whether 
the informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies among different industries. 
Secondly, we investigate whether the level of information asymmetry in an 
industry influences the informativeness of directors’ trades.  
6.3 Data and Methodology  
Similar to previous chapter, the data on insiders’ activities for the period 1st 
January 2002 to 31
st
 December 2010 for UK companies is sourced from the 
Directors Deals database. This dataset contains information on the industry and 
super sector in which the director works for all firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Industry refers to a few general segments in the economy 
within which a large group of companies can be categorised, whereas sector 
describes a much more specific grouping of companies with highly similar 
business activities. In other words, industry contains many sectors49.  
Daily returns, daily market values, Research and Development Expenditure 
values, and volatility values for the event firms, net sales, total ruminations, 
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 In our study we have 10 industries and 19 sectors.  
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and the Industry Market indices returns are sourced from DataStream. Since 
open market sales and purchases are more likely to represent actions taken as a 
result of special insider information, we only consider ordinary purchases and 
sales by directors.  
After removing duplicate and inaccurate or incomplete transactions, missing 
announcement dates and transactions dates, there is a total of 40,860 trades by 
directors over the sample period, divided into 31,950 purchases of company 
stock and 8,910 sales – meaning there are approximately four times more 
purchases than sales. The methodology we employ is similar to what is used in 
the previous chapter, meaning the event study methodology.  
In order to undertake an event study based on daily data, we need to identify a 
daily signal for directors’ trades, taking into account multiple and possibly 
conflicting signals when there are more than one director trades on the same 
day in the same firm. The standard approach to identifying a daily trading 
signal is to aggregate the net number of shares traded by each director on a day, 
and define either a buy or sell signal if the net number of trades is positive or 
negative. However, this procedure is inappropriate when multiple directors 
with multiple characteristics are trading on the same day. Our approach is, 
therefore, similar to our approach in chapter five with small changes. For 
example, if two directors are trading on the same day in the same company, we 
have two choices: firstly, to consider this transaction as one transaction (if 
director’s type is the same); or secondly, to consider this transaction as two 
separate transactions (if director’s type is different).  
Similar to previous chapter, we decided to use the announcement date as an 
event date for the same reason discussed in that chapter.  
The event period, in our study, ranges from 0 to +10 days after the 
announcement date. The estimation period for the parameters in the market 
model starts on day -1 and is 200 days in length. 
Previous studies used different industry and sector indices to test for market 
efficiency assuming that some sectors are efficient while others are not and that 
the variance of returns for most sectors is largely influenced by their own 
innovations (Brooks, 2002; Willcocks, 2006; and Petra and Poshakwale, 2008). 
Also, industry indices mirror the performance of the sector representative firm, 
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so large firms have high participation to the relative sector index (Pepelas, 
2006).  
In this chapter, we used ten industry and nineteenth sector indices as a proxy 
for market return. Sharpe's (1964) simple Market Model expresses the actual 
rate of return (R) on the security (i) at time (t) as a function of market return 
(  ), in the context of past time series, such that: 
 
 
 (    )    ∑  
   
     
       
(6.1) 
 
Where α is the intercept term, β the systematic risk of security i, and    is the 
error term, with ∑      
We used the same equations used before in the previous chapter to calculate 
the abnormal returns, average abnormal returns, and cumulative average 
abnormal returns. However, the aim of this chapter is to test two issues. Firstly, 
we examined whether the informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies 
among different industries. Secondly, we investigate whether the level of 
information asymmetry in an industry influences the informativeness of 
directors’ trades.  
6.4 Results 
This section reports the empirical results of the study. First, a summary 
statistics is presented to highlight the trends and patterns of directors’ trades by 
industries and sectors. Second, to test the informativeness of directors’ trades 
across different industries/sectors we used a Univariate analysis controlling for 
only one factor that is likely to affect the informativeness, namely transaction 
type. Third, we examine the same hypothesis whilst controlling for other 
factors that might have an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades. 
Next, we test whether the level of information asymmetry with a sector 
influences the informativeness of directors’ trades whilst controlling for R&D 
Expenditure, volatility, concentration level, regulation, and Chief Executive 
Officers pay.  
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6.4.1  Summary Statistics 
Table (6.1) reports summary statistics related to our sample categorised by 
directors’ trades in different industries and sectors. The table shows that the 
total number of buy trades was approximately three times larger than the total 
number of sell trades. On the other side, the total value of sell trades was over 
£13 billion which was roughly two times higher than the total value of buy 
trades. Thus, directors’ buys were higher in number, but of a smaller value. 
Also, the average value of buy trades is approximately ten times less than the 
average value of sell trades.  
According to industries column, the total number of directors’ buy trades in 
financial industries is higher than the total number of directors’ buys trades in 
other industries. Furthermore, the total value of buy trades in oil and gas and 
consumer service industries is bigger than the total value of buy trades in other 
industries. Directors’ buy trades in Utilities industries are the lowest in term of 
total number.  
Additionally, the average value of directors’ buys are higher than the average 
value of directors’ sells and range between more than ten times less in 
industries such as basic materials and consumer goods, and two times less in 
oil and gas industry. For directors’ sells, the total number of directors’ sell 
trades in Industrial industries was higher than the total number of directors’ 
sells trades in other industries. Similar to buy trades, the total value of sell 
trades in Consumer Services industries was the highest among other industries. 
Although the total number of buy trades overweighs the total number of sell 
trades, but the total value of sell trades is three times bigger suggesting that 
directors sell less frequently but more in value.  
Turning to the sectors column, the total number of directors’ trades in 
construction and material sectors was higher than the total number of directors’ 
trades in other sectors. Also, oil and gas sectors registered the highest value 
among all other sectors. Similarly, Directors’ buys were higher in number, but 
of less value except for oil and gas and bank sectors. Similarly, the average 
value of buy trades is higher than the average value of sell trades for all sectors.  
 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
179 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics Categorised by Directors’ Trades in Different Industries and Sectors 
Industries Sectors BUY SELL 
No Of Trades Value £m Average Value No Of Trades Value £m Average Value 
Basic Materials Basic Resources 1,268 619 488,104 396 2,773 7,003,073 
 Chemicals 400 7 17,695 86 26 303,857 
Total  1,668 626 375,296 482 2,799 5,807,777 
Consumer Goods Automobiles and Parts 113 3 28,906 22 3 148,070 
 Food and Beverage 832 51 61,197 317 188 593,888 
 Personal and Household Goods 1,024 62 60,463 376 343 912,072 
Total  1,969 116 58,962 715 534 747,496 
Consumer Services Media 1,948 164 84,388 428 391 913,154 
 Retail 1,505 1,353 899,021 568 1,295 2,279,757 
 Travel and Leisure 1,674 314 187,366 517 1,374 2,658,201 
Total  5,127 1,831 357,142 1,513 3,060 2,022,486 
Financials Banks 792 958 1,209,977 202 403 1,992,649 
 Financial Services 5,563 434 77,949 1,308 1,519 1,161,603 
 Insurance 1,047 57 54,177 235 333 1,416,663 
 Real Estate 1,783 259 145,111 484 444 916,659 
Total  9,185 1,707 185,889 2,229 2,698 1,210,619 
Health Care Health Care 1,624 90 55,321 394 326 826,996 
Industrials Construction and Materials 752 66 87,461 207 260 1,256,912 
 Industrial Goods and Services 6,342 265 41,782 1,692 1,488 879,332 
Total  7,094 331 46,624 1,899 1,748 920,490 
Oil and Gas  1,565 2,083 1,331,188 456 1,531 3,356,684 
Technology Technology 2,844 234 82,284 845 734 868,790 
Telecommunications Telecommunications 558 44 78,595 170 152 894,292 
Utilities Utilities 316 40 126,816 207 178 859,575 
Total  31,950 7,102 104,776 8,910 13,761 1,076,656 
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6.4.2  Univariate Analysis 
In the same vein with earlier studies (Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 
2006; and Gregory et al., 2009), we conduct a Univariate analysis to test 
market reactions to directors’ trades. Unlike previous studies, we test the 
hypothesis whether industry (sector) has an impact upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. 
Table (6.2) and table (6.3) show how the informativeness varies with industry 
and transaction type. More specifically, table (6.2) examines how the 
informativeness of buy trades varies with industry and table (6.3) examines 
how the informativeness of sell trades varies with industry. Based on previous 
literature which finds, on the whole, only buy trades are informative we have 
deliberately split our sample into two. We measured the informativeness of 
directors’ trades by using the CAARs associated with different event windows 
ranging between one and ten days after the announcement date. One clear 
pattern emerges from table (6.2) which is consistent to previous findings where 
purchases are positive and significant (informative) across all industries 
(except for utilities industries). This is also consistent with the view that 
directors are motivated by market participants as containing good information 
about firm future prospects.  
Another clear pattern emerges from table (6.3) is that, consistent to our priors, 
sells are negative and insignificant (uninformative) across all industries (up to 
five days event window). This is also consistent with the view that market 
participants view the insignificance of sell trades as uninformed trades likely to 
be motivated by liquidity/diversification, for longer event window ( 10 days 
event window), there is some evidence of statistically significantly negative 
CAARs for directors’ trades in basic materials, consumer services, industrials, 
and telecommunications industries. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest 
that sell transactions may be informative across certain industries. 
Turning to our original hypothesis, table (6.2) shows how the informativeness 
of buy trades varies with industry. To examine this, we chose ten industries 
across four event windows. Based on the previous literature (Aboody and Lev, 
2000; Choe, 2009; Jo et al., 2011; and Knewtson, 2011), information 
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asymmetry is expected to vary across different industries due to many factors 
such as R&D Expenditure, regulation, industry concentration, and CEO pay. 
This variation enables insiders in certain industries to exploit information and 
gain higher abnormal returns. Thus, we might expect the informativeness of 
directors’ trades to vary with industry. Since our aim is to examine how the 
informativeness varies with industry, our focus will be only on informative 
trades (directors’ buys).  
One clear pattern emerges from table (6.2) – informativeness across all event 
windows for directors of technology industries is the highest. This result is 
consistent with Aboody and Lev (2000) who found that insider gains in 
technology industries (high R&D) are higher than insider gains in other 
industries (low or R&D).  
To summarise, our results are consistent with the UK studies by King and Roll 
(1988), Gregory et al. (1994), and Pope et al. (1990) which found positive 
(significant) abnormal return associated with buy trades, and negative 
(insignificant) abnormal return associated with sell trades for different event 
windows. When focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it appears 
that market perceives technology industries directors’ trades to be more 
informed than directors of other industries. 
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Table 6.2: The Results of Univariate Analysis for Buy Trades  
(Industry) 
Industry  Event windows No of Trades 
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Basic Materials CAARs 1.81% 1.97% 1.60% 1.61% 1,346 
 t-student 4.53 4.92 3.99 4.02  
Consumer Goods CAARs 1.48% 1.99% 1.78% 1.53% 1,604 
 t-student 3.56 4.78 4.27 3.68  
Consumer Services CAARs 1.96% 2.50% 2.58% 3.07% 4,005 
 t-student 4.59 5.85 6.04 7.16  
Financials CAARs 1.11% 1.47% 1.55% 1.86% 7,444 
 t-student 3.11 4.10 4.32 5.19  
Healthcare CAARs 2.81% 3.41% 3.10% 3.36% 1,255 
 t-student 7.59 9.20 8.38 9.06  
Industrials CAARs 2.21% 2.81% 2.94% 3.08% 5,676 
 t-student 5.91 7.51 7.87 8.22  
Oil and Gas CAARs 2.25% 2.53% 2.42% 1.99% 1,283 
 t-student 2.23 2.51 2.39 1.97  
Technology CAARs 3.61% 4.60% 5.32% 5.34% 2,262 
 t-student 4.21 5.35 6.19 6.22  
Telecommunications CAARs 1.33% 1.99% 1.85% 2.25% 363 
 t-student 2.07 3.10 2.88 3.50  
Utilities CAARs 0.19% 0.22% 0.04% 0.35% 243 
 t-student 0.54 0.61 0.12 0.98  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’ buys categorised by industry for 
different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and 10 days after the 
announcement date.  
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Table 6.3: The Results of Univariate Analysis for Sell Trades 
(Industry) 
Industry  Event windows No of Trades 
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Basic Materials CAARs -0.41% -0.62% -0.62% -0.92% 398 
 t-student -1.01 -1.53 -1.54 -2.28  
Consumer Goods CAARs -0.27% -0.51% -0.62% -0.85% 603 
 t-student -0.51 -0.96 -1.18 -1.60  
Consumer Services CAARs -0.22% -0.21% -0.06% -0.33% 1,181 
 t-student -1.85 -1.75 -0.46 -2.71  
Financials CAARs -0.35% -0.62% -0.91% -0.60% 1,663 
 t-student -0.45 -0.82 -1.20 -0.79  
Healthcare CAARs -0.15% -0.27% -0.30% -0.51% 319 
 t-student -0.51 -0.92 -1.03 -1.75  
Industrials CAARs -0.54% -0.83% -0.93% -1.31% 1,536 
 t-student -0.99 -1.52 -1.70 -2.40  
Oil and Gas CAARs -0.65% -0.25% 0.00% -1.31% 351 
 t-student -0.83 -0.32 0.00 -1.69  
Technology CAARs -0.51% -0.72% -0.78% -0.61% 651 
 t-student -1.15 -1.63 -1.78 -1.39  
Telecommunications CAARs -0.70% -0.96% -1.71% -1.54% 113 
 t-student -1.06 -1.44 -2.57 -2.32  
Utilities CAARs -0.39% -0.10% -0.25% -0.82% 175 
 t-student -0.71 -0.19 -0.45 -1.50  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’ sells categorised by industry for 
different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and 10 days after the 
announcement date.  
 
Similar to tables (6.2) and (6.3), tables (6.4) and (6.5) show how the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with sectors. Specifically, table (6.4) 
examines how the informativeness of directors’ buys varies with sector and 
table (6.5) examines how the informativeness of directors’ sells varies with 
sector.  
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The results of tables (6.4) and (6.5) support the previous findings of tables (6.2) 
and (6.3). Moreover, purchases are positive and significant (informative) across 
all sectors and sells are negative across all sectors. These results are again 
consistent with the view that market participants view the significance of buy 
trades as informative trades likely to be motivated by good information 
contained in directors’ trades. 
Since our aim is to examine how the informativeness varies with sector, our 
focus is only on informative trades (directors’ buys). One clear pattern emerges 
from table (6.4) – informativeness across all event windows for directors of 
technology sectors is again the highest.  
Again, when focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it appears that 
the market perceives technology sectors directors’ trades to be more informed 
than directors of other sectors. 
Another clear pattern emerges from table (6.5) which is consistent with 
previous findings and which indicates that sells are negative and insignificant 
(uninformative) across all sectors (up to five days event window). This is also 
consistent with the view that market participants view the insignificance of sell 
trades as uninformed trades likely to be motivated by liquidity/diversification, 
for longer event window (10 days event window), there is some evidence of 
statistically significantly negative CAARs for directors’ trades in basic 
resources, automobiles and parts, industrials, goods and services, personal and 
household goods, and telecommunications sectors. Thus, there is some 
evidence to suggest that sell transactions may be informative across certain 
industries. 
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Table 6.4: The Results of the Univariate Analysis for Directors’ Buy 
(Sectors) 
Sector  Event Windows No of Trades 
  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Automobiles and Parts CAARs 2.58% 3.10% 2.76% 0.27% 87 
 t-student 2.12 2.54 2.27 0.22  
Banks CAARs 0.17% 0.49% 0.40% 0.81% 611 
 t-student 0.69 1.96 1.59 3.23  
Basic Resources CAARs 1.95% 1.99% 1.59% 1.24% 1,040 
 t-student 2.99 3.05 2.43 1.91  
Chemicals CAARs 1.27% 1.98% 1.77% 2.63% 306 
 t-student 2.41 3.76 3.37 5.00  
Construction and Materials CAARs 2.08% 2.91% 2.85% 3.21% 580 
 t-student 5.03 7.01 6.87 7.73  
Financial Services CAARs 1.05% 1.35% 1.36% 1.56% 4,659 
 t-student 4.47 5.75 5.80 6.64  
Health Care CAARs 0.74% 1.26% 1.37% 1.03% 698 
 t-student 1.26 2.15 2.34 1.76  
Food and Beverage CAARs 2.81% 3.41% 3.10% 3.36% 1,255 
 t-student 7.59 9.20 8.38 9.06  
Industrial Goods and Services CAARs 2.20% 2.80% 2.98% 3.10% 5,096 
 t-student 5.66 7.20 7.65 7.96  
Insurance CAARs 0.99% 1.58% 1.83% 2.57% 725 
 t-student 1.53 2.44 2.82 3.96  
Media CAARs 2.56% 3.33% 3.60% 3.79% 1,558 
 t-student 4.80 6.23 6.73 7.09  
Oil and Gas CAARs 2.25% 2.53% 2.42% 1.99% 1,283 
 t-student 2.23 2.51 2.39 1.97  
Personal and Household Goods CAARs 1.76% 2.14% 1.86% 1.63% 819 
 t-student 4.80 5.82 5.05 4.43  
Real Estate CAARs 1.45% 1.88% 1.96% 2.09% 1,450 
 t-student 4.03 5.21 5.44 5.80  
Retail CAARs 1.82% 1.93% 2.04% 2.76% 1,104 
 t-student 5.66 6.00 6.32 8.58  
Technology CAARs 3.61% 4.60% 5.32% 5.34% 2,262 
 t-student 4.21 5.35 6.19 6.22  
Telecommunications CAARs 1.33% 1.99% 1.85% 2.25% 363 
 t-student 2.07 3.10 2.88 3.50  
Travel and Leisure CAARs 1.33% 1.99% 1.85% 2.25% 1,342 
 t-student 2.07 3.10 2.88 3.50  
Utilities CAARs 0.22% 0.04% 0.35% 243 0.22% 
 t-student 0.61 0.12 0.98  0.61 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’ buys categorised by sectors for 
different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and 10 days after the 
announcement date.  
 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
186 
 
 
Table 6.5: The Results of Univariate Analysis for Sell Trades (Sectors) 
Sectors  Event windows No of Trades 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
Automobiles and Parts CAARs -3.70% -5.17% -4.55% -3.15% 17 
 t-student -0.85 -1.97 -1.89 -2.53  
Banks CAARs -0.05% -0.46% -0.37% -0.42% 172 
 t-student -0.14 -1.21 -0.97 -1.10  
Basic Resources CAARs -0.34% -0.54% -0.47% -0.83% 332 
 t-student -1.14 -1.82 -1.57 -2.80  
Chemicals CAARs -0.35% -0.62% -0.91% -0.60% 66 
 t-student -0.45 -0.82 -1.20 -0.79  
Construction and Materials CAARs -0.58% -0.47% -0.56% -0.78% 163 
 t-student -0.92 -0.65 -0.7 -0.79  
Financial Services CAARs -0.09% 0.12% 0.14% -0.16% 951 
 t-student -0.29 0.38 0.42 -0.49  
Healthcare CAARs -0.15% -0.27% -0.30% -0.51% 256 
 t-student -0.51 -0.92 -1.03 -1.75  
Food and Beverage CAARs -0.15% -0.27% -0.30% -0.51% 319 
 t-student -0.51 -0.92 -1.03 -1.75  
Industrial Goods and Services CAARs -0.53% -0.71% -0.86% -1.20% 1,373 
 t-student -1.11 -1.51 -1.82 -2.54  
Insurance CAARs -0.05% -0.28% -0.15% -0.04% 184 
 t-student -0.18 -1.01 -0.53 -0.13  
Media CAARs 0.00% -0.28% -0.80% -0.98% 338 
 t-student -0.01 -0.52 -1.48 -1.82  
Oil and Gas CAARs -0.65% -0.25% 0.00% -1.31% 351 
 t-student -0.83 -0.32 0.00 -1.69  
Personal and Household Goods CAARs -0.62% -1.17% -1.25% -1.81% 330 
 t-student -0.81 -1.55 -1.66 -2.39  
Real Estate CAARs -0.17% -0.29% -0.17% -0.49% 356 
 t-student -0.41 -0.71 -0.41 -1.21  
Retail CAARs -0.38% -0.01% -0.52% -1.35% 439 
 t-student -0.8 -0.02 -0.86 -1.81  
Technology CAARs -0.51% -0.72% -0.78% -0.61% 651 
 t-student -1.15 -1.63 -1.78 -1.39  
Telecommunications CAARs -0.70% -0.96% -1.71% -1.54% 113 
 t-student -1.06 -1.44 -2.57 -2.32  
Travel and Leisure CAARs -0.39% -0.10% -0.25% -0.82% 404 
 t-student -0.71 -0.19 -0.45 -1.50  
Utilities CAARs -0.51% -0.72% -0.78% -0.61% 175 
 t-student -1.15 -1.63 -1.78 -1.39  
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for directors’ sells categorised by sectors for 
different event windows ranging between one day after the announcement date and 10 days after the 
announcement date.  
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6.4.3  Multivariate Analysis  
Section (6.4.2) analysed how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies 
with industry/sector controlling for only one factor that is likely to affect the 
informativeness, namely transaction type. However, the previous literature has 
highlighted many factors that may have impact upon the information contained 
in directors’ trades. In this section, our aim is to examine the same hypothesis 
whilst controlling for other factors. The results and conclusions from our 
Univariate analysis should be viewed tentatively and are mainly included for 
comparison with other Univariate studies in this area (Seyhun, 1986; Gregory 
et al., 1994; Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; and Gregory et al., 
2009).  
In this section, we examine how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies 
with industry/sector controlling not only for transaction type, but also for firm 
size measured by market value (see for example, Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et 
al., 1994; and Friederich et al., 2002), trade size measured by the value of the 
trade divided by the market value (Fidrmuc et al., (2006) and Gregory et al., 
(2009) used value of the trade as a measure of trade size), and holding 
percentage (see Scott and Xu, 2004 and Gregory et al., 2009). 
Studies such as Seyhun (1986), Gregory et al. (1994) and Friederich et 
al.(2002) examined the impact of firm size upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. They argued that the directors of smaller companies are more 
able to predict their company’s future prospects than directors of larger 
companies. This is perhaps because larger companies tend to include more 
non-executive directors or because directors’ trades of larger companies are 
more public so that stock market reaction is faster (Gregory et al., 1994). 
Therefore, insiders of smaller firms are more informed about their trades than 
insiders of larger firms (Seyhun, 1988a; Gregory et al,. 1997; Huddart and Ke, 
2007a; and Gregory et al,. 2009).  
Besides, trade size has an impact upon the informativeness of directors’ trades. 
Informed traders prefer to trade larger amount at any given price, whereas 
uninformed traders do not share this quantity bias. The larger the trade size, the 
more likely it is that the market maker is trading with an informed trading 
(Easley and O’Hara, 1987). Informed trades are more concentrated in medium 
sizes and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders’ private 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
188 
information (Barclay and Warner, 1993). Medium-sized trades as a whole seem 
more informative than large ones (Friederich et al, 2002). Gregory et al. (2009) 
used the value of the trade divided by the market value as a measure of trade 
size (that was in their summary statistics table). Similarly, we used this 
percentage to control for trade size effects in our multivariate regression.  
Scott and Xu (2004) used the traded shares as a percentage of insiders’ 
holdings to separate sells driven by liquidity or diversification needs from sells 
driven by information advantage. Gregory et al. (2009) found that when 
directors are buying more shares as a percentage of their holdings, buys 
produce strong signals.  
Formally, our hypothesis is tested within the context of the following model: 
 
                                       
          
(6.2) 
 
The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return for the 
windows [0, 1], [0, 3], [0, 5] and [0, 10]. The independent variables are as 
follows: Trade Value is the natural logarithm of the value of the trade; Market 
Value is the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm on the event day; 
Holding is the number of shares transacted as a percentage of total holding; 
Industry is a dummy variable which represents different industry categories. In 
this analysis, as with the Univariate, we have ten industry groups. We assumed 
no constant term to avoid dummy variables trap. Therefore, we have ten 
dummy variables for the ten industry groups.  
Table (6.6) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ buys. 
On the whole, our results for buy trades confirm the pattern found in the 
Univariate analysis. Namely, ceteris paribus, informativeness is positive across 
all industries for buy transactions. The following pattern is also noticed; across 
all windows, as witnessed by the size of the coefficient, abnormal returns for 
technology industries directors are the highest..  
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across industries, we preformed the 
following test;  
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As can be seen from table (6.5), the null was rejected across all event windows. 
Specifically, abnormal returns are positive and statistically different across all 
industries. For example, a p-value of 0.0094 for (0, 1) event window confirms 
the latter.  
Table (6.6) also shows the impact of our controlling variables. Consistent with 
our previous findings, market value is significantly negative i.e. transactions in 
smaller firms are more informative. Also, trade size has an impact on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. Therefore, larger trades are more 
informative than smaller trades. Besides, holding percentage is significantly 
positive. This suggests the larger the number of shares traded as a percentage 
of holdings, the higher the abnormal return. Another result also emerges 
insignificant cumulative average abnormal returns for directors in Utility 
industries across all event windows.  
The test for heteroscedacity reveals high heteroscedacity .i.e. the residuals are 
not constant or not homogenate.  To avoid this, we run robustness check 
regression, namely, regression diagnostic. Table (1.A) shows the results of 
diagnostic regression for directors’ buys.  The coefficients remained the same, 
but the standard errors were robusted. However, the results, in general, did not 
change. Hence, buy trades by directors in Technology industry are more 
informative.  
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Table 6.6: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Buys by Industry 
industries Event Windows 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 Coefficients  T-statistics Coefficients  T-statistics Coefficients  T-statistics Coefficients  T-statistics 
Basic Materials 1.16% 3.04 1.42% 3.24 1.50% 3.27 0.56% 0.95 
Consumer Goods 1.40% 3.77 1.92% 4.53 1.97% 4.42 0.88% 1.53 
Consumer Services 1.30% 3.69 1.85% 4.59 1.99% 4.71 1.67% 3.07 
Financials 0.81% 2.37 1.24% 3.16 1.41% 3.44 0.83% 1.57 
Healthcare 2.17% 5.83 2.68% 6.26 2.63% 5.87 2.05% 3.57 
Industrials 1.77% 5.31 2.34% 6.1 2.51% 6.24 1.94% 3.75 
Oil and Gas 1.54% 3.91 1.90% 4.21 2.13% 4.5 0.75% 1.23 
Technology 2.48% 6.95 3.19% 7.78 3.55% 8.27 3.19% 5.78 
Telecommunications 2.23% 4.57 2.40% 4.29 2.32% 3.95 2.51% 3.32 
Utilities 0.26% 0.4 1.19% 1.63 1.18% 1.55 0.61% 0.62 
Market Value -0.34% -9.73 -0.42% -10.4 -0.43% -9.81 -0.45% -8.37 
Trade Value 0.33% 9.51 0.33% 8.35 0.37% 8.54 0.42% 7.95 
Holding 0.10% 4.11 0.10% 3.56 0.12% 4.01 0.14% 3.78 
Heteroscedacity Test 113 166.42 166.43 173.78 
Normality Test 19.749 19.550 19.624 19.694 
Model Specification Test 2.12 (0.0957) 0.66 (0.5750) 4.35 (0.0045) 9.33 (0.00) 
F-statistics 6.75 
(0.0094) 
9.98 
(0.0016) 
26.11 
(0.00) 
16.05 
(0.0001)  
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Table (6.7) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ sells. 
The first thing we notice is that, like the Univariate analysis, sells are negative 
and insignificant (uninformative) across all industries (up to five days event 
window). This is also consistent with the view that market participants view 
the insignificance of sell trades as uninformed trades likely to be motivated by 
liquidity/diversification. For longer event window (10 days event window), 
there is some evidence of statistically significantly negative CAARs for 
directors’ trades in almost all industries (except utilities). Thus, there is some 
evidence to suggest that sell transactions may be informative across certain 
industries. However, the results of F-statistics show no significantly difference 
between industries coefficients.  
While the majority of previous studies found that sells are uninformative, it is 
worth noting that Hamil et al. (2002) found that sells are informative and that 
directors might sell based on the information they possess about their firm 
future prospects. 
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Table 6.7: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Sells by Industry 
industries Event Windows 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics 
Basic Materials -0.39% -0.9 -0.57% -1.09 -0.92% -1.58 -1.99% -2.67 
Consumer Goods -0.41% -1 -0.56% -1.13 -0.98% -1.78 -2.08% -2.95 
Consumer Services -0.31% -0.78 -0.38% -0.78 -0.69% -1.29 -1.85% -2.7 
Financials -0.10% -0.26 -0.12% -0.25 -0.52% -1 -1.69% -2.53 
Healthcare -0.29% -0.66 -0.45% -0.85 -0.94% -1.59 -2.04% -2.69 
Industrials -0.49% -1.29 -0.65% -1.4 -1.13% -2.19 -2.21% -3.36 
Oil and Gas -0.70% -1.57 -0.51% -0.94 -1.07% -1.77 -1.34% -1.74 
Technology -0.49% -1.21 -0.68% -1.38 -1.11% -2.02 -1.91% -2.72 
Telecommunications -0.52% -0.95 -0.75% -1.14 -1.75% -2.37 -2.69% -2.85 
Utilities -0.55% -1.14 -0.43% -0.74 -0.48% -0.74 -0.53% -0.64 
Market Value 0.04% 1.25 0.04% 1.02 0.06% 1.4 0.10% 1.89 
Trade Value -0.02% -0.78 -0.01% -0.4 0.02% 0.46 0.10% 2.13 
Holding 0.01% 0.29 -0.01% -0.46 -0.01% -0.37 -0.07% -1.48 
Heteroscedacity Test 34.76 (0.8649) 38.56 (0.7398) 19.33 (0.9997) 52.17 (0.2151) 
Normality Test 16.386 16.479 16.703 15.622 
Model Specification Test 2.51 (0.0571) 1.52 (0.2060) 0.71 (0.5435) 1.60 (0.1878) 
F-statistics 1.1 
(0.3323) 
  1 
(0.3662) 
0.88 
(0.3478)    
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In order to examine whether the informativeness of directors’ trades varies 
with different sectors, we used the same regression whilst controlling for 
different sectors instead of industries. In this analysis, as with the Univariate, 
we have nineteenth sectors.  
Similar to tables (6.6) and (6.7), tables (6.8) and (6.9) show the results of the 
multivariate regression for directors’ trades. Specifically, table (6.8) shows the 
results of the multivariate regression for directors’ buys and table (6.9) shows 
the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ sells.  
The results of tables (6.8) and (6.9) support the previous findings of tables (6.4) 
and (6.5). Moreover, purchases are positive and significant (informative) across 
all sectors and sells are negative across all sectors. These results are again 
consistent with the view that market participants view the significance of buy 
trades as informative trades are likely to be motivated by good information 
contained in directors’ trades. 
One clear pattern emerges from table (6.8) which indicates that 
informativeness across all event windows for directors of technology sectors is 
the highest. Again, when focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it 
appears that market perceives technology sectors directors’ trades to be more 
informed than directors of other sectors. 
Table (2.A) shows the results of diagnostic regression for directors’ buys.  The 
coefficients remained the same, but the standard errors were robusted. 
However, the results, in general, did not change. Hence, buy trades by directors 
in Technology industry are more informative.  
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Table 6.8: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Buys (Sectors)  
Sectors Event Windows No of Trades 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
 Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics  
Banks 0.61% 1.99 0.86% 2.45 0.80% 2.06 0.72% 1.52 791 
Basic Resources 1.45% 3.6 1.71% 3.68 1.29% 2.55 0.61% 0.98 1,266 
Chemicals 1.19% 2.4 1.75% 3.07 1.42% 2.26 1.78% 2.32 376 
Construction and Materials 1.84% 4.17 2.63% 5.2 2.51% 4.53 2.40% 3.54 691 
Financial Services 0.68% 1.97 1.09% 2.78 0.94% 2.19 0.70% 1.32 5,405 
Food and Beverage 1.24% 2.91 1.75% 3.59 1.58% 2.95 0.80% 1.22 832 
Healthcare 2.17% 5.83 2.68% 6.26 2.63% 5.87 2.05% 3.57 1,605 
Industrial Goods and Services 2.00% 5.93 2.59% 6.69 2.53% 5.96 2.27% 4.37 6,328 
Insurance 1.77% 4.25 2.39% 5 2.39% 4.57 2.31% 3.61 1,045 
Media 1.77% 4.71 2.43% 5.64 2.35% 4.98 2.13% 3.7 1,936 
Oil and Gas 1.54% 3.91 1.90% 4.21 2.13% 4.5 0.75% 1.23 1.54% 
Personal and Household Goods 1.63% 4.01 2.16% 4.62 1.81% 3.54 1.25% 2 1,022 
Real Estate 0.85% 2.17 1.28% 2.86 1.09% 2.23 0.72% 1.21 1,726 
Retail 1.78% 4.47 2.15% 4.71 2.07% 4.14 2.12% 3.47 1,337 
Technology 2.48% 6.95 3.19% 7.78 3.55% 8.27 3.19% 5.78 2.48% 
Telecommunications 2.23% 4.57 2.40% 4.29 2.32% 3.95 2.51% 3.32 2.23% 
Travel and Leisure 1.05% 2.68 1.61% 3.58 1.43% 2.91 1.39% 2.31 1,651 
Market Value -0.41% -11.37 -0.50% -12.03 -0.52% -11.42 -0.56% -10.04  
Trade Value 0.32% 9.34 0.33% 8.23 0.37% 8.43 0.42% 7.82  
Holding 0.11% 4.47 0.11% 3.91 0.13% 4.35 0.15% 4.08  
Heteroscedacity Test 
128.27 218.40 223 254 
 
Normality Test 
17.777 17.529 17.458 17.149 
 
Model Specification Test 
0.78 (0.5031) 0.79 (0.5015) 3.65 (0.012) 9.66 (0.00) 
 
F-statistics 6.81 
(0.0091) 
10.02 
(0.0016) 
21.91 
(0.00) 
15.16 
(0.0001) 
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Table (6.9) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ sells. 
The first thing we notice is that, unlike the Univariate analysis, there is some 
evidence of statistically significantly negative CAARs for directors’ trades in 
industrial goods and services, and technology sectors. Across all event 
windows, directors’ trades in technology and industrial goods and services 
have statistically significantly negative abnormal returns. This pattern is again 
repeated for longer event windows for directors’ in retail and personal and 
household goods sectors. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that sell 
transactions may be informative across certain industries. 
In conclusion, there appears to be an industry/ sector impact upon the 
informativeness of directors’ trades for buy transactions, where directors in 
Technology industry/sector were more able to gain high abnormal returns. 
Also, there is some evidence of statistically significant and negative CAARs 
for directors in certain industries/sectors such as technology and industrial 
industries for longer event windows. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest 
that sell transactions may be informative across certain industries/sectors.  
These results, the informativeness of directors’ trades in technology and 
industry/sector, are, somehow, similar to studies such as Aboody and Lev 
(2000), Gonzales (2006), Ali et al. (2009), McLaughlin and Safieddine (2008), 
and Knewtson (2011) which found that directors’ trades in high R&D, low 
competition, and low regulated firms are higher than directors’ trades in low 
R&D, high competition, and high regulated firms.   
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Table 6.9: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Sells (Sectors) 
Sectors Event Windows  
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
 Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics  
Banks -0.34% -0.65 -0.78% -1.22 -1.02% -1.43 -1.54% -1.68 202 
Basic Resources -0.47% -1.05 -0.80% -1.49 -1.13% -1.86 -2.25% -2.89 395 
Chemicals  -0.37% -0.6 -0.49% -0.67 -1.01% -1.21 -1.40% -1.32  
Construction and Materials -0.22% -0.46 -0.50% -0.86 -0.74% -1.12 -1.17% -1.4 199 
Financial Services -0.21% -0.54 -0.32% -0.68 -0.70% -1.32 -1.88% -2.78 1,292 
Food and Beverage -0.35% -0.78 -0.53% -0.98 -1.01% -1.66 -1.77% -2.26 317 
Healthcare -0.35% -0.8 -0.62% -1.17 -1.11% -1.88 -2.16% -2.83 394 
Industrial Goods and Services -0.60% -1.55 -0.86% -1.85 -1.37% -2.64 -2.47% -3.72 1,690 
Insurance 0.10% 0.21 0.03% 0.05 -0.56% -0.86 -1.36% -1.61 235 
Media -0.23% -0.53 -0.28% -0.53 -0.30% -0.51 -1.07% -1.41 426 
Oil and Gas -0.77% -1.72 -0.69% -1.28 -1.25% -2.07 -1.46% -1.88 401 
Personal and Household Goods -0.68% -1.57 -1.15% -2.19 -1.51% -2.55 -2.64% -3.51 375 
Real Estate -0.11% -0.25 -0.20% -0.38 -0.63% -1.08 -1.91% -2.57 480 
Retail -0.55% -1.28 -0.77% -1.49 -1.50% -2.58 -2.71% -3.64 529 
Technology -0.55% -1.36 -0.84% -1.71 -1.27% -2.31 -2.02% -2.88 825 
Telecommunications -0.59% -1.07 -0.93% -1.42 -1.94% -2.62 -2.80% -2.97 167 
Travel and Leisure -0.31% -0.73 -0.55% -1.06 -0.68% -1.16 -1.92% -2.57 517 
Utilities -0.62% -1.29 -0.63% -1.08 -0.68% -1.05 -0.63% -0.76 198 
Market Value 0.05% 1.45 0.06% 1.56 0.08% 1.84 0.11% 1.94  
Trade Value -0.02% -0.68 -0.01% -0.21 0.02% 0.63 0.10% 2.32  
Holding 0.01% 0.29 -0.01% -0.47 -0.01% -0.38 -0.06% -1.44  
Heteroscedacity Test 
63.36 (0.9262) 87.17 (0.2997) 0.2172 72.55 (0.737) 
 
Normality Test 
15.193 16.760 15.934 15.591 
 
Model Specification Test 
1.90  (0.1270) 1.46 (0.2244) 0.67 (0.5705) 1.75 (0.1550) 
 
F-statistics 0.78 
(0.4584) 
0.64 
(0.4225) 
0.11 
(0.7434) 
1.74 
(0.1876) 
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6.4.4  Information Asymmetry and the Informativeness 
of Directors’ Trades 
Section (6.4.3) examined how the informativeness of directors’ trades varies 
with industries/sectors. The results showed that the informativeness across all 
event windows for directors of technology industries/sectors is the highest. 
This section presents the results of the hypothesis whether the level of 
information asymmetry in a sector has an impact on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades using the different measures of information asymmetry 
discussed earlier in the literature section.  
6.4.4.1 The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades and R&D 
Expenditure 
One reason why information asymmetry may vary across industries is Research 
& Development Expenditure.  
In technology and science based sectors, R&D Expenditure is an important 
source of information asymmetry between insiders and outsider investors 
which enables insiders to profit from insider trading (Aboody and Lev, 2000). 
Hence, directors’ trades in high R&D industries/sectors may contain more 
information than directors’ trades in low or no R&D industries/sectors (Barth 
et al., 2001 and Aboody and Lev, 2000) 
One explanation given by Barth et al. (2001) is that investment in intangible 
assets such as R&D is risky and uncertain making sectors with high R&D 
Expenditures exhibit more information asymmetry. Thus, in high R&D 
industries, outside investors should regard directors’ trades (insiders) as being 
more informative than low R&D industries. Further, in high R&D industries, 
where potential information asymmetry is high, any private information which 
the directors may have is more valuable to them than in low R&D industries.  
Based on these previous points, this section examines whether the 
informativeness of directors’ trades varies with sectors based on R&D 
expenditure. Specifically, based on our priors, we may expect directors’ trades 
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in highly R&D sectors to be more informed than directors’ trades in lowly 
R&D sectors. 
There are many ways to calculate Research and Development Expenditure for 
each sector. One way is, across all firms within a sector, to divide Research and 
Development value for each firm over the total sales for that firm on the chosen 
date. In other words, the equation is: 
 
                                          
 
 
∑
    
      
 
 
 
(6.3) 
 
Where N refers to the number of firms.  
Another way to calculate Research and Development Expenditure is to add 
weights to the previous equation such as market value. Therefore the equation 
becomes as follows; 
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(6.4) 
 
 
   is a value-weighted variable which captures the effect of firm size measured 
by market capitalisation. Additionally, there is another way of calculation 
through this equation;  
 
                                          
∑   
∑     
  
(6.5) 
 
 
For example, suppose the total sells for company A and company B are 20 and 
30 respectively and the Research and Development Expenditures are 4 and 
8.both of these companies are working in Financial sector. To calculate the 
Research and Development Expenditure for the specified sector, we divide the 
Research and Development Expenditures for each company by total sells (i.e. 
4/ 20 for company A and 8/30 for company B). Then, we sum the outputs 
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(4/20=0.2 for company A + 0.26 for company B = 0.46) and divide the results 
over the number of companies (0.46/2=0.23). Another way to calculate 
Research and Development Expenditures is by summing the Research and 
Development Expenditures values for the firms operating in the same sector 
(4+8=12) as well as the total sells (20+30=50)  and then divide the results 
(12/50=0.24). Both methods indicates that Financial sector spends 24% on 
Research and Development projects.  Assuming the market values for 
companies A and B are 5 and 2 respectively, we can also calculate the 
Research and Development Expenditures by multiplying the market values by 
Research and Development Expenditures for each company (5*4=20 and 
2*8=16) and summing the outputs (46). Then, we divide the output over the 
sum of sells (50) and then by the number of companies (2).  
All three measures of R&D Expenditure were calculated, and the results 
presented in table (6.10) are qualitatively similar. Therefore, the results focus 
only on the second measure. Table (6.10) shows the distribution of Research 
and Development Expenditure per sector based on this measure of R&D. We 
split our sample into three groups: 
 High R&D expenditure sectors include healthcare and technology;  
 Medium R&D expenditure sectors include automobiles and parts; 
industrial goods and services; chemicals; personal and household 
goods; telecommunications; oil and gas; travel and leisure; media; 
utilities; 
 Low or No R&D expenditure sectors include food and beverage; banks; 
retailers; real estates; insurance; financial services; basic resource; 
construction and materials. 
This table shows that sectors such as healthcare and technology invest more in 
Research and Development where they invest approximately 15% and 14% 
respectively (High Research and Development), whereas sectors, such as 
banks, insurance, and retail invest less in Research and Development.  
 
 
 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
200 
Table 6.10:The Average R&D Expenditure for Each Sector 
Sector Average Research and Development Expenditure 
Healthcare 15.17% 
Technology 14.32% 
Chemicals 6.31% 
Automobiles and Parts 5.21% 
Media 4.09% 
Utilities 4.02% 
Industrial Goods and Services 3.05% 
Travel and Leisure 2.70% 
Oil and Gas 2.35% 
Telecommunications 2.33% 
Personal and Household Goods 1.21% 
Construction and Materials 0.95% 
Food and Beverage 0.93% 
Retail 0.86% 
Basic Resources 0.34% 
Financial Services 0.22% 
Banks 0% 
Insurance 0% 
 
Formally, our hypothesis istested within the context of the following model; 
 
                                           
                       
(6.6) 
 
 
Similar to multivariate analysis, we attempted to control for other factors that 
affect the informativeness by including market value, trade value, and holding.  
We also consider that transaction type is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the transaction is “Buy” or 0 if the transaction is “Sell”, and sector is a dummy 
variable for the three R&D categories (High R&D, Medium R&D, and Low 
R&D). In our analysis, sector and transaction type are interacted in order to 
identify whether the informativeness of directors’ trades varies across different 
sector groups. Thus, we used three sector dummies interacted with buy trades 
and another three dummies interacted with sell trades assuming no constant 
term to avoid dummy variables trap. Table (6.11) shows the results of the 
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multivariate regression for directors’ trades. Again, purchases are significantly 
positive across all sector groups. One clear pattern emerges from table (6.11) - 
informativeness across all event windows for high R&D sector group (for 
directors’ buy trades) is the highest.  
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across sector groups, we preformed the 
following test;  
 
                                         
                                         
 
As can be seen from table (6.11), the null was rejected across all event 
windows. Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant for all buys in respective of sector R&D Expenditure, they are also 
statistically different from each other. For example, a p-value of 0.00 for (0, 1) 
event window confirms the latter. Therefore, the informativeness of directors’ 
trades in high R&D sectors is significantly different from those in low R&D 
sectors. This is also the case of sell trades as can be seen from the last row of 
table (6.11).  
Again, when focusing only on informative trades (buy trades); it appears that 
the market perceives directors’ trades in high R&D sectors to be more 
informative than directors’ trades in other sectors.  
Turning to directors’ sells, there is some evidence of statistically significantly 
negative CAARs for directors’ trades in high R&D sectors. For example, 
across all event windows directors’ trades in high R&D sectors have 
statistically significantly negative abnormal returns. Thus, there is some 
evidence to suggest that sell transactions may be informative across certain 
industries. 
Studies by Barth et al., (2001) and Aboody and Lev (2000) found that insider 
gains in high R&D firms are higher than insider gains in low or no R&D firms. 
The first study used a sample of financial analysts whereas the second sample 
used a sample of former directors. Our results added to the previous studies by 
identifying that the informativeness of directors’ trades is highest for directors 
in high R&D sectors.  
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Table 6.11: The Result of the Multivariate Regression by Sectors Categorised by R&D Expenditure Level 
Industry Event Windows N 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
  coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics  
High R&D sectors (Buy) 2.40% 7.13 3.14% 8.05 3.06% 7.16 2.63% 5.02 3,451 
Medium High R&D sectors (Buy) 1.62% 4.99 2.20% 5.87 2.01% 4.88 1.54% 3.05 6,214 
Low R&D sectors (Buy) 1.04% 3.15 1.52% 4 1.27% 3.04 1.07% 2.1 12,375 
High R&D sectors (Sell) -1.18% -2.69 -1.06% -2.07 -1.45% -2.59 -1.93% -2.83 9,51 
Medium High sectors R&D (Sell) -0.67% -1.7 -0.38% -0.83 -0.72% -1.44 -1.21% -1.98 1,767 
Low R&D sectors (Sell) -0.30% -0.77 0.00% -0.01 -0.29% -0.58 -1.02% -1.65 3,321 
Market Value -0.31% -11.25 -0.37% -11.72 -0.38% -11 -0.39% -9.16  
Trade Value 0.22% 8.31 0.22% 7.37 0.26% 7.81 0.32% 7.79  
Holding 0.07% 3.36 0.06% 2.67 0.08% 3.08 0.08% 2.7  
Heteroscedacity Test 32.93 (0.6605) 23.76 (0.9548) 30.06 (0.7837) 27.42 (0.8746) 
 Normality Test 14.942 16.388 18.299 16.432 
 Model Specification Test 0.85 (0.4675) 0.51 (0.6732) 1.47 (0.2193) 7.04 (0.0001) 
                                2.73 
(0.0986) 
5.94 
(0.0148) 
2.97 
(0.0850) 
0.37 
(0.5454) 
F-statistics (Buy) 38.27 
 (0.00) 
5.59 
 (0.0037) 
57.90  
(0.00) 
5.788  
(0.0031) 
58.97  
(0.00) 
5.84 
(0.0029) 
27.91 
(0.00) 
2.40 
(0.0908) 
 
F-statistics (Sell)  
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6.4.4.2 The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades and 
Volatility 
Another reason why information asymmetry may vary across industries is 
industry volatility. Investment in high volatile industries might be more risky 
and uncertain making sectors with high volatile exhibit more information 
asymmetry. Thus, in high volatile outside investors should regard directors’ 
trades (insiders) as being more informative than low volatile. Further, in high 
volatile industries, where potential information asymmetry is high, any private 
information directors may have is more valuable to them than in low volatile 
industries.  
Based on the previous points, this section examines whether industry volatility 
as a measure of information asymmetry influences the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. Specifically, based on previous findings, we may expect 
directors’ trades in highly volatile sectors to be more informed than directors’ 
trades in lowly volatile sectors.  
We measured industry volatility in three ways. One way to measure industry 
volatility is by estimating Beta term from the covariance of industry index 
monthly returns. Another way of calculating industry volatility is by collecting 
yearly (or quarterly) beta values for each firm in an industry from DataStream 
and average them over the period of study. Moshirian and Wu (2009) 
calculated Bank sector volatility by constructing bank sector portfolios and 
value-weighted
50
 excess returns for each portfolio. Then, they ran the following 
regression to obtain the beta; 
 
                (6. 7) 
 
Where     is the quarterly value-weighted bank excess return,     is the 
quarterly market excess return,    is the beta of the banking industry, and     is 
                                                          
50
 Weights are based on market capitalisation.  
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the error term. Finally, they used weekly data to construct bank sector volatility 
as follows;  
 
                
 
           
 
     (6.8) 
 
The results of the three measures of industry volatility are qualitatively similar. 
Therefore we only reported the results of the first measure.  
Table (6.12) shows the average volatility per sector based on the first measure 
of industry volatility. Beta, as a measure of volatility, represents the tendency 
of stock’s returns to response to market swings. Less than one Beta means that 
the stock return is less volatile than market, whereas more than one Beta means 
that the stock return is more volatile than the market. Thus, we split our sample 
based on industry volatility into two categories. High volatility sectors such as 
oil and gas, basic materials, banks, insurance, technology, media, automobiles 
and parts, industrials, chemicals, and telecommunications, and low volatility 
sectors for the remaining industries.  
Table (6.12) shows that sectors such as technology and automobiles and parts 
experience high volatility, whereas sectors such as utilities and real estate 
experience low volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
205 
 
Table 6.12: Average Volatility for Each Sector over the Sample Period 
Sector Average Volatility 
Automobiles and Parts 1.70 
Technology 1.58 
Basic Resources 1.37 
Media 1.16 
Banks 1.13 
Telecommunications 1.08 
Industrial Goods and Services 1.03 
Chemicals 1.02 
Oil and Gas 1.01 
Insurance 1.01 
Construction and Materials 0.98 
Retail 0.94 
Healthcare 0.92 
Financial Services 0.92 
Real Estate 0.84 
Personal and Household Goods 0.80 
Travel and Leisure 0.71 
Food and Beverage 0.60 
Utilities 0.51 
 
Similar to multivariate analysis, we use the same regression where the 
dependent variable is the CAARs for different event windows, whereas the 
independent variables are: market value, trade value, holding which are defined 
before, and sector which is a dummy variable for the two sectors volatility 
categories. In our analysis, we have two sector dummy variables one for high 
volatility sectors and the other for low volatility sectors.  
Table (6.13) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ 
trades. Similar to previous findings, purchases are significant and positive 
across all sectors groups, whereas sells are insignificant and negative across all 
sectors groups. 
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One clear pattern emerges from table (6.13) – the informativeness of directors’ 
buy trades across all event windows for high volatility sectors is the highest.  
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across sectors groups, we preformed the 
following test;  
 
                                     
                                     
 
As can be seen from table (6.13), the null was rejected across all event 
windows. Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant across all sectors, they are also statistically different from each 
other. For example, a p-value of 0.00 for (0, 1) event window confirms the 
latter. Thus, the informativeness of directors’ trades in high volatility sectors is 
significantly different from those in low volatility sectors. This is not the case 
for sell trades as can be seen from the last row of table (6.13). Again, when 
focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it appears that market 
perceives directors’ trades in high volatile sectors to be more informative than 
directors’ trades in other sectors.  
Studies by Campbell et al. (2001), and Crouzille et al. (2004) found that there 
is an increase in volatility level in some industries which might be due to 
private information revealed through trading. However, our results showed that 
insider gains are highest for directors in high volatile sectors.  
Table (3.A) shows the results of diagnostic regression for directors’ trades.  
The coefficients remained the same, but the standard errors were robusted. 
However, the results, in general, did not change. Hence, insider gains are 
highest for directors in high volatile sectors.  
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Table 6.13: The Result of the Multivariate Regression by Sectors Categorised by Volatility Level 
Industry Event Windows N 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
  coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics   
High Volatility sectors (Buy) 1.98% 6.13 2.63% 7.01 2.51% 6.1 2.04% 4.06 12,977 
Low Volatility sectors (Buy) 1.18% 3.63 1.72% 4.55 1.44% 3.48 1.15% 2.28 11,823 
High Volatility sectors (Sell) -0.57% -1.46 -0.28% -0.61 -0.63% -1.26 -1.17% -1.91 3551 
Low Volatility sectors (Sell) -0.27% -0.71 0.04% 0.09 -0.24% -0.49 -0.97% -1.6 3365 
Market Value -0.33% -12.21 -0.40% -12.7 -0.41% -11.97 -0.42% -9.82   
Value 0.21% 8.2 0.22% 7.24 0.26% 7.7 0.31% 7.75   
Holding 0.07% 3.66 0.07% 2.99 0.09% 3.39 0.09% 2.88   
Heteroscedacity Test 20.85 (0.0760) 17.98 (0.1582) 24.42 (0.0275) 38.99 (0.0002)  
Normality Test 22.750 22.836 22.677 22.795  
Model Specification Test 0.83 (0.4762) 0.26 (0.8531) 0.77 (0.5089) 3.84 (0/009)  
                                   3.45 
(0.0318) 
5.40 
(0.0045) 
3.33 
(0.0358) 
1.38 
(0.2515) 
 
F-statistics (Buy) 85.39  
(0.00) 
82.13  
(0.00) 
94.15  
(0.00) 
43.28  
(0.00)  
  
F-statistics (Sell) 2.85 
(0.0912) 
2.46 
(0.1170) 
2.99 
(0.0838) 
0.51  
(0.4750) 
 
  
 
Chapter Six: the Informativeness of Directors’ Trades  
 
208 
6.4.4.3 The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades and 
Competition Level 
Information asymmetry is likely to vary across firms in differently competitive 
environments. In highly competitive environments, market competition forces 
firms to operate effectively and competitively, and reduce the information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors (Chu and Song, 
2011). Hence, directors’ trades are more profitable in lightly competitive 
environments.  
Based on these priors, this section examines whether industry concentration as 
a measure of information asymmetry influences the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. Specifically, based on our previous findings, we may expect 
directors’ trades in lowly competitive sectors to be more informed than 
directors’ trades in highly competitive sectors. Similar to previous studies 
(Gregg, Jewell and Tonks, 2005), we measured industry concentration using 
the Herfindahl index, which is defined as 
 
             ∑   
 
   
 
(6.9) 
 
Where     is the market share of firm i in industry j. We performed the above 
calculations each year for each industry, and then averaged the values over the 
past nine years. This ensures that potential data errors do not have undue 
influence on our Herfindahl measure (Hou and Robinson, 2006). 
The study uses total sales to calculate market share as this is the most common 
Herfindahl measure. Small values of the Herfindahl Index (0–1800) imply that 
the market is shared by many competing firms, while large values (1800–
10,000) indicate that market share is concentrated in the hands of a few large 
firms.  
For example, suppose the total sells for company A and company B are 2 and 8 
respectively. To calculate the Herfindahl value, we divide the total sells for 
each company by the sum of total sells (i.e. 2/ 2+8 for company A and 8/2+8 
for company B). Then, we squared the outputs (2/10=0.2^=0.4 for company A 
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and 1.6 for company B) and sum the results and multiply them by 1000 
(0.4+1.6=2*1000=2000). Hence, the industry, in which these firms operate, is 
considered highly concentrated (Herfindahl value is between 1800-10000).  
Turning to our hypotheses, in this section we examine whether sectors, 
measured by their concentration level, have an impact upon the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. To examine this, we chose two sectors 
groups (high and low concentrated sectors) over four event windows.  
Based on Herfindahl measure, we split the sample into two categories. High 
concentrated sectors such as automobiles and parts, chemicals, basic resources, 
healthcare, insurance, oil and gas, telecommunication, and utilities. Low 
concentrated sectors such as banks, construction and materials, financial 
services, food and beverage, industrial goods and services, media, personal and 
household goods, real estate, retails, technology, and travel and leisure.  
Similar to the multivariate analysis, we used the same regression where sector 
is a dummy variable for the two sectors concentration categories (High 
concentrated sectors and low concentrated sectors). Table (6.14) shows the 
results of the multivariate regression for directors’ trades. Again, purchases are 
significantly positive across all sectors groups. 
One clear pattern emerges from table (6.14) – the informativeness of directors’ 
buy transactions across all event windows for high concentration sectors group 
is the highest.  
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across sectors groups, we preformed the 
following test; 
  
                                             
                                              
 
As can be seen from table (6.14), the null was rejected across all event 
windows. Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant for all buys in respective of industry concentration, they are also 
statistically different from each other. For example, a p-value of 0.00 for (0, 1) 
event window confirms the latter. Thus, the informativeness of directors’ trades 
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in high concentrated sectors is significantly different from those in low 
concentrated sectors. On the other hand, this is not the case of sell trades as can 
be seen from the results of the F-test (Sell) of table (6.14).  
Once again, when focusing only on informative trades (buy trades), it appears 
that market perceives directors’ trades in low concentrated industries to be 
more informative than directors’ trades in other sector groups.  
Similar to multivariate analysis results, market value, trade value and holding 
have an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. Turning to 
directors’ sells, there is some evidence of statistically significantly negative 
CAARs for directors’ trades in high concentrated industries. Thus, there is 
some evidence to suggest that sell transactions may be informative across low 
concentrated sectors. 
Table (4.A) shows the results of diagnostic regression for directors’ trades.  
The coefficients remained the same, but the standard errors were robusted. 
However, the results, in general, did not change. Hence, informativeness of 
directors’ trades is lowest for directors in less concentrated sectors. 
Thomas (2002) and Ataullah et al. (2012) reported that insiders in high 
concentrated firms may have more information than insiders in low 
concentrated firms, and, therefore, have more opportunity to earn higher 
abnormal returns. We added to the previous literature by finding that the 
informativeness of directors’ trades is lowest for directors in less concentrated 
sectors.  
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Table 6.14: The Result of the Multivariate Regression by Sectors Categorised by Concentration Level 
Industry Event Windows N 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
  coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics   
Low Concentrated Industries (Buy) 1.06% 3.26 1.59% 4.24 1.32% 3.2 1.04% 2.05 8793 
High Concentrated Industries (Buy) 1.87% 5.82 2.53% 6.77 2.36% 5.77 1.88% 3.75 8013 
Low Concentrated Industries (Sell) -0.36% -0.93 -0.03% -0.06 -0.32% -0.65 -1.05% -1.74 2100 
High Concentrated Industries (Sell) -0.97% -2.47 -0.71% -1.58 -1.13% -2.28 -1.62% -2.66 2327 
Trade Value 0.23% 8.83 0.23% 7.77 0.27% 8.28 0.33% 8.25   
Market Value -0.31% -11.27 -0.37% -11.87 -0.38% -11.08 -0.39% -9.15   
Holding 0.00% -0.2 0.00% 0.51 0.00% 0.45 0.00% -0.78   
Heteroscedacity Test 25.66 (0.0189) 24.10 (0.0302) 39.69 (0.0002) 46.86 (0.000)  
Normality Test 24.024 24.863 25.205 24.497  
Model Specification Test 0.86 (0.4608) 0.44 (0.7258) 1.26 (0.2877) 4.86 (0.0022)  
F-statistics (Buy) 11.36 
(0.0008) 
15.94 
(0.0001) 
9.86 
(0.00) 
12.81 
(0.0003) 
  
F-statistics (Sell) 1.65 
(0.1991) 
2.73 
(0.0984) 
3.39 
(0.0655) 
1.79 
(0.1815) 
 
                    
                         
1.68 
(0.1954) 
4.99 
(0.0255) 
1.90 
(0.1680) 
0.06 
(0.8116) 
 
                                       3.82  
(0.0220) 
5.14 
(0.0059) 
2.92  
(0.0538) 
0.50  
(0.6057) 
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6.4.4.4 The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades and 
Regulation Level 
Information asymmetry also varies across firms in differently regulated 
environments. In highly regulated environments, greater information released 
to the public reduces the information asymmetry between corporate insiders 
and outside investors (Knewtson, 2011). Hence, directors’ trades are more 
profitable in lightly regulated environments.  
Based on that, this section examines whether the informativeness of directors’ 
trades varies with sectors based on regulation level. Specifically, based on 
previous findings, we may expect directors’ trades in lowly regulated sectors to 
be more informed than directors’ trades in highly regulated sectors.  
Similar to Knewtson (2011), we adopted the same division to highly and 
lightly regulated sectors. High regulated sectors are defined as financials, 
consumer goods, utilities, and healthcare sectors, whereas other sectors are 
defined as low regulated industries.  
Similar to the multivariate analysis, we use the same regression where sector is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for financials, consumer goods, 
healthcare, and utilities sectors (highly regulated) and the value of 0 otherwise 
(lowly regulated).  
Table (6.15) shows the results of the multivariate regression for directors’ 
trades. Comparable to our previous results, purchases are significantly positive 
and sells are insignificant and negative nearly always across all sector groups. 
One clear pattern emerges from table (6.15) – informativeness across all event 
windows is the highest for low regulated sectors group.  
In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across sectors groups, we preformed the 
following test;  
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As can be seen from table (6.15), the null was rejected across all event 
windows. Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant for all buys in respective of sector regulation, they are also 
statistically different from each other. For example, a p-value of 0.000 for (0, 
1) event window confirms the latter. Therefore, the informativeness of 
directors’ trades in high regulated sectors is significantly different from those 
in low regulated sectors. Turning to directors’ sells, there is some evidence of 
statistically significantly negative CAARs for directors’ trades in low regulated 
sectors only for ten days event window. When testing whether the abnormal 
returns associated with sell transactions are significantly different across 
sectors groups, the null was rejected across all event windows (except for one 
day event window). Therefore, the informativeness of directors’ sells in high 
regulated sectors is significantly different from those in low regulated sectors 
 The results are consistent with Knewtson (2011) and Amir et al. (1999) who 
found that directors’ trades in lightly regulated industries are more profitable 
because less information is flowing to the markets.  
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Table 6.15: The Result of the Multivariate Regression by Sectors Categorised by Regulation Level 
Industry Event Windows N 
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10]  
  coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics   
High Regulated Sectors (Buy) 1.28% 3.92 1.83% 4.85 1.61% 3.89 1.42% 2.8 11036 
Low Regulated Sectors (Buy) 1.88% 5.82 2.50% 6.69 2.34% 5.71 1.83% 3.64 13764 
High Regulated Sectors (Sell) -0.19% -0.5 0.17% 0.37 -0.08% -0.15 -0.74% -1.22 2876 
Low Regulated Sectors (Sell) -0.69% -1.78 -0.45% -0.99 -0.82% -1.65 -1.35% -2.23 4040 
Market Value -0.33% -11.97 -0.40% -12.47 -0.41% -11.76 -0.42% -9.77   
Value 0.21% 8.2 0.22% 7.25 0.26% 7.7 0.31% 7.71   
Holding 0.07% 3.46 0.07% 2.8 0.08% 3.22 0.09% 2.84   
Heteroscedacity Test 23.14 (0.3356) 25.90 (0.2101) 35.67 (0.0238) 23.00 (0.3440)  
Normality Test 14.998 15.215 15.078 14.389  
Model Specification Test 0.48 (0.6945) 0.36 (0.7814) 2.23 (0.0823) 0.66 (0.5795)  
F-statistics (Buy) 45.21  
(0.00) 
46.30  
(0.00) 
54.07  
(0.00) 
34.98  
(0.00)  
  
F-statistics (Sell) 8.00 
(0.2297) 
9.02 
(0.0027) 
10.96 
(0.0009) 
4.90 
(0.0268) 
 
                              1.47  
(0.0220) 
3.20  
(0.0407) 
1.50  
(0.2242) 
0.36  
(0.7012) 
 
N presents the number of trades.   
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6.4.4.5 The Informativeness of Directors’ Trades and CEO 
Compensation  
Information asymmetry also varies across firms in differently CEO pay sectors. 
In highly CEO pay sectors, CEOs are forced to reveal more information to 
outsiders which in turn reduces the information asymmetry between corporate 
insiders and outside investors (Jo et al., 2011; and Jung and Subramanian, 
2013). Hence, directors’ trades are more profitable in lightly CEO pay sectors. 
Based on these previous points, this section examines whether the level of 
CEO pay has an impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. 
Specifically, based on our priors, we may expect directors’ trades in lowly 
CEO pay sectors to be more informed than directors’ trades in highly CEO pay 
sectors.  
To measure CEO pay, Gregg et al. (2005) suggested two measures of directors’ 
compensation which can be collected from DataStream: the first measure is the 
total remuneration of the whole board and the other is the pay of the highest 
paid director. Total board pay includes the total of directors fees, emoluments 
for management services and pensions or pension fund contributions paid to, or 
on behalf of directors (Gregg et al,. 2005). Similarly, we used total 
remuneration to differentiate industries with higher and lower CEO pays.  
Turning to our hypotheses, in this section we examine whether sectors 
measured by their CEO pay level have an impact upon the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. To examine this, we chose two categories: high CEO 
compensation sectors such as oil and gas, chemicals, insurance, healthcare, 
media, constructions and materials, food and beverage, retails, and 
telecommunications; and low CEO compensation sectors for the remaining 
industries. The basis of this division can be seen in table (6.16). Directors in 
media, basic resources, and bank sectors earn higher remunerations, whereas 
directors in travel and leisure, real estate, and technology sectors earn lower 
remunerations. This division, to a large extent, is similar to Gregg et al. (2005) 
division which classified UK industries according to total remuneration. High 
remunerations are in industries such as resources and financials, while low 
remunerations are in industries such as information technology and utility.  
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Table 6.16 : The Average Remuneration for Each Sector over the Sample 
Period 
Sector Total remuneration (£) 
Media 3.137 
Basic Resources 2.976 
Banks 2.862 
Oil and Gas 2.845 
Telecommunications 2.453 
Chemicals 2.391 
Food and Beverage 2.322 
Insurance 2.274 
Retail 2.179 
Construction and Materials 2.155 
Industrial Goods and Services 2.002 
Financial Services 1.991 
Automobiles and Parts 1.934 
Healthcare 1.905 
Utilities 1.886 
Personal and Household Goods 1.832 
Travel and Leisure 1.811 
Real Estate 1.783 
Technology 1.633 
 
Again, we use the same regression where sector is a dummy variable 
representing the two CEO pays categories (High CEO pay sectors and Low 
CEO pay sectors). Table (6.17) shows the results of the multivariate regression 
for directors’ trades. Similar to Univariate and multivariate analysis, purchases 
are significant and positive and sells are insignificant and negative across all 
sectors groups. One clear pattern emerges from table (6.17) – the 
informativeness of directors’ buy trades across all event windows for low CEO 
pay sectors group is the highest.  
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In order to formally test whether the abnormal returns associated with buy 
transactions are significantly different across sectors groups, we preformed the 
following test;  
 
                               
                               
 
As can be seen from table (6.17), the null was rejected across all event 
windows. Specifically, although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant across all industries, they are also statistically different from each 
other. For example, a p-value of 0.042 for (0, 1) event window confirms the 
latter. Thus, the informativeness of directors’ trades in high CEO pay sectors is 
significant and higher from those in low CEO pay sectors 
Turning to directors’ sells, there is no evidence of statistically significantly 
negative CAARs for directors’ trades in low and high CEO pay sectors.  
Table (5.A) shows the results of diagnostic regression for directors’ trades.  
The coefficients remained the same, but the standard errors were robusted. 
However, the results, in general, did not change. Hence, the informativeness of 
directors’ trades in high CEO pay sectors is significant and higher from those 
in low CEO pay sectors. 
Roulstone (2003) and Zhang et al. (2005) documented an increased (decreased) 
level of insider trading associated with decreased (increased) pay-performance 
sensitivity. We expanded the scope of these studies by examining the 
informativeness of directors’ trades in different CEO Pay environments. Our 
results suggested that the informativeness of directors’ trades is highest for low 
CEO compensation sectors. 
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Table 6.17: The Result of the Multivariate Regression for Directors’ Trades by Sector Categorised by CEO Pay  
Industry Event Windows  
 [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] N 
  coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics coefficients T-statistics   
High CEO compensation sectors (Buy) 1.32% 4.11 1.89% 5.07 1.66% 4.07 1.32% 2.64 10279 
Low CEO compensation sectors (Buy) 2.09% 6.35 2.78% 7.31 2.61% 6.26 2.06% 4.03 1452 
High CEO compensation sectors (Sell) -0.48% -1.26 -0.14% -0.32 -0.46% -0.95 -1.11% -1.86 2731 
Low CEO compensation sectors (Sell) -0.74% -1.79 -0.53% -1.11 -0.93% -1.78 -1.52% -2.39 4185 
Market Value -0.31% -11.64 -0.38% -12.22 -0.39% -11.45 -0.40% -9.42   
Trade Value 0.22% 8.67 0.23% 7.62 0.27% 8.13 0.33% 8.15   
Holding 0.00% -0.18 0.00% 0.53 0.00% 0.47 0.00% -0.77   
Heteroscedacity Test 32.74 (0.0019) 28.57 (0.007) 34.16 (0.0011) 42.77 (0.00)  
Normality Test 23.345 23.320 23.413 23.519  
Model Specification Test 1.21 (0.3042) 0.42 (0.7382) 1.15 (0.3283) 5.34 (0.0011)  
F-statistics (Buy) 71.08 
(0.000) 
 
60.89 
(0.000) 
 
65.66 
(0.000) 
  
36.83 
(0.000) 
 
  
F-statistics (Sell) 1.65 
(0.1991) 
2.73 
(0.0984) 
3.39 
(0.0655) 
1.79 
(0.1815) 
 
                           3.82 
(0.0220) 
5.14 
(0.0059) 
2.92 
(0.0538) 
0.50 
(0.6057) 
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6.5 Conclusions  
The previous empirical literature in the general area of information contents of 
directors’ trades has found that the informativeness of directors’ trades depends 
on firm, trade, and director characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, an 
empirical investigation of the effect of industry classification on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades has yet to be examined. 
There are many reasons why the informativeness of directors’ trades may vary 
across industries. These are related to information asymmetry differences 
across industries. Many measures of information asymmetry such as Research 
and Development Expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 2000), industry regulation 
(Knewtson, 2011), industry concentration (Gugler, 2001; Blair, 1995; Chu and 
song, 2011), and directors pay (Jung, 2013) have been shown to vary across 
industries. This variation may enable directors in certain industries to exploit 
information, trade on the basis of this information and this should manifest 
itself in higher abnormal returns (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  
Using a dataset of 2,830 UK companies over the period January 2002 to 
December 2010 resulting in 34,090 events, we carried out a series of 
Univariate and multivariate tests to determine the impact of industry/sector on 
the informativeness of directors’ trades and to investigate whether information 
asymmetry level impacts this informativeness. Our results indicated the 
following: the informativeness is significant and positive across all 
industries/sectors for buy transactions. The following pattern is also noticed: 
across all windows, abnormal returns for directors of technology industries are 
the highest. Turning to the sell transactions, the first thing we noticed is that 
there is some evidence of statistically significantly negative CAARs for 
directors of certain industries. 
Consistent to our priors, market value is significantly negative i.e. transactions 
in smaller firms are more informative. Also, the size of the trade has an impact 
(large trade values are more informative than small trade values). Besides, 
holding percentage is significantly positive. This suggests the larger the 
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number of shares traded as a percentage of holdings, the higher the abnormal 
return. The results again show that the level of information asymmetry has an 
impact on the informativeness of directors’ trades. More specifically, insider 
gains in high R&D, high volatility, and low regulated, highly concentrated, and 
low CEO compensation industries/sectors are higher than insider gains in low 
R&D, low volatility, highly regulation, lightly concentrated, and high CEO 
compensation industries. Thus, directors’ trades in high R&D, high volatility, 
lightly regulated, highly concentrated and low CEO compensation 
industries/sectors might be more informative than directors’ trades in low 
R&D, low volatility, highly regulation, lightly concentrated, and high CEO 
compensation industries. 
Previous literature suggests that information asymmetry varies across 
industries based on R&D expenditure level, volatility level, competition level, 
regulation level, and CEO pay level. These studies brought many reasons to 
this variation which explained in details in chapter six. Our results add to the 
previous literature by identifying that the level of information asymmetry, as 
measured by R&D expenditure level, volatility level, competition level, 
regulation level, and CEO pay level, has an impact on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. Moreover, insider gains are highest for high R&D, high 
volatility, low regulated, highly concentrated, and low CEO compensation 
industries/sectors. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
The key objective of this research was to examine various issues relating to 
insiders’ trades, particularly, the general patterns and characteristics of 
directors’ trades, the seasonality patterns of aggregate directors’ trades, the 
impact that director’s age has on trade informativeness, and the effect of 
industry classification on the information content of directors’ trades. To the 
best of our knowledge, no empirical examination of the last two issues has yet 
to be examined.  
chapter two reviewed the relevant literature of insider trading activities and 
analyzed the increasing body of the literature considering the information 
content of insider trading, the timing behavior of insiders’ activities, and other 
issues in order to provide readers, researchers, and newcomers with an insight 
into how these concepts have been researched, been developed, and been 
linked over time. Previous studies showed that insider trading activities might 
reduce agency costs and increase firm value. Trades by insiders are used as 
signals to contradict or confirm the information released to public. Thus, 
outsiders view these signals and act accordingly. Also, the previous empirical 
literature in the general area of information contents of directors’ trades found 
that the informativeness of directors’ trades depends on firm, trade, and 
director characteristics. More specifically, buy trades are more informative 
than sell trades (Seyhun, 1988b; King and Roll, 1988; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; 
Gregory et al., 2009), medium-size trades are more informative than other-size 
trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001; Abad and Pascual, 
2010), insiders in small firms (with high price to earnings ratio) are more 
informative than insiders in large firms (with low price to earnings ratio) 
[Williams, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Pope et al., 1990; Ajlouni and 
Toms, 2008], trades by executive directors are more informative than trades by 
other types of directors (Seyhun, 1988b; Jenter, 2005; Knewtson, 2011), female 
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executive directors are more informative than male executive directors 
(Gregory et al., 2012) and trades conducted by CEOs are more informative 
than trades conducted by CFOs (Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz, 2012). Besides, 
the previous empirical literature in the timing behavior of insider trading found 
that directors who trade prior to the disclosure of price sensitive news inform 
the market of mispricing, and as such the market will react correspondingly. In 
examine different hypothesis regarding insider trading activities, previous 
studies employed different methodological approaches. For example, event 
study methodology based on Market Model or Capital Asset Pricing Model 
was used to calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns in order to 
examine the informativeness of directors’ trades (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Ajlouni 
and Toms, 2008). Finally, other insider trading studies examined; whether high 
returns in January and April can be explained by insider trading activities 
(Seyhun, 1992b; Hillier and Marshall, 2002a); whether insiders use private 
information when they exercise options (Carpenter and Rimerez, 2001; 
Kyriacou and Mase, 2003); whether insiders trade on the basis of contrarian 
beliefs or superior information (Jiang and Zaman, 2010); the relationship 
between insider trading and stock price crashes (Marin and Olivier, 2008); or 
whether the changes in R&D productivity can be explained by insider trading 
patterns within the firm (Rong, 2013).  
Chapter Three described the dataset used in this thesis to analyze the 
information content of director trading and to familiarize the reader with some 
important characteristics of insider trading activities. Focusing only on 
ordinary buy and sale transactions of directors between the period 1991 and 
2010, the following patterns were observed: 
1) Directors buy more frequently than they sell but the average 
value of individual sell trades are approximately seven times 
larger, which suggests that directors sell less frequently but in 
larger monetary amounts (a similar argument was made for 
volume). Also, the total value of shares sold peaked in 2007. 
This is perhaps due to the financial crisis which occurred 
during that year. Interestingly, the value of shares sold was 
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similar in 2006, perhaps indicating that directors, collectively, 
were anticipating the crisis. 
2) The majority of buys and sales transactions occurred for 
directors between the age 45 and 65. Buys and sales under the 
age of 40 and over the age of 70 are less frequent compared to 
buys and sales of other age groups. Directors engage in buy 
transactions most frequently between the age 55 and 59 but sell 
more often between 50 and 54. The average value of directors’ 
buy transactions (and sell transactions) is highest above the age 
of 65. This may be driven by a greater requirement for liquidity 
after 65 (sales) and an increased desire for the income from 
investments (i.e. Dividends) at retirement age (hence greater 
value buys).  
3)  When categorising transactions by volume of trades, it is found 
that small transactions (less than 10,000 shares) tend to be 
purchases while large transactions tend to be sells.  
4)  The majority of the trades were by former directors51 (for both 
transaction types) followed by executive and non- executive 
directors. This pattern is repeated for buy transactions but not 
for sales. For buy transactions, the average amount per trade of 
executive and PDMR directors dominate those of former and 
non-executive directors (about three times larger). For sell 
transactions, the average money spent per trade by executive 
directors is approximately six times than that of PDMRs.  
5)  Directors trade in most in Financial industries and least in 
Utilities industries. Also, directors trade in most in Industrial 
Goods and Services sectors and least in Utilities sectors. 
As well as these general findings, a few unexplained patterns have identified: 
I. There are five times as many non-executive buys as there are sales, 
whereas for PDMRs, they are slightly equal.  
                                                          
51 Fidrmuc, et al. (2006) suggested that former directors still possess superior information and 
can trade more freely on that information. On the other hand, when former directors sell shares, 
the market may not react because of the belief that they sell for diversification needs and not 
because of negative insider information 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
224 
II. The total value of shares sold reached its maximum in 2007.  
We suggest these unexplained patterns as an avenue for further research in this 
area.  
One aim of Chapter Four was to test for seasonal patterns in aggregate insider 
trading transactions. Specifically, do insiders prefer to trade on any particular 
day of the week or month of the year? A second aim of Chapter Four, given 
that such seasonal patterns exist, was to attempt to relate these patterns to 
explanations drawn from the literature on calendar anomalies in returns (and 
volumes). Our results find the following: There is a day of the week anomaly 
in aggregate insider activities (as measured by number and value of insider 
transactions). Specifically, relative to other days, insiders tend to trade more on 
Fridays and less on Tuesdays. Also, the distribution of the average value of 
directors’ trades (buys and sells) across the week days forms a U shape i.e. 
high trading value on the beginning of the week (Monday) and the end of the 
week (Friday). The aggregate value of director transactions, which is higher on 
Friday and lower on Tuesday, is consistent with the previous studies such as 
Agrawal and Tandon (1994) and Balaban (1995, 1996) which reported positive 
returns on Friday and negative returns on Tuesdays. Previous studies on trading 
volume anomalies have found that informed investors tend to trade more on 
Mondays because private information is available all days of the week 
including weekends, whereas other studies indicates Tuesday effect in trading 
volume in other markets rather than US and reasoned that as a reflection of 
trades by informed investors on Monday. On the other side, studies by 
lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and Chan et 
al., (2004) suggest that individual investors sell more (buy less) on Monday 
because they have more time to think about their decisions during the 
weekends. Our results find Friday and Tuesday effects in average number of 
directors’ trades which reflects the desire for insiders to trade more on Friday 
and less on Tuesday. One possible explanation, based on the previous studies, 
is that insiders act like institutional investors who trade less on Tuesday as a 
reflection of insiders’ trades on Monday in US. Also, bearing in mind that the 
aim of the previous studies in trading volume anomalies is to explain the 
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calendar anomalies in stock returns, our results were consistent with studies on 
stock returns anomalies that show high returns on Friday and lower returns on 
Tuesdays. Therefore, these results might explain the seasonal pattern in stock 
returns. Also, the U shape pattern (in average value of directors’ trades) 
observed when running OLS (excluding trades over £15 million) and TOBIT 
model can be attributed to price changes from larger(smaller) trades which are 
higher (lower) at the beginning and end of the day. This is attributed to smaller 
trades will move prices during periods of low volume because informed traders 
do not want to reveal their information to the market. When volume is low, 
informed traders are able to increase their trade sizes because high volume 
hides their information (Blau et al., 2012). 
 
Also, there is a month of the year anomaly in aggregate insider activities (as 
measured by the number of insider transactions). Insiders tend to trade most 
frequently in March and least in August. The results of OLS Regression Model 
indicate that there is no monthly anomaly in aggregate insider selling activities 
as measured by the aggregate value of insider transactions. The results of 
TOBIT Regression Model show that the average value of directors’ selling 
activities in March is higher and significantly different relative to other months 
of the year. The results of OLS regression are also confirmed by the results of 
K-W statistic test which supported the non existence of monthly anomaly in 
aggregate director trading (measured by the value of director transactions). 
Unlike the previous findings, there seems to be a day of the week effect in 
director aggregate value of buy trades which might happen normally when 
OLS regression model assumptions are not met completely.  
Also, In UK, April is the month of taxation. According to the tax-loss 
hypothesis, investors sell more in the month before the taxation and buy more 
after taxation. Therefore, our results, which showed that the average number of 
directors’ trades in March is higher than the average number of trades in other 
months of the year, might due to directors selling more to avoid taxes. Another 
explanation why April and March aggregate number of sell trades are higher 
than those of other month is related to capital gains taxation. Accordingly, it is 
also possible, for investors, to delay capital gains realization so that they can 
delay tax payment on capital gains. By doing so, investors might postpone tax 
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payment by one year. Thus, investors will sell winners (shares) in April. 
Hence, more sell pressure will occur in April.  
Although the purpose of chapter Four is purely to identify whether such 
anomalies exist (day of the week and month of the year), we do not attempt to 
explain why they do. We suggest these unexplained patterns as an avenue for 
further research in this area.  
 
Both chapters three and four used a dataset of more than 5,000 UK companies, 
over the period January 1991 to December 2010, resulting in 91,970 
transactions of which 69,967 were buy trades and 22,003 were sales. The total 
monetary value of all trades over this period was £28.9 billion. 
Chapter Five examined whether directors age has an impact on the 
informativeness of their trades. The literature which has examined the effect of 
directors on the informativeness of their trades, to the best of our knowledge 
the impact of director age has yet to be examined. Using a dataset of 2,300 UK 
companies over the period January 2002 to December 2010 resulting in 25,096 
events, we carry out a series of Univariate and multivariate tests to determine 
the impact of age. Our results find the following: 
1) Although abnormal returns are positive and statistically 
significant across all age groups, they are also statistically 
different from each other. However, as measured by the 
size of the buy coefficients, we find that younger 
directors’ buy transactions produce significantly higher 
abnormal returns than older directors.The following 
pattern is also noticed; across all windows, as witnessed 
by the size of the coefficient, abnormal returns are highest 
for the younger age group (under 40). Thereafter, they 
decline until the 60 to 65 age group and then begin to 
level off.  
2) For sell transactions, there is some evidence of 
statistically negative CAARs for younger directors. For 
example, across all event windows the 40 to 44 age group 
has statistically negative abnormal returns. This pattern is 
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again repeated for longer event window for the 45 to 49 
age group. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that 
sell transactions may be informative across certain age 
groups.  
3) When controlling for director type, the same pattern 
found in Univariate and multivariate analysis for buy 
trades is also identified for Executives’ and Formers’ buy 
transactions. Hence, younger executives (formers) are 
more informed about their buy trades than executives 
(formers) of other age groups. Unlike the previous 
pattern, older non-executives (over 70) seem to be more 
informed about their buy trades than younger non-
executives. Regardless the type of director, sells produces 
insignificantly negative CAARs.  
These results were in line with the previous literature of age impact on 
cognitive and physical abilities. For example, Baltes and Lindenberger (1997), 
and Fair (2007) showed a linear percent decline in Man (Woman) cognitive 
and physical abilities between the age of 35 and about age 70 (in our study 
between ages 40 and 65). After the age of 70, the role of experience, education, 
wealth, and income may lower the effects of cognitive abilities leading 
investors to make better financial decisions (King and Leape, 1987; 
Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; and Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). This might 
explain the pattern found in Univariate and multivariate analyses for buy trades 
when examining the informativeness of directors’ trades. Our results are also 
consistent with Kyriacou and Mase (2003), who suggested that the signals 
generated from executive stock option exercises by younger executives are 
consistently more informative than those generated from the corresponding 
exercises by older executives. The results for non-executive directors’ trades 
are also consistent with studies by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Van Rooij, et 
al. (2007), and Korniotis and Kumar (2011) which found that investors with 
more experience and more financial knowledge are better decision makers. 
Therefore, this might indicate that the market reacts more strongly to buy 
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transactions of the over-70 non-executives presumably because they believe 
experience and expertise are likely to be increased with age.  
Although we have identified age of director as an important determinant of the 
informativeness of directors’ trades we remain agnostic as to why the pattern 
identified exists. We suggest these unexplained patterns as an avenue for 
further research in this area.  
 
Many measures of information asymmetry such as Research and Development 
expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 2000), industry regulation (Knewtson, 2011), 
industry concentration (Gugler, 2001; Blair, 1995; Chu and song, 2011), and 
directors pay (Jung, 2013) have been shown to vary across industries. This 
variation may enable directors in certain industries to exploit information, trade 
on the basis of this information and this should manifest itself in higher 
abnormal returns. Therefore, chapter six further explored whether the 
informativeness of UK directors’ trades varies among different industries and 
whether the level of information asymmetry in an industry influences the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. The following results were observed: 
1) The informativeness is significant and positive across all 
industries/sectors for buy transactions. Also, across all windows, 
abnormal returns are highest for directors of technology 
industries.  
2) Turning to the sell transactions, there is some evidence of 
statistically significantly negative CAARs for directors of 
certain industries. 
3) The level of information asymmetry has an impact on the 
informativeness of directors’ trades. Specifically, insider gains 
are highest for high R&D, high volatility, low regulated, highly 
concentrated, and low CEO compensation industries/sectors. 
 
Previous literature suggests that information asymmetry varies across 
industries based on R&D expenditure level, volatility level, competition level, 
regulation level, and CEO pay level. These studies brought many reasons to 
this variation which explained in details in chapter six. Our results add to the 
previous literature by identifying that the level of information asymmetry, as 
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measured by R&D expenditure level, volatility level, competition level, 
regulation level, and CEO pay level, has an impact on the informativeness of 
directors’ trades. Moreover, insider gains are highest for high R&D, high 
volatility, low regulated, highly concentrated, and low CEO compensation 
industries/sectors. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1.A: The Result of Diagnostic Regression for Directors’ Buys (Industries) 
Industry  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 coefficients Robust 
Std Error 
T coefficients Robust 
Std Error 
T coefficients Robust 
Std Error 
T coefficients Robust 
Std Error 
T 
Basic Materials 1.16% 0.005133 2.26 1.42% 0.0071 2 1.50% 0.007426 2.02 0.56% 0.002617 2.14 
Consumer Goods 1.40% 0.006542 2.14 1.92% 0.007805 2.46 1.97% 0.006633 2.97 0.88% 0.001413 6.23 
Consumer Services 1.30% 0.005285 2.46 1.85% 0.007806 2.37 1.99% 0.006219 3.2 1.67% 0.005 3.34 
Financials 0.81% 0.003418 2.37 1.24% 0.00496 2.5 1.41% 0.005261 2.68 0.83% 0.002345 3.54 
Healthcare 2.17% 0.01014 2.14 2.68% 0.012127 2.21 2.63% 0.011955 2.2 2.05% 0.006699 3.06 
Industrials 1.77% 0.008762 2.02 2.34% 0.010174 2.3 2.51% 0.009401 2.67 1.94% 0.006713 2.89 
Oil and Gas 1.54% 0.00744 2.07 1.90% 0.00751 2.53 2.13% 0.006265 3.4 0.75% 0.002492 3.01 
Technology 2.48% 0.012525 1.98 3.19% 0.013632 2.34 3.55% 0.0142 2.5 3.19% 0.010528 3.03 
Telecommunications 2.23% 0.010619 2.1 2.40% 0.009836 2.44 2.32% 0.007682 3.02 2.51% 0.007515 3.34 
Utilities 0.26% -0.00813 -0.32 1.19% 0.079333 0.15 1.18% -0.10727 -0.11 0.61% -0.02033 -0.3 
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Table 2.A: The Result of Diagnostic Regression for Directors’ Buys (Sectors) 
Industry  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T 
Banks 0.61% 0.008971 0.68 0.86% 0.005181 1.66 0.80% 0.013115 0.61 0.72% 0.005106 1.41 
Basic Resources 1.45% 0.007214 2.01 1.71% 0.009716 1.76 1.29% 0.007167 1.8 0.61% 0.003297 1.85 
Chemicals 1.19% 0.002576 4.62 1.75% 0.004258 4.11 1.42% 0.004451 3.19 1.78% 0.005669 3.14 
Construction and Materials 1.84% 0.00844 2.18 2.63% 0.011435 2.3 2.51% 0.012613 1.99 2.40% 0.009717 2.47 
Financial Services 0.68% 0.003178 2.14 1.09% 0.004486 2.43 0.94% 0.003443 2.73 0.70% 0.001763 3.97 
Food and Beverage 1.24% 0.003701 3.35 1.75% 0.005368 3.26 1.58% 0.004788 3.3 0.80% 0.002768 2.89 
Healthcare 2.17% 0.01014 2.14 2.68% 0.012018 2.23 2.63% 0.011955 2.2 2.05% 0.006699 3.06 
Industrial Goods and Services 2.00% 0.01 2 2.59% 0.011164 2.32 2.53% 0.009134 2.77 2.27% 0.007747 2.93 
Insurance 1.77% 0.003057 5.79 2.39% 0.006373 3.75 2.39% 0.005371 4.45 2.31% 0.004695 4.92 
Media 1.77% 0.008082 2.19 2.43% 0.011739 2.07 2.35% 0.008484 2.77 2.13% 0.007634 2.79 
Oil and Gas 1.54% 0.00744 2.07 1.90% 0.00728 2.61 2.13% 0.006283 3.39 0.75% 0.002492 3.01 
Personal and Household Goods 1.63% 0.008109 2.01 2.16% 0.008438 2.56 1.81% 0.005231 3.46 1.25% 0.001911 6.54 
Real Estate 0.85% 0.003602 2.36 1.28% 0.005378 2.38 1.09% 0.004977 2.19 0.72% 0.002846 2.53 
Retail 1.78% 0.006593 2.7 2.15% 0.007544 2.85 2.07% 0.005405 3.83 2.12% 0.004117 5.15 
Technology 2.48% 0.012525 1.98 3.19% 0.013517 2.36 3.55% 0.014087 2.52 3.19% 0.010459 3.05 
Telecommunications 2.23% 0.010619 2.1 2.40% 0.009639 2.49 2.32% 0.007682 3.02 2.51% 0.007515 3.34 
Travel and Leisure 1.05% 0.003261 3.22 1.61% 0.005279 3.05 1.43% 0.003961 3.61 1.39% 0.004112 3.38 
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Table 3.A: The Result of Diagnostic Regression by Sectors Categorised by Volatility Level 
Industry  [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 coefficients Robust Std Error T coefficients Robust Std Error T coefficients Robust Std Error T coefficients Robust Std Error T 
High Volatility sectors (Buy) 0.0198 0.006972 2.84 0.0263 0.007013 3.75 0.0251 0.0047 5.34 0.0204 0.007183 2.84 
Low Volatility sectors (Buy) 0.0118 0.004126 2.86 0.0172 0.004831 3.56 0.0144 0.002571 5.6 0.0115 0.003305 3.48 
High Volatility sectors (Sell) -0.0057 0.001014 -5.62 -0.0028 0.000517 -5.42 -0.0063 0.001173 -5.37 -0.0117 0.002955 -3.96 
Low Volatility sectors (Sell) -0.0027 0.001031 -2.62 0.0004 -0.00011 -3.79 -0.0024 0.000825 -2.91 -0.0097 0.004554 -2.13 
 
 
Table 4.A: The Result of Diagnostic Regression by Sectors Categorised by Concentration Level 
Industry [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T 
Low Concentrated Industries (Buy) 1.06% 0.005354 1.98 1.59% 0.007227 2.2 1.32% 0.005176 2.55 1.04% 0.003467 3 
High Concentrated Industries (Buy) 1.87% 0.009034 2.07 2.53% 0.011145 2.27 2.36% 0.009958 2.37 1.88% 0.006912 2.72 
Low Concentrated Industries (Sell) -0.36% 0.000662 -5.44 -0.03% 5.87E-05 -5.11 -0.32% 0.000552 -5.8 -1.05% 0.001262 -8.32 
High Concentrated Industries (Sell) -0.97% 0.00344 -2.82 -0.71% 0.002483 -2.86 -1.13% 0.004593 -2.46 -1.62% 0.012366 -1.31 
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Table 5.A: The Result of Diagnostic Regression by Sectors Categorised by CEO Pays Level 
Industry [0, 1] [0, 3] [0, 5] [0, 10] 
 coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T coefficients Robust Std 
Error 
T 
High CEO compensation sectors (Buy) 1.32% 0.006439 2.05 1.89% 0.007875 2.4 1.66% 0.006288 2.64 1.32% 0.00394 3.35 
Low CEO compensation sectors (Buy) 2.09% 0.009248 2.26 2.78% 0.01144 2.43 2.61% 0.009031 2.89 2.06% 0.007055 2.92 
High CEO compensation sectors (Sell) -0.48% 0.001345 -3.57 -0.14% 0.000292 -4.8 -0.46% 0.001045 -4.4 -1.11% 0.003437 -3.23 
Low CEO compensation sectors (Sell) -0.74% 0.001326 -5.58 -0.53% 0.002137 -2.48 -0.93% 0.004745 -1.96 -1.52% 0.005188 -2.93 
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